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Glossary of key terms 
 
Term Definition 
Altruism 
Behavior that is costly to oneself and beneficial to another person. 
The term was coined by French philosopher Auguste Comte 
(1798-1857) as antonym of egoism.  
Ambiguity 
State in which probabilities and/or payoffs associated with 
outcomes are unknown. Also referred to as “Knightean 
uncertainty” after economist Frank Knight (1885-1972). 
Contrasted with risk, in which probabilities and payoffs are 
precisely defined. 
Bounded 
rationality 
The notion that bounds to cognitive capacities, decision time and 
the tractability of the problem lead to limited rationality 
Cognitive 
bias 
Systematic deviation of rationality in cognition and subsequent 
decision making (for definition of rationality see below) 
Complex 
choice 
Choice between multiple options which in turn each consist of 
multiple attributes 
Cooperation 
Process whereby multiple being work together for mutual benefit. 
Typically contrasted with competition. 
Cultural 
evolution 
Development of culture and its constituent behaviors and norms 
through the process of natural selection  
Evolution 
Change in characteristics of populations over successive 
generations 
Field 
experiment 
Application of the experimental method to test theories outside of 
the laboratory in a “natural” context that more closely resembles 
the context in which the phenomenon on interest occurs 
 
x 
 
 
Free will belief 
Degree to which people believe they have free will. Does not 
specify what is meant by free will. 
Genotype The genetic constitution of an organism 
Indirect altruism 
Altruistic behavior which is reciprocated  by others later in 
time, often through the mechanism of reputation 
Kin altruism 
Altruistic behavior directed to genetically related others, for 
example offspring 
Multi-level 
selection 
Proposed mechanism of evolution whereby selection pressure 
on the level of both genes, organism and group  
Natural selection 
Key mechanisms driving evolution through differential 
survival and reproduction of genes, organisms and groups 
through differences in phenotype 
Other-decision Choice made on behalf of another person 
Phenotype 
Observable characteristics, behaviors and behavioral products 
of an organism 
Proportion 
dominance 
Tendency to place more decision weight on relative values 
than absolute values 
Rationality 
The state of being rational: making judgments and decisions 
that are logically consistent with one’s beliefs and preferences 
Reciprocal 
altruism 
Altruistic behavior implemented with the expectation that the 
beneficiary will later act similarly  
Self-serving bias 
The tendency to interpret information in a way that 
contributes to an overly positive self-image 
Social 
preferences 
Preferences related to the wellbeing or payoffs of others, also 
referred to as “other-regarding preferences” 
Social norms Informal rules governing the behavior of members of a group 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
What drives us to help complete strangers? How do cognitive biases shape our 
prosociality? And what can policymakers and organizations do to promote smart 
and social decisions? This dissertation presents a series of experiments that aim to 
provide new insights related to these questions. Chapter 1 sketches how these 
experiments fit into the existing body of research. Chapter 2 presents a field 
experiment about the effect of an ethics program on bank employee behavior 
towards clients.  Chapter 3 presents an online experiment about the role of 
expertise in susceptibility to cognitive biases in the allocation charitable funds. 
Chapter 4 presents a lab experiment about the influence of beliefs about free will 
on donation behavior. Chapter 5 presents a lab-in-the-field experiment about 
attitudes towards ambiguity in decisions made on behalf of others. Chapter 6 
presents a lab experiment about the effect of choice architecture on decision 
quality in complex choices.  Finally, chapter 7 concludes. 
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The puzzle of human social behavior 
Humans can be very selfish, and very selfless. Consider for example the case of 
the Indian librarian Paalam Kalyanasundaram who, for a period of 30 years, 
donated all his salary to the poor (Pareek, 2014). At the same, there are people 
such as Bernard Madoff, whose firm, according to prosecutors, engaged in fraud 
amounting to nearly $65 billion, including fraud with funds from charitable 
organizations (Arvedlund, 2009). These anecdotes suggest that people differ 
strongly in what economist call “social preferences”, the propensity to cooperate 
and help others. Whereas economic theory traditionally assumed that humans are 
narrowly self-interested, it is now widely accepted that this assumption is often 
violated (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Gintis et al., 2003; 
Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Thaler, 2015a; Bowles, 2016).   Similarly, the 
assumption that people pursue their goals in a rational manner is often violated 
because of deeply rooted cognitive biases and limits to human cognitive 
capacities, so-called bounded rationality (Simon, 1982; Gigerenzer and Selten, 
2002; Kahneman, 2003a). 
 This thesis revolves around these two central topics in the field of 
behavioral economics; (i) social preferences and (ii) bounded rationality and 
cognitive biases. It also considers their interplay. Cognitive bias and bounded 
rationality can result in people making sub-optimal choices for themselves, for 
example when gamblers think they are more likely to beat the casino after a streak 
of losses (Croson and Sundali, 2005). However, biases and bound rationality can 
also stand in the way of people’s helping of others. Consider someone who wants 
to donate money to charity to help people in developing countries.  Due to the 
inclination to focus more on proportions than absolute quantities, people often 
focus more on overhead cost ratios than on the absolute number of people that are 
helped. Because of this “overhead aversion”, charitable donations are often not 
allocated in a manner that achieves the most good (Gneezy et al., 2014). 
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 Social preferences and bounded rationality play a role in many economic 
phenomena, ranging from charitable donations to bank fraud.  Before presenting 
the chapters of the thesis, I now sketch the literature on these topics, spanning 
from philosophy and early economics to biology and psychology and ultimately 
back to the field of behavioral economics. 
 
Social nature in philosophy and economics 
For many centuries philosophers have been fascinated by the topic of the social 
nature of mankind. For example, Aristotle (384–322 BC) wrote in his “Rhetoric” 
that “Most man are rather bad than good and the slaves of gain…as a rule men do 
wrong whenever they can”. 
 In contrast, Aristotle’s contemporaries in China such as the Confucian 
philosopher Mencius (372 – 289 BC) posited that humans are good natured but 
require society to cultivate their innate goodness: “If you let people follow their 
feelings, they will be able to do good. This is what is meant by saying that human 
nature is good”  
Similarly, thinkers in the emerging field of political economy in the 17th 
and 18th century held widely differing views about human social nature and its role 
in society. For example, Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733) wrote in his “Fable of 
the Bees” that virtue or altruism was not needed for a functioning society but 
rather that: “…The great Taskmasters Necessity, Avarice, Envy and Ambition… 
keep the Members of the Society to their labour, and make them submit, most them 
cheerfully, to the Drudgery of their Station, Kings and Princes not excepted” 
(Mandeville, 1714). 
In contrast, Adam Smith (1723-1790) noted in his “Theory of Moral 
Sentiments” that humans have a sympathetic nature and derive pleasure from the 
fortune of their fellow men, and share the sorrows of their misery: “How selfish 
soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, 
4 
 
which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary 
to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it.”1 
However, whilst recognizing the social nature of humans, Adam Smith also 
posited in this same book that humans are by nature primarily focused on 
satisfying their personal desires: “Nature has directed us to the greater part of 
these by original and immediate instincts. Hunger, thirst, the passion which unites 
the two sexes, and the dread of pain, prompt us to apply those means for their own 
sakes, and without any consideration of their tendency to those beneficent ends 
which the great Director of nature intended to produce by them” (Smith, 1759). 
Smith’s contemporary David Hume (1711-1776) wrote in his “Essays: 
Moral, Political and Literary” that policymakers should assume that humans only 
care about their own personal interest: “In contriving any system of government, 
and fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution, every man ought to 
be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private 
interest” (Hume, 1758). 
For many years, philosophers and early political economists continued to 
disagree about the nature of human sociality. Then, in 1859 Charles Darwin 
published “The Origin of Species”. This book presented a ground-breaking theory 
of evolution through natural selection, which strongly challenged the prevailing 
view of humans as being “intelligently designed” and fundamentally distinct from 
all other species. Furthermore, Darwin’s theory provided a framework by which to 
explain the social nature of animals and humans alike. 
 
                                                     
1 Smith further wrote: “…Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion we feel for the misery of 
others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive 
sorrow from the sorrows of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove 
it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to 
the virtuous or the humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The 
greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it.” 
5 
 
The evolution of human sociality  
Approximately half a century after Hume and Smith published their seminal 
theories on human nature and sentiments, the political economist and demographer 
Thomas Robert Malthus published the book “An Essay on the Principle of 
Population” in which he observed that given the human tendency to reproduce, the 
limited availability of resources will result in famine and starvation, unless births 
are controlled: "…Yet in all societies, even those that are most vicious, the 
tendency to a virtuous attachment is so strong, that there is a constant effort 
towards an increase of population. This constant effort as constantly tends to 
subject the lower classes of the society to distress and to prevent any great 
permanent amelioration of their condition" (Malthus, 1798).  
It was Malthus’ theory on the relation between resource availability, 
population dynamics and the consequent “struggle for survival” that inspired 
Charles Darwin to formulate his theory of evolution through natural selection.  
Darwin’s key insight was that the struggle for survival would drive nature to select 
certain organisms with traits adaptive to this competitive environment to be more 
successful in reproducing, hence driving this variant of the organism to be more 
numerous in subsequent generations (Darwin, 1859). Although at the time Darwin 
was still unsure about the mechanisms by which such variation arises and 
transmits, which only became clear with the discovery of the structure of DNA in 
the 1950’s (Watson and Crick, 1953).  
This so-called “modern synthesis” of evolutionary theory and genetics 
proved fruitful not only for understanding the origins of species, but also to 
understand the origins of social behavior. Firstly, from an evolutionary standpoint 
it can make good sense for an organism to be altruistic towards other organisms 
that are genetically related. When the British geneticist David Haldane was asked 
whether he would give his life to save his drowning brother he famously replied 
“no, but I would to save two brothers or eight cousins”. The rationale here is that 
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siblings typically share half of their genes, and cousins one eighth, so that by 
saving two brothers you save – statistically speaking – the same number of genes 
that you would if you would preserve yourself. This type of altruism is referred to 
as kin selection and is described by Hamilton’s rule “r>c/b” which states that acts 
of kin altruism will occur if the degree of relatedness between the altruist and the 
recipient exceed the cost/benefit ratio of this act (Hamilton, 1964).   
Aside from kin altruism, humans also provide costly help to non-relatives. 
Robert Trivers proposed that for repeated interactions, it can be advantageous to 
both parties to behave in a mutually altruistic manner, whereby the roles of altruist 
and recipient are rotated over time, such that both parties benefit compared to 
selfish or non-cooperative strategies which have higher short-term payoffs, but 
will undermine cooperation in the future (Trivers, 1971).  
And even in non-repeated interactions between non-related parties 
altruism may be observed. One proposed explanation for such behaviors is through 
reputation building.  If others know that you were helping someone, they will in 
turn be more likely to help you in the future (Alexander, 1987; Nowak and 
Sigmund, 2005).  It has been proposed that the evolution of indirect reciprocity 
was intertwined with the development of cognitive capacities to keep track of 
other people’s behavior and make moral judgments as well as the development of 
strategies to deceive others about one’s reputation, so-called “second-order free-
riding” (Fowler, 2005). Various examples of indirect reciprocity have been 
demonstrated, for example in the domain of charitable donations, where subjects 
preferentially supported others that had donated to a charity (Milinski et al., 2002). 
However, not all behaviors  can be explained with the theories of kin-, 
reciprocal- altruism and indirect altruism. Consider for example a soldier that 
gives his life to defend his country from invaders. It is argued that this tendency to 
help group members but behave aggressively towards outsiders, so-called 
“parochial altruism”, evolved as a strategy in an environment where violent 
between-group conflicts were common (Choi and Bowles, 2007). Even though 
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human societies have grown much larger and more complex since humanity 
migrated out of Africa, tendencies towards parochial altruism are still observed 
among humans both in small and large-scale societies (Bernhard et al., 2006; Dreu 
et al., 2010). Furthermore, recent experiments suggest this tendency is rather 
intuitive even in the latter group, suggesting that our evolutionary past still 
resonates clearly in our present sociality, despite considerable changes in our 
environment (Dreu et al., 2015).  
 
Social preferences and bounded rationality  
Evolution been a key force in shaping not just our social preferences, but also our 
cognition and behavior more broadly. This is the central notion in evolutionary 
psychology (Barkow et al., 1995). Consider for example our love for sugary and 
fatty foods. Whereas in our ancestral environment it was beneficial to eat as much 
of these foods when they were available – to build up some reserves for future 
periods of hunger – in our modern “supermarket society” this same preference can 
drive people to overeating and consequent health problems. In other words, while 
we are hardwired to optimize evolutionary success our mental machinery is not 
necessarily calibrated to the conditions of our present-day world.  
 In addition, there are fundamental limits to the cognitive capacities of 
humans. Although a human brain is immensely complex - comprising 
approximately one hundred billion neurons – its computational power is limited 
nevertheless. In addition to the bounds to our computational power, time 
constraints make it even harder to make optimal decisions.  These limitations 
imply so-called “bounded rationality”, whereby people do not necessarily choose 
an optimal solution but rather one that is satisfactory (Simon, 1982). As a result of 
these evolutionary imprints and inherent bounds to our rationality we sometimes 
make choices that do not maximize our  personal long-term wellbeing, as 
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illustrated for example by the rise of obesity and consequent health problems 
(Afshin et al., 2017). 
 Furthermore, irrationality may also occur when humans want to cooperate 
or help others. Consider for example someone who wants to donate 50 euros to 
save the lives of children in developing countries. This person may have two 
options. They can donate to charity A, which sends the money to a poor family 
with two hungry children; or to charity B, which provides bed-nets in areas with 
high malaria prevalence. The donation to charity A is expected to save the lives of 
the two hungry children, while the donation to charity B is expected to save the 
lives of five children.  Given the objective of saving as many children as possible 
would be thus be rational for this potential donor to select charity B. However, this 
person may nevertheless donate to charity A because it can show a picture of the 
specific two children that will be helped, whereas in the malaria prevention case 
these five potential victims are still “statistical”. Since pictures of hungry children 
typically trigger feelings of empathy (Burt and Strongman, 2005), the donor may 
select choose to help the “identifiable victims” although more children could been 
saved otherwise (Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997). 
 
The behavioral synthesis 
Throughout most of the 20th century, economics models have been built on the 
notion that that humans are rational and narrowly self-interested. However, this 
view has been challenged in recent decades. Through integration of insights from 
psychology and the application of experiments, the emerging discipline of 
behavioral economics has identified systematic deviations from rationality in the 
form of various cognitive biases (Kahneman et al., 1991; Kahneman, 2003a; 
Mullainathan and Thaler, 2000).  Furthermore, behavioral economics has shown 
that humans systematically deviate from rational self-interest: they donate to 
strangers (Engel, 2011); they reject offers which they perceive as unfair (Fehr and 
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Schmidt, 1999; Thaler, 1988); they punish cheaters at a cost to themselves (Fehr 
and Gächter, 2002); and they care – even when being merely passive observers 
with no “skin in the game” – that others are treated fairly as well (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2004).  
Furthermore, through the increasing use of experiments with diverse 
populations in different settings, a better understanding is emerging regarding the 
ways by which they cognitive biases and social preferences are shaped by culture, 
beliefs, social norms and other local conditions (Charness and Fehr, 2015; Henrich 
et al., 2005; Levitt and List, 2009). Moreover, the genetic and neural mechanisms 
underlying these behaviors are increasingly studied in the emerging disciplines of 
geno- and neuro-economics (Benjamin et al., 2012; Glimcher and Fehr, 2013). 
Finally, insights in behavioral economics are increasingly obtained and applied 
outside of academia, with governments, businesses and other organizations using 
behaviourally informed experiments to investigate how- and how well their 
activities, interventions and policies work.  
 
Overview 
This thesis aims to contribute to the field of behavioral economics by means of a 
series of lab- and field-experiments focused on the causes, consequences and 
interplay of social preferences and bounded rationality. Table 1.1 provides an 
overview of the focus of the various chapters.  
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Table 1.1 Focus, per chapter 
  
Experimental manipulation 
Ethics 
training 
Size of 
reference 
group 
Text 
about 
free 
will 
Choice 
for 
self/ 
other 
Bench-
mark 
product 
Main 
outcome 
Helpfulness 
towards client 
Ch 2. 
    
Rating of 
charitable project  
Ch. 3 
   
Amount donated 
to charity   
Ch. 4 
  
Demand for 
business training    
Ch. 5 
 
Selection of 
financial product 
        Ch. 6 
 
Chapter 2 considers the role of culture and knowledge in ethical behavior 
in the banking sector. This study builds on the finding that the professional culture 
in the financial sector contributes to dishonest and unethical behavior of 
employees (Cohn et al., 2014). Using a nationwide randomized controlled trial 
with a commercial bank, we test if a so-called “ethics program” whereby 
employees discuss work-related ethical dilemmas promotes more client-centric 
behavior. In addition to changing the culture and social norms, this intervention 
also aims to serve as a platform for knowledge exchange between employees. 
Using a newly developed version of the audit study methodology this study 
provides novel evidence about effectiveness of ethics programs. 
Next, chapter 3 investigates the role of professional expertise in 
susceptibility to the psychological bias known as proportion dominance. Given 
that proportions can typically be more easily evaluated than absolute quantities, 
many people prefer charitable projects were large fractions of a group are saved, 
11 
 
even if these projects do not save the greatest number of people in absolute terms 
(Bartels, 2006). Given that previous studies on proportion dominance  and this so-
called “reference group bias” were conducted only among students, this study 
compares susceptibility to this bias among professionals from the charitable sector 
and a group of students.  
Subsequently, chapter 4 focuses on the role of personal beliefs about free 
will on charitable donations. This study builds on previous findings that people 
become inclined to cheat for personal financial gains when their belief in free will 
is undermined (Vohs and Schooler, 2008), which in turn builds on the theory self-
serving bias whereby people attribute negative behaviors to external factors. Using 
an online experiment to test the effect of free will belief on donation behavior, this 
study extends the literature on self-serving bias to free will beliefs and altruistic 
behaviors. 
Chapter 5 considers how ambiguity - the lack of information about payoffs 
and probabilities - influences how people make choices for themselves and others. 
This study builds on the theory that decision-making for others involves greater 
social and psychological distance which results in more abstract and distanced 
thinking (Trope and Liberman, 2010). Since previous research has shown 
differences in risk attitudes for self- and other-decisions, this raises the question 
whether attitudes towards ambiguity also differ in choices for others. Using a lab-
in-the-field experiment with entrepreneurs to investigate this question, this study 
extends the empirical literature on self-other differences to a new domain of 
decision-making and a new population of subjects outside of the typical population 
of so-called “western, educated, industrialized, rich and developed” (WEIRD) 
subjects used in most lab experiments (Henrich et al., 2010a). 
Finally, chapter 6 addresses the topic of complex choices, where people 
face multiple options which each consist of multiple attributes. As such choices 
are computationally complex and people have bounded rationality, such choices – 
for example in the context of pension schemes, health insurance and mobile phone 
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subscriptions, can lead to suboptimal decisions. A growing body of research 
suggests that decision-making in such contexts can be improved without reducing 
the choice set, but merely by changing the “choice architecture”, the way in which 
the information is presented17. Building on this notion, this study uses a lab 
experiment where subjects choose between financial products to investigate how 
decision quality is affected by reference points that provide the market average for 
each product. The rationale for this approach is that reference points make it easier 
for consumers to compare costs of product features.  
 
Table 1.2  Research type and contribution, per chapter 
  
Type 
Replication Extension Innovation 
Contribution 
Theory    C2   
Methodology      C2 
Empirical C4 C3, C4, C5    C2, C6 
 
As such, this thesis presents five chapters on the drivers of social preferences and 
bounded rationality. The main contribution of these chapters is empirical, both in 
terms of replication and extension (chapters 3, 4 and 5) and in terms of novel 
evidence (chapters 2 and 6). Furthermore, chapter 2 introduces a newly developed 
method to study unethical behavior in the financial sector. Finally, chapter 2 
extends the theory about  the role of culture and bounded rationality in social 
preferences to the design of an ethics program for a large commercial bank. The 
next section provides an overview of the respective chapters. 
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Outline of chapters 
 
Table 1.3 Overview of chapters 
Ch. Title Research 
question 
Sub-
questions 
Theoretical 
perspective 
Methodology 
2 Better bankers 
 
What is the effect 
of an ethics 
program on bank 
employee client-
focus? 
How does the 
program 
work?  
Culture, 
bounded 
rationality  
Field 
experiment 
with 
employees in 
bank branches 
3 Professional 
experience 
and the 
reference 
group bias 
Are professionals 
in charitable 
organizations less 
susceptible to the 
reference group 
bias than 
students? 
Is the 
reference 
group bias 
reduced under 
joint 
evaluation of 
projects? 
Cognitive 
bias and 
proportion 
dominance 
Lab 
experiment 
with students 
and 
professionals 
from charitable 
organizations 
4 Free to help?  What is the effect 
of free will belief 
on charitable 
donations? 
Does this 
effect differ 
for religious 
and non-
religious 
people? 
Motivated 
reasoning and 
social 
preferences 
Online 
experiment 
with subjects 
in Amazon 
mTurk 
5 Choosing for 
colleagues  
How do ambiguity 
attitudes compare 
for choices people 
make for 
themselves vs. for 
others? 
Could 
delegated 
decisions 
improve 
business 
outcomes? 
Ambiguity 
aversion, self-
other 
differences in 
decision-
making 
Lab-in-the-
field 
experiment 
with 
entrepreneurs 
in Bangladesh 
6 Choice 
complexity, 
benchmarks 
and costly 
information 
Do consumers 
facing complex 
choice problems 
make better 
decisions when 
shown a 
benchmark 
product? 
Are 
benchmarks 
more effective 
when 
attributes 
expressed in 
relative 
terms? 
Complex 
choices, 
decision aids 
Lab 
experiments 
with students 
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Table 1.3 (continued) 
Data Main results Co-authors Status Outlet 
(i) Behavioral data 
from mystery 
shopping visits before 
and during program, 
(ii) post-experiment 
survey 
No effect on average, 
negative effect for 
sub-group of 
branches with high 
baseline variance in 
perceived ethicality 
Alain Cohn, 
Ernst Fehr, 
Karen Maas, 
Michel 
Marechal, 
Helen Toxopeus 
Working 
paper 
 
(i) Reported 
willingness to support 
projects with variable 
absolute and relative 
life savings (through 
vignette), (ii) post-
experiment survey 
Students and experts'  
both susceptible to 
reference group bias, 
joint evaluation 
reduces bias 
particularly for 
students  
Dinand 
Webbink 
Submitted, 
under 
review 
(2017) 
Judgment 
and 
Decision 
Making 
(i) Behavioral data 
from 24 incentives 
binary dictator games 
(donations to 
charity), (ii) post-
experiment survey 
Free will disbelief 
reduces charitable 
giving, but only for 
non-religious subjects 
Kellie Liket, 
John Protzko, 
Vera 
Scholmerich 
Published 
(2017) 
PLoS 
ONE 
(i) Vignette to 
measure attitudes 
towards risk and 
ambiguity in self- and 
other-decisions, (ii) 
post-experiment 
survey 
Subjects display 
similar degree of 
ambiguity aversion in 
self- and other-
decisions, higher 
degree of AA for 
other-choices 
conditional on belief 
that prob.<0.5 
Karen Maas, 
Haki Pamuk 
Revise and 
resubmit 
(2018) 
Small 
Business 
Economics 
(i) Behavioral data 
from incentived 
choice tasks, (ii) post-
experiment survey 
Decision making is 
improved with 
benchmark products 
with attributes framed 
in relative terms  
Mark Sanders, 
Stephanie 
Rosenkranz 
Submitted, 
under 
review 
(2017) 
Journal of 
Econ. 
Behavior 
and Org. 
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Chapter 2: Better bankers: a field experiment  
Despite widespread misbehavior in the financial sector, little is known 
about the causal effects of policies to promote ethical behavior among bank 
employees. In this field experiment, we test the effect of an ethics program in 
which bank employees jointly discuss ethical dilemmas they encounter in their 
interactions with clients. This ethics program was developed jointly with the bank 
and implemented for a period of circa two months. Ethical behavior is measured 
using an audit study in which mystery shoppers – actors presenting themselves as 
potential clients – elicit advice from bank employees about various financial 
products. The scripts for these mystery visits were constructed such that it was in 
the interest of employees to pursue a product sale, rather than to inform the client 
that the financial product may not be suitable. We find that the program promotes 
ethical behavior in shops with low levels of baseline ethicality, whereas an 
opposite effect is found among shops with higher baseline ethicality. Survey data 
suggests this differential effect resulted partly from the fact that employees 
perceive the program as a signal about the social norm, with conformity 
preferences driving behavior towards this norm. 
 
Chapter 3: Professional expertise and the reference group bias 
People have a tendency to focus more on relative than absolute quantities. 
For example, most people have greater liking of a filled small cup than a three 
times larger cup that is half-full. This so-called “proportion dominance” effect has 
also been shown to play a role in the field of charitable donations, as private 
donors have tendency to favour projects that help larger fractions of smaller 
groups rather than projects that help smaller fractions but a larger overall number 
of people. This effect has been demonstrated in experiments with student 
populations, but it is unclear whether professionals in charitable organizations 
behave similarly. Through a combined experiment with students and professionals 
from the charitable sector in the Netherlands, we find that both groups are 
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similarly prone to the reference group bias. This finding adds to a large literature 
on expert decision-making that indicates that many cognitive biases are insensitive 
to professional expertise. In turn, this study calls for interventions to steer 
professionals in the charitable sectors towards allocating funds more based on the 
absolute number of people that can be helped.  
 
Chapter 4: Free will belief and altruism  
Do we have free will? This ancient and unresolved philosophical question 
has surprising implications for the social sciences. Previous studies show that 
reduced belief in free promotes dishonest behavior, suggesting that people justify 
their selfish tendencies by not believing in free will. Building on this work, we 
investigate whether free will belief also shapes altruistic behavior. In an online 
experiment subjects’ belief in free will is primed through a reading task. We find 
that belief in free will influences charitable giving among non-religious subjects, 
but not among religious subjects. This could be explained by our finding that 
religious subjects associate more strongly with social norms that prescribe helping 
the poor, and might therefore be less sensitive to the effect of reduced belief in 
free will. These results indicate the effect of free will belief are more nuanced than 
suggested in previous studies.  
 
Chapter 5: Ambiguity attitudes in self-other decisions  
Many business decisions are made on behalf of others, and involve 
ambiguity. Whereas it is widely known that most people are averse to ambiguity, it 
remains unclear if they display similar levels of ambiguity aversion when making 
choices on behalf of others. We conduct a survey experiment among entrepreneurs 
in Bangladesh to investigate such self-other differences in ambiguity attitudes. 
Subjects are presented various hypothetical choices between certain payoffs and 
ambiguous or risky payoffs. The results indicate that entrepreneurs are less 
ambiguity averse when deciding for colleagues compared to deciding for 
17 
 
themselves. This self-other difference is only found for entrepreneurs that believe 
the ambiguous outcome to occur with a probability of less than fifty percent. 
Furthermore, we find that subjects are more risk averse when choosing for others. 
Finally, we find that social distance between the decision-maker and the other 
person does not explain ambiguity attitudes.  
 
Chapter 6: Choice complexity, benchmarks and costly information 
Modern life confronts us with many complex choices between numerous 
multi-attribute options, such as in the case of selecting a mortgage or pension 
scheme. Given bounded rationality, people often make suboptimal decisions in 
such situations, which can in turn lead to societal problems, as the subprime 
mortgage crisis illustrated. One approach towards enabling consumers to make 
better decisions in such situations is to provide so-called ‘benchmarks’ to which 
the available options can be compared. We experimentally investigate the effect of 
information interventions on decision quality in complex choices. Choice options 
were framed as financial products and could be objectively ranked. In our 
benchmark treatments one option was revealed as having average values for all 
attributes, either in relative or absolute terms. In our costly information treatment 
two options were revealed as being suboptimal. We find that costly information 
and relative benchmarks improve decision quality. Finally, the provision of 
benchmarks has limited effects on demand for costly information.  
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Chapter 2  
Better Bankers  
A Field Experiment* 
 
Abstract 
Despite widespread misbehavior in the financial sector, little is known about the 
causal effects of policies to promote ethical behavior among bank employees. In 
this field experiment, we tested the effect of an ethics program in which bank 
employees jointly discussed ethical dilemmas they encounter in their interactions 
with clients. This ethics program was developed jointly with the bank and 
implemented for a period of two months. Ethical behavior was measured using an 
audit study in which “mystery shoppers” – actors presenting themselves as 
potential clients – elicited advice from bank employees about various financial 
products. The scripts for these mystery visits were constructed such that 
employees faced a trade-off between pursuing a product sale and informing the 
client that the financial product might not be suitable. Two key findings emerged. 
First, the program had no significant effect and the majority of employees in both 
the treatment and control groups did not provide advice that places the client 
central. Second, a negative treatment effect was observed for bank shops with 
above-median levels of variance in baseline ethicality. This suggests that the group 
                                                     
*Joint work with Alain Cohn, Ernst Fehr, Karen Maas, Michel Maréchal and Helen 
Toxopeus 
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meetings may have inadvertently provided a platform for less ethical employees to 
undermine the client-focus of their colleagues. 
2.1 Introduction 
Rationale of the study 
There is widespread “misbehavior” in the financial sector. This is illustrated by a 
number of widely publicized fraud cases, such as the LIBOR manipulation scandal 
(Abrantes-Metz et al., 2012) and the recent Wells Fargo scandal involving cross-
selling of products and the creation of fraudulent accounts2. Contrary to commonly 
heard criticisms that such cases are exceptional, it was recently found that 
approximately seven percent of financial advisors in the United States have 
misconduct records (Egan et al., 2016), suggesting that such misbehavior is rather 
commonplace. Similarly, an audit study found that many financial advisors 
reinforce their clients’ biases in order to further their own interest, at the cost of 
their clients (Mullainathan et al., 2012). Correspondingly, consumer trust in the 
banking sector is low34, with approximately two-thirds of US citizens indicating 
they have some, limited or no trust in banks. Another recent global survey 
revealed that only around one-quarter of bank customers trust their bank to 
provide them with unbiased advice5.  
This misbehavior in the financial sector is recognized by policymakers as a key 
risk to financial stability and has been attributed to a number of factors, including 
financial incentives to sell certain products, irrespective of whether these are 
                                                     
2 See, for example, the Wall Street Journal article “How Wells Fargo’s High-Pressure Sales Culture 
Spiraled Out of Control” by Emily Glazer (2016), accessed 12-09-2017 
3 According to a 2017 Gallup poll, 67% of the US population had some, limited or no trust in banks. 
A similar result was found in another 2015 survey, indicating that financial advisors are often 
perceived as dishonest and untrustworthy (Anna. 2015. _Brokers are Trusted Less than Uber Drivers, 
Survey Finds._ Wall Street Journal.) 
 
5Source: Ernst & Young 2016 Global Consumer Banking Survey, accessed 12-09-2017 via: 
http://www.ey.com/gl/en/industries/financial-services/banking---capital-markets/ey-global-
consumer-banking-survey-2016 
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optimal for the client (Danilov et al., 2013; Inderst and Ottaviani, 2009). In 
addition, such misbehavior has been attributed to the business culture in banks and 
financial institutions. A recent experiment by Cohn et al. (2014) showed that bank 
employees primed with their professional identity were more likely to cheat for 
financial gains. This result suggests that it is the professional culture and 
organizational norms in banks, rather than the nature of employees per se, that is 
promoting dishonesty and misbehavior. 
Several strategies have been proposed to address this issue. Firstly, it has 
been argued that financial incentives should be changed, for instance by reducing 
sales incentives and introducing “clawbacks” by which bonuses can be revoked if 
products do not continue to perform over longer periods of time, so as to curtail 
short-termism. For example, in 2014 the European Union introduced a bonus cap 
for bank employees at a maximum of one hundred percent of the fixed salary6. In 
the Netherlands, bonuses were capped even further, at twenty percent of base pay7. 
Although economic theory suggests that such measures will reduce employee 
motivation to sell products which do not serve the clients’ best interest, there is 
limited empirical evidence about the effect of such reforms on bank employee 
behavior.  
Furthermore, it has been argued that the organizational culture in banks 
should promote ethical behavior. To this end, various interventions have been 
proposed including: ethics codes, integrity oaths, ethics trainings and ethics 
reminders. As for codes of conduct, meta-analytic research suggests that the mere 
existence of such codes does not significantly increase ethical behavior, and might 
even reduce ethical behavior in the absence of enforcement, presumably because it 
signals that the bank implements this ethics code as a form of “window dressing”. 
                                                     
6 Source: Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and 
investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC Text with EEA relevance § 94 
7 Source: https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2017/04/dutch-bonus-cap-and-brexit 
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In contrast, active enforcement of an ethics code is associated with reduced levels 
of unethicality (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010).  
Regarding the proposal of an ethics oath for the banking sector (Boatright, 
2013), similar in spirit to the Hippocratic oath in the medical profession, the 
Netherlands has recently introduced a so-called “bankers’ oath” requiring all 
employees to swear to place the clients’ interests central in their decision-making8.  
Lab experiments suggest that commitments and promises, even when non-binding, 
can promote cooperation and honesty, presumably because people have a 
preference for behaving according to their promises (Charness and Dufwenberg, 
2010; Vanberg, 2008). In a similar fashion, signing an insurance claim form at the 
beginning rather than the end was shown to significantly reduce insurance fraud, 
suggesting the ex-ante signature induced a commitment to ethical behavior (Shu et 
al., 2012). In sum, these results suggest that an integrity oath for the banking 
industry could promote client-centric behavior, but field evidence is still lacking. 
As for ethics programs and trainings, many different initiatives have been 
implemented by banks. According to a 2015 survey by the US Ethics Resource 
Center9, comprehensive programs are related to reduced misconduct, increased 
reporting of misconduct and reduced pressure to compromise standards. However, 
given the observational nature of this research, it remains unclear to what extent 
this reflects a causal effect. Furthermore, it is not clear which components of these 
programs are most effective (Treviño et al., 2014). For example, some programs 
focus more on individualized learning about ethical behavior, whereas others 
involve more social processes such as speaking up in a group. Lab research 
suggests that various forms of peer influence such as discussing  ethical issues 
with others can promote ethical behavior (Gino and Pierce, 2009; Gunia et al., 
2012) but it remains unclear how effective such approaches are in the context of 
                                                     
8 Source: Dutch Central Bank, accessed 12-09-2017 via: https://www.dnb.nl/en/publications/dnb-
publications/newsletters/nieuwsbrief-banken/nieuwsbrief-banken-januari-2013/dnb284394.jsp 
9 Source: Ethics & Compliance Initiative, accessed 13-09-2017 via: 
https://connects.ethics.org/viewdocument/the-state-of-ethics-in-large-compan 
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the banking sector. 
Another strategy that has been suggested is to use so-called “ethical 
reminders”. This approach builds on the notion that humans have limited memory 
and may forget about their good intentions and not have others’ interest in mind 
during the critical moment of decision-making. Reminders have been successfully 
applied in the field to promote behaviors such as donating blood (Stutzer et al., 
2011; Vuletić, 2015) and voting in presidential elections (Dale and Strauss, 2009), 
as well as in more personal decisions such as timely repayment of loans (Cadena 
and Schoar, 2011) and adhering to saving plans (Karlan et al., 2016).  However, it 
remains unclear whether such reminders are also effective within the cultural 
context of commercial banks. It could be the case that moral reminders mainly 
promote ethical behavior among people who were already inclined towards such 
behaviors but that they are less effective in restraining unethical behavior, such as 
cheating a client. Furthermore, in the presence of financial incentives to sell 
products to clients, it is even more questionable how effective moral reminders 
and ethics programs will be in changing employee behavior, i.e. in restraining 
them to sell suboptimal products to clients. 
 
Overview of experiment 
In sum, there is limited evidence about the effectiveness of various “soft 
measures” to promote ethical behavior in the banking sector. To address this 
knowledge gap, we conducted the first field experimental test of the effect of an 
ethics program on client-focused behavior among employees in a large 
commercial bank. To this end, we worked with a bank to develop an ethics 
program for front-office staff which we then randomly assigned among a total of 
N=94 bank shops spread across the country where this bank operates. The main 
component of this intervention was a weekly meeting in which employees 
discussed an ethical dilemma they encountered in their daily work. Furthermore, 
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employees were encouraged to implement a new slogan when greeting clients, 
which aimed to serve as a moral reminder. However, compliance with this 
component was very limited, so the main component of the treatment was the 
weekly meetings. 
To measure bank employee behavior, we implemented an audit study, 
whereby bank employees were not aware that they were being studied. This 
method is particularly suitable for studying behaviors that are socially undesirable 
and which people may wish to hide if they know they are being studied. The audit 
study method has been successfully used to study racial and sex discrimination in 
the labor market (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Neumark et al., 1996). More 
recently, this method has also been used to study unethical behavior in the 
financial sector, for example among financial advisors (Mullainathan et al., 2012) 
and in the context of setting up shell companies for tax avoidance (Sharman, 
2010).  In our study, we worked with a professional “mystery shopping” firm 
which sends professional actors to organizations, often for the purposes of testing 
the service quality. 
We developed standardized case scripts that the mystery shoppers used to 
elicit advice from front-office bank employees. These case scripts constituted a 
query where the client’s interest did not align with the interest of bank employees, 
who have financial incentives to sell financial products such as credit and 
insurance. The main outcome we measured was whether the bank employee 
provided an advice which served the client’s best interest, or whether their advice 
steered the client towards a product sale, thereby serving their own interest. Every 
bank shop was visited six times before the ethics program was implemented and 
six times during the period when the program was implemented in the treatment 
shops. More details on the audit methodology are provided in section 2. After 
completion of the ethics program, we sent a survey to all bank employees to gather 
information about their attitudes towards the program and their perceptions 
regarding social norms in the bank. 
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The main results of our study are as follows. First, we find that during the 
baseline in the majority of audit visits the bank employee did not provide the 
advice which best served the client’s interest. Second, we find that the ethics 
program had no effect on the bank employee’s behavior in the audit study, 
suggesting it was ineffective in promoting more ethical behavior. Third, we find 
that the ethics program had a negative effect for shops with high variance in 
baseline ethicality, while a positive effect was observed for shops with low 
variance in, and absolute levels of, baseline ethicality. This result suggests “ethical 
contagion”, whereby the ethics program provided a platform for the less ethical 
employees to exert a negative influence on their colleagues’ norms and behavior. 
The positive effect for the low-variance group suggests that without such 
“contagion”, group discussion can indeed promote more ethical behavior. 
 
Main contributions 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that applies a randomized 
controlled trial to estimate the causal effect of an ethics program within a 
company. As such, it builds on a growing literature of field experimental evidence 
on the dynamics of  ethical behavior in organizations (Pierce and 
Balasubramanian, 2015; Pierce and Snyder, 2008). The evidence we present is 
relevant for academics trying to understand the drivers of unethical behavior as 
well as for policymakers and organizations who wish to limit such behavior, for 
example in the financial sector.  Our main result, that the ethics program had an 
insignificant net effect, casts doubts on the notion that soft measures alone will 
suffice to cut down on unethical behavior in the financial sector. It also suggests 
that further revisions of the financial incentives, such as bonuses for product sales, 
might also be needed. In addition, our results warrant caution in designing and 
implementing ethics programs in an organizational context. Given that such ethics 
programs might be interpreted by employees as signals about how other 
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employees behave, preferences for conformity can drive down ethical behavior 
among workers with higher initial levels of ethical behavior.  
Furthermore, we contribute to the growing body of literature that uses audit 
methodologies to measure ethical behavior in the financial sector. Our design is 
similar in spirit to Mullainathan et al. (2012), who use a mystery shopping 
methodology to study how financial advisors fail to de-bias their clients in order to 
advance their own personal interests, for example by selling investment products 
with higher agent fees. In a similar fashion, we find that many of the front-office 
bank employees in our sample fail to inform clients when credit and insurance 
products might not be suitable. Our results contribute to the literature that is 
showing how “misbehavior” in the financial sector is still widespread (Egan et al., 
2016; Lo, 2015), and calls for increased efforts to promote ethical behavior in the 
financial sector.  
 
Outline 
The paper proceeds as follows. In chapter 2 we provide an overview of the ethics 
program, the experimental design and the audit study methodology. In chapter 3 
we provide the results of the baseline study, the main treatment effects and the 
results from our ex-post survey. We then discuss these results in chapter 4, with a 
particular focus on the differential effect of the program on employees in shops 
with high vs. low baseline levels of ethicality. Finally, in chapter 5 we conclude. 
2.1 Experimental design 
Ethics program 
The program was developed jointly with a large commercial retail bank, which 
provides a range of financial products and services to its clients. During the period 
2015-2016, a number of meetings were held between the research team and 
various managers from the banks to discuss possibilities for ethics programs that 
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could be randomly assigned to either individual employees or bank shops. In 2016, 
it was agreed that the program would consist of two main components: (i) a 
weekly meeting in which employees would discuss ethical dilemmas and (ii) a 
new client greeting to make the topic of ethics more salient during the critical 
moment of front-office employees’ interactions with clients. Subsequently, the 
program materials were developed. These included a manual for the managers of 
the selected bank shops to use during the program kick-off, a list of example 
dilemmas to be discussed during the weekly meetings and instructions with the 
wording of the new client greeting. The program was then launched among the 
selected bank shops in February-March 2017 and ran for a period of six weeks. 
Two weeks prior to the start of the program, managers received an email and video 
message from the bank’s director, as well a set of documents with instructions on 
how to implement the program. We will now describe in more detail the two main 
components of the program. 
Managers were instructed to integrate the weekly meetings into their pre-
existing weekly team meetings, during which they discuss operational questions 
with the shop employees. These meetings typically last 15-30 minutes and are 
often implemented at the beginning of the work week, so specific goals and targets 
can be discussed with the team. The ethics program started with a kickoff meeting, 
in which the manager communicated to the shop employees that the bank 
headquarters promotes a culture in which employees openly discuss ethical 
dilemmas with each other so they can give each other feedback, learn from each 
other and promote a “client-first” approach. Furthermore, it was explained exactly 
what is meant by an ethical dilemma; namely a situation in which it is not in the 
client’s best interest to purchase a financial product. Subsequently, the manager 
presented an example of what such a dilemma could practically entail, either from 
a list of pre-constructed cases or from his/her own personal work experience.  
Subsequently, employees were encouraged to think of ethical dilemmas to 
discuss in the upcoming weekly meetings, as well as to discuss these with their 
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colleagues. In the following weeks, the employees held meetings in which they 
discussed these dilemmas with each other. These meetings were held in the back 
office and typically lasted between 10-15 minutes. In addition, the bank developed 
an intranet page for the employees in the selected bank shops to share dilemmas. 
This intranet page was only accessible using a specific password that was 
exclusively provided to employees in the treatment shops. Finally, some treatment 
shops used a message board in the back office where employees could write down 
ethical dilemmas they encountered. More details on the implementation 
compliance are provided in section 3. 
As for the revised client greeting, the bank and research team jointly 
developed a short slogan that employees were instructed to use when engaging in a 
conversation with a client in the front office. This new greeting read as follows: 
“Hello, I will do my utmost to serve you to the best of my abilities”. However, 
during the rollout of the program it appeared that many employees did not feel 
comfortable using this slogan, and reported that it felt unnatural to apply it. 
Correspondingly, an ex-post survey revealed that the slogan was only applied in 
approximately ten percent of the encounters.  Finally, halfway during the six-week 
program, employees in the treatment shops were sent cakes with the title of the 
ethics program printed on them, to serve as an additional reminder about the 
program and boost worker morale concerning implementation of the program.  
 
Randomization 
To test the hypothesis that the ethics program promotes client-centered behavior 
among bank employees, the treatment was randomly assigned at a total of 92 bank 
shops, clustered by 26 bank shop managers. The results of the baseline audit study 
are explained in more detail below. Based on these results, in which every bank 
shop was visited by six mystery shoppers, the shops were ranked in terms of the 
level of ethical behavior. Through stratified sampling, a total of 45 bank shops 
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clustered by 12 managers were assigned to the program, with the remaining 47 
shops and 15 managers assigned to the control group. As a result, the treatment 
and control group were balanced in terms of baseline levels of ethicality. Details 
on the randomization are provided in the results section. This randomization took 
place in February 2017, after finalization of the baseline data collection which 
took place in the preceding two months. Subsequently, the six-week ethics 
program was implemented in the period March-May 2017, with an approximate 
two-week variation between shops in terms of the exact start and end dates. 
Simultaneously, the second round of data collection, consisting of another six 
mystery shopper visits per shop, was implemented.   
After the ethics program was finalized and the data were analyzed, an 
online survey was sent by the bank to all employees in the control and treatment 
group in June 2017. It was communicated in the email invitation to the survey that 
the bank was working together with universities in the research team to implement 
a study about behavior and attitudes towards work at the bank. Participation in this 
survey was voluntary and invitees were informed that the survey would last 
between 5-10 minutes. This survey included questions about attitudes towards 
ethical matters in the workplace, as well as an additional section of questions 
about participation in the ethics program, which was only presented to the 
treatment group.  
 
Audit study  
To measure ethical behavior, six different case scripts were developed, with two 
different versions of each script. These scripts described a query by a client made 
to a front-office bank employee about various financial products, including credit 
and insurance. The cases were constructed such that the bank employee, in 
advising the client, was facing a tradeoff between private benefits and serving the 
client’s best interest. For example, in one case the client signaled interest in buying 
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a so-called in-house insurance policy to cover damages if their pet damaged their 
new sofa. However, this particular insurance policy does not cover such damages.  
Due to confidentiality, the exact formulation of the cases cannot be revealed. 
However, we do provide a conceptual description of each case.  
In case 1 the mystery shopper informs the bank employee they want a loan 
for consumption purposes, and they indicate that they think they should be eligible 
because they hold considerable savings. This purportedly signals that they may fail 
to understand that they can also use part of their savings for this consumption. The 
outcome variable is whether the bank employee informs them about this 
possibility or not. In case 2, the mystery shopper wants a loan and signals they 
think the total loan costs will not increase if they take longer to repay it. The 
outcome variable is whether the bank employee informs them that loan costs will 
be higher if the repayment period is longer. In case 3, the mystery shopper wants 
an insurance product but signals they think this insurance covers a risk which is 
actually not covered. In case 4, the mystery shopper wants a loan for consumptive 
purposes but also indicates they already have several other outstanding loans with 
other banks. The outcome variable is whether or not the bank employee informs 
them that it might not be prudent to apply for more credit. In case 5, the mystery 
shopper wants a loan to on-lend funds to a friend who cannot get a loan. The 
outcome variable is whether the bank employee informs them that they still have 
to repay the loan to the bank even if their friend does not repay them. In case 6, the 
client wants a loan with a flexible interest rate and signals they do not understand 
that total costs will increase if the interest rate rises. The outcome variable is 
whether or not the bank employee informs them about this possibility. 
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Table 2.1 Description of cases 
Case Description More ethical response 
1 
client wants a loan but indicates 
he/she also holds considerable 
savings 
inform client to consider using (part 
of) their savings instead of a loan 
2 
client wants a loan but doesn't 
understand total cost increase with 
longer repayment period 
inform client that total costs go up 
with longer repayment period 
3 
client doesn't understand that 
insurance won’t cover the relevant 
risk 
inform client that particular risk is not 
covered by insurance product 
4 
client wants consumer loan but has 
outstanding loans at other banks 
inform client that they should consider 
not taking another loan before 
repaying outstanding loans 
5 
client wants loan to on-lend to a 
friend who cannot get a bank loan 
inform client that they are liable to 
repay the bank even if friend does not 
repay them 
6 
client wants loan with flexible rate 
but doesn't understand rate can go 
up 
inform client that costs will go up if 
interest rate will rise 
 
All these cases were constructed based on extensive discussions with various bank 
employees both from the headquarters as well as staff with closer ties to the daily 
operations of the shops in the field. Furthermore, prior to the implementation of 
the audit study, these case scripts were pre-tested with N=1198 subjects in 
Amazon mTurk to see whether people indeed considered the less ethical response 
in the various cases to be unethical/inappropriate. For each case script they were 
asked to indicate on a scale ranging from -3 to +3 how inappropriate/appropriate 
they considered the less ethical response from the bank employee. The average 
rating was -1.35, significantly lower than zero (P<0.01), indicating that people 
indeed considered the described bank employee responses as inappropriate10. 
Subsequently, a professional “mystery shopping” firm was hired and 
trained to implement these case scripts. A total of N=233 different mystery 
shoppers were trained by this firm to implement the various scripts during mystery 
                                                     
10 More details on this pilot test are provide in appendix 2.3 
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visits to the bank shops. These mystery shoppers had previous experience with 
implementing audit studies, typically for corporate clients, for example to test 
sales staff adherence to company protocols. During both six-week phases of the 
data collection, every bank shop was visited once per week by a mystery shopper. 
As such, there were a total of twelve waves of data collection. The same bank shop 
was never visited by the same mystery shopper more than once, so as to avoid 
recognition by the bank employees. Furthermore, mystery shoppers were recruited 
from the specific region in which these banks shops were located, so as to avoid 
making a suspicious impression, for example by not speaking with the local 
accent. Before the start of data collection, the different cases were randomly 
assigned to the bank shop – wave combination, such that the ordering of data 
collection over cases was counterbalanced.  
After visiting the bank shop and implementing the specific case script to 
which they were assigned, the mystery shoppers recorded - directly after leaving 
the bank shop - how the bank employee had advised them in this situation. In 
addition, they rated the perceived ethicality of the bank employee on a -3 to +3 
scale, as well as their perception of the extent to which the advisor asked questions 
to better understand their financial situation. These three questions formed the 
main outcome variables for the analysis11. In addition, the mystery shoppers 
recorded the age and gender of the bank employee, and the number of other 
employees and clients present in the office. These variables were used as control 
measures in the estimation of the treatment effect. Responses were entered using a 
tablet and directly sent to the mystery shopping firm, who in turn transferred these 
to the research team.  
                                                     
11 The exact audit survey instrument in provided in appendix 2.2 
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2.3 Results 
Descriptive statistics 
A total of N=92 bank shops participated in the experiment. Of these, N=45 were 
randomly assigned to the treatment group and the remaining N=47 to the control 
group. More details on the randomization follow later in this section. These shops 
were managed by a total of N=27 different managers12. Each shop was visited by 
mystery shoppers a total of N=12 times, before and during the program, yielding a 
total of 1.104 unique observations.  
 
Table 2.2: Data Structure 
  Control Treatment Total 
Managers (distinct) 15 12 27 
Bank shops (distinct) 47 45 92 
Total observations 564 540 1.104 
 
Bank shops have on average 4.12 employees (SD=1.90) working in the shop 
simultaneously13. Most shops have a greater pool of employees, since most 
employees do not work all hours. Furthermore, employees may sometimes work in 
another bank shop that belongs to the same manager group, for example to fill in 
for a sick colleague. Most bank shops were located in the center of cities and 
larger towns. Both clients and non-clients could walk into the front office of these 
bank shops without making an appointment. Front-office staff provide 
information, sell or request products such as consumer loans and help clients with 
simple matters such as requesting a new ATM card. They are not licensed to 
provide advice about more complex products such as mortgages; this requires an 
appointment with a specialized financial advisor. We restricted our study to 
                                                     
12 For the analysis, observations for shops belonging to a particular manager were excluded as the 
headquarters reported that this manager was unwilling to implement the program. 
13 This result was obtained during the post-program employee survey. 
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queries that could be addressed to front-office staff. In this regard, our study 
differs from Mullainathan et al. (2012), who focused on investment advice. The 
mystery shoppers reported in 66.3% cases that they encountered a female bank 
employee. Approximately 70% of employees were 20-40 years, and 20% were 
between 40-50 years.  
 
Baseline 
We will now report the results of the mystery shopping visits implemented during 
the six weeks prior to the implementation of the ethics program. The first key 
result is that bank employees provided the more ethical response in 38.22% of the 
N=552 mystery visits. In the remaining 61.78% of cases the bank employees did 
not inform the mystery shopper about the product-related misunderstanding or 
lack of understanding that they signaled during their query. The bank employee 
responses differed between the six types of cases. As can be seen in table 3 below, 
ethical responses were most common for case 3 (insurance) and case 5 (borrowing 
for friend), and lowest for case 4 (borrowing when already indebted). 
 
Table 2.3 Fraction of ethical responses per case, baseline 
Case nr Ethical advice Obs. 
1 39.67% 184 
2 31.52% 184 
3 53.80% 184 
4 15.76% 184 
5 51.09% 185 
6 33.70% 184 
Total 37.59% 184 
 
Furthermore, mystery shoppers were asked to indicate, on a scale running from -3 
to +3, the extent to which they perceived that the bank employee put their interest 
first. The average rating for this question during the baseline was 0.39, with scores 
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of zero or below reported in 47.46% of visits.  Secondly, mystery shoppers 
reported the extent to which the bank employee asked them questions to better 
understand their financial situation, using a scale from -3 (not at all) to +3 (very 
much). The average rating for this question was -0.43, with scores of zero or 
below reported in 58% of visits. These three outcomes – ethical behavior (EB), 
perceived ethicality (PE) and asking question (AQ) – correlate positively and 
significantly with each other (EB vs. PE=0.563***, EB vs. AQ=0.2960***, PE vs. 
AQ=0.4468***). 
Based on the baseline results, the ethics program was then randomly 
assigned to N=26 managers and the respective N=92 bank shops under their 
management. Randomization was stratified by the bank shops’ baseline levels of 
ethicality, calculated as the fraction of baseline visits in which employees provided 
the more ethical response.  
 
Table 2.4 Randomization balance 
  Control Treatment 
P-val 
 
mean s.d. mean s.d. 
Employee ethical response (1=y) 0.369 0.166 0.396 0.199 0.473 
Perceived ethicality (0-6) 0.44 1.878 0.337 1.868 0.547 
Employee asked questions (0-6) -0.344 2.01 -0.481 2.012 0.435 
Employee age (years) 33.298 7.82 34 7.957 0.475 
Employee male (1=yes) 0.383 0.487 0.267 0.443 0.063* 
Nr of other clients in shop 0.387 0.766 0.441 0.796 0.525 
Nr of other employees in shop 1.28 0.883 1.289 0.844 0.905 
 
As such, the baseline fractions of ethical responses in the treatment and control 
group are 39.6% and 36.9% respectively, the difference being not statistically 
significant (Mann-Whitney test, z=-0.757. Pr>|z|=0.4491). In addition, the 
randomization was also balanced in terms of baseline levels of the following 
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variables: (i) mystery shopper’s perception of the ethicality of the employee, (ii) 
mystery shopper’s perceptions of the extent to which the employee asked 
questions to understand their financial situation, (iii) employee demographics, and 
(iv) the number of other clients and employees in the shop during the mystery 
shopping visit. 
 
Compliance 
At the start of the program, selected bank managers were informed via 
email by the headquarters that they had been selected to participate in a pilot ethics 
program. This email indicated that the program built on the bank’s ambition to 
maintain the highest ethical standards and to restore the trust of society in the 
financial sector. Furthermore, the email informed the selected managers about the 
various activities they and their team were requested to carry out during the 
program: (i) implementation of a kickoff meeting, (ii) usage of the new client 
greeting and (iii) implementation of weekly “dilemma meetings”. In the 
subsequent two weeks, the headquarters checked with all selected bank managers 
to see whether they had read the email and made the necessary preparations for the 
program kickoff. During this phase, the research team was informed that one 
manager was unwilling to implement the program. In the estimation of the 
treatment effect, this manager and corresponding shops were omitted from the 
analyses.  
We will now report several indicators regarding the compliance with the 
program. Data about compliance were obtained in two ways. First, mystery 
shoppers recorded whether the bank employee greeted them with a slogan 
“similar” to the actual slogan employees were requested to use when starting a 
conversation with clients. Because the concept of similarity is inherently vague, 
we cannot refute the possibility that this question captures not only whether 
employees actually used the slogan, but also more generally whether they used a 
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client-friendly greeting. Second, an online survey was sent to all shop employees 
after the program had finished. This survey contained questions about participation 
in the kickoff meeting and weekly meetings.  
Regarding the client greeting, we find that client-focused greetings were 
observed in 7.2% of visits during the baseline as opposed to 15.3% during the 
actual program phase. However, it appeared that client-focused greetings were 
recorded both in the treatment and control shops. For the control shops, client-
focused greetings were recorded in 7.6% of baseline visits and 12.7% of program 
phase visits. For the treatment shops, such client-focused greetings were recorded 
in 6.7% of baseline visits and 18.3% of program phase visits.  
These figures indicate that the slogan was not adopted in most of the 
treatment shops. This corresponds with anecdotal reports received from the bank 
during the implementation phase indicating that employees found the slogan to be 
“artificial”, “bothersome” or simply “annoying” and that many simply refused to 
use it.  
Furthermore, these results indicate that some employees – both in the 
treatment and control group – were already using client-focused greetings. Next, 
the increase for the control group could imply several things: (i) there may have 
been some spillovers from the treatment group, for example through employees 
rotating between shops, however such rotations were purportedly very infrequent 
according to the bank headquarters; (ii) mystery shoppers may have been more 
attuned to the greetings during the program phase, and thus more likely to interpret 
any type of client-focused greeting as sounding “similar” to the actual program 
greeting. Finally, the fact that usage of such greetings was recorded in both 
treatment and control shops does speak to the fact that shoppers were not aware of 
the treatment status of the shops. 
We now turn to the results from the ex-post online survey, which was sent 
to the employees in all bank shops in June 2017. Participation was voluntary, but 
employees were strongly urged by the bank management to fill it out. In total 
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N=238 employees opened the survey. These responses corresponded to N=35 
control shops (N=110 responses) and N=38 treatment shops (N=128 responses). 
After filling out several questions related to ethical behavior and social norms – 
which we report on in the next chapter –  employees in treatment shops were asked 
to fill out several questions about the implementation of the program.  
In total, N=63 employees from N=31 bank shops responded to these 
questions. These responding shops have slightly higher levels of baseline ethicality 
than shops where no employees responded (44% vs. 35%), so the survey results 
may be biased although it is unclear which direction such a bias would have. It is 
conceivable that more ethical shops are also more compliant, while at the same 
time employees in such shops may be less motivated to engage in the program – 
for example because they think they already behave ethically. In sum, it remains 
unclear if and to what extent these survey results reflect the actual compliance 
with the program. We now proceed to discussing the survey results. 
As shown in table 2.5 below, approximately 76% of employees reported 
they attended the kickoff meeting (q1). Furthermore, employees reported they 
participated in an average of 3.5 weekly meetings (q2). Most employees 
participated in 1-5 meetings (60%), while some participated in 5-10 meetings 
(22%). Approximately 5% participated in more than 10 meetings, while around 
12% did not attend any meetings. Next, 37% of weekly meetings were attended by 
colleagues from other shops in the manager’s clusters (“sales region”, q3). 
Employees shared, on average, 1-2 personal dilemmas during these meetings (q4) 
and reported they were moderately active in terms of speaking vs. listening (q5). 
Typically, these meetings were held with around 4 employees (q6).   
In sum, these figures suggest that compliance with the meeting component 
was quite successful and that – given the limited compliance with the client-
greeting – these meetings are the primary component of the overall ethics 
program.  
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Table 2.5 Compliance with program 
Question mean s.d. N 
1.      Did you attend the kickoff during which a video 
message from the director was shown? (1=yes,0=no) 0.76 0.43 63 
2.      How many times did you attend a weekly meeting, 
during which you discussed ethical dilemmas? (0-20) 
3.57 3.44 63 
3.      Where there colleagues present from other shops in 
your sales region during the meetings? (1=yes,0=no) 
0.37 0.49 63 
4.      How many times did you share a personal dilemma 
during the meetings? (0-20) 
1.57 1.88 63 
5.      Did you mostly listen or mostly speak during the 
weekly meetings? (0=mostly listen, 6=mostly speak) 
3.87 1.24 63 
6.      How many colleagues (that is, excluding you) were 
typically present during the weekly meetings? (0-10) 3.33 2.19 63 
 
Average treatment effect  
We estimate the average treatment effect14 using the following difference-in-
difference model, with Yij denoting the respective outcome variable for bank shop i 
at time t; Tit denoting treatment status of bank shop i at time t; Xit denoting a 
vector of control variables15; λt denoting a time fixed effect; Bi denoting a bank 
shop fixed effect and Mi denoting a mystery shopper fixed effect: 
 
Yij = β0 + β1Tit + β2Xit + λt + Bi + Mi + εit    (3.1) 
 
The results in table 5 indicate that the ethics program did not have a statistically 
significant effect on employee advice, as indicated by the insignificant point 
estimate on the “ethics program” variable in column 1. The treatment did have a 
marginally significant positive effect on the perception of bank employee 
ethicality. However, the treatment did not influence the perception of the extent to 
                                                     
14 Observations for six shops in the treatment group - where the manager did not implement the 
program – were excluded from the analysis 
15 The controls are: (i) bank employee age; (ii) bank employee sex, (iii) nr. of clients in bank shop 
during visit (iv) nr. of employees in bank shop during visit 
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which bank employees asked the client questions to better understand their 
financial situation. In sum, these analyses suggest that – on average – the ethics 
program had limited effects on employee behavior towards the client.  
We find a similar null result when considering the treatment effects on the 
two other key outcome variables: (i) “perceived ethicality”; whether the mystery 
shopper perceived the bank employee to be placing the client’s interest first (table 
6 column 2) and (ii) “asking questions”; whether the mystery shopper perceived 
the bank employee to be asking to questions to better understand the client’s 
financial situation (table 6, column 3).  
 
Table 2.6 Treatment effects on ethical response 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Ethical response 
Ethics program 0.010 0.024 -0.023 -0.066 
 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.059) (0.077) 
Post -0.011 -0.015 0.008 0.094* 
 
(0.037) (0.036) (0.038) (0.052) 
Constant 0.384*** 0.371*** 0.383*** 0.315 
 
(0.020) (0.054) (0.052) (0.312) 
Observations 1,032 1,032 1,032 1,032 
R-squared 0.000 0.008 0.006 0.310 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Shop FE No No Yes Yes 
Shopper FE No No No Yes 
Case FE No No No No 
Nr of bank shops  86  86 86 86 
OLS regression with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is whether the 
bank employee gave the more ethical response (1=yes, 0=no). Visit controls include: employee age, 
employee sex, other clients in shop (yes/no), other employees in shop (yes/no). Post is a dummy 
variable indicating the period (0=before program, 1=during)*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
41 
 
Table 2.7 Treatment effects on all outcome variables 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Ethical response Perceived ethicality Asking questions 
 
(0=no 1=yes) (-3 to +3 scale) (-3 to +3 scale) 
Ethics program -0.100 -0.136 0.013 
 
(0.077) (0.271) (0.309) 
Post 0.105** 0.223 0.115 
 
(0.049) (0.202) (0.240) 
Constant 0.351 -2.382*** 0.907 
 
(0.276) (0.850) (1.309) 
Observations 1,032 1,032 1,032 
R-squared 0.377 0.454 0.426 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Shop FE Yes Yes Yes 
Shopper FE Yes Yes Yes 
Case FE Yes Yes Yes 
Nr of bank shops 86 86 86 
OLS regression with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Visit controls include: employee age, 
employee sex, other clients in shop (yes/no), other employees in shop (yes/no). Post is a dummy 
variable indicating the period (0=before program, 1=during)*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Heterogeneous treatment effects 
We then estimate the treatment effect separately for the bank shops with below- 
vs. above-median “baseline ethicality”, again using model 3.1. To this end, we 
apply the same score that was used for the stratified randomization of the program: 
the fraction of baseline mystery shop visits in which the employee provided the 
more ethical advice. We split the sample into a group of shops with baseline 
ethicality scores equal to and above the median of 33% (BE>median) and a group 
with below-median baseline ethicality scores (BE<median). In this manner, there 
are N=64 shops with equal-to and above-median baseline ethicality and N=22 
shops with below-median baseline ethicality. As a robustness check, we also split 
the sample into above vs. below and equal to median sub-groups (columns 3-4).  
 
  
42 
 
Table 2.8 Treatment effect, by baseline ethicality 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Ethics response(0=no, 1=yes) 
 
EB<median EB≥median EB≤median EB>median 
Ethics program 0.107 -0.188** -0.000 -0.061 
 
(0.157) (0.086) (0.099) (0.154) 
post 0.232 0.082 0.156** -0.104 
 
(0.159) (0.062) (0.063) (0.129) 
Constant 0.164 0.853*** -0.156 1.429*** 
 
(0.354) (0.174) (0.215) (0.293) 
Observations 264 768 600 432 
R-squared 0.683 0.435 0.474 0.551 
Nr of bank shops 22 64 50 36 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Shop, Shopper 
and Case FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OLS regression with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is whether the 
bank employee gave the more ethical response (1=yes, 0=no). EB≤median (EB>median ) indicates if 
the fraction of ethical responses during the baseline was equal/below (above) median. Visit controls 
include: employee age, employee sex, other clients in shop (yes/no), other employees in shop 
(yes/no). Post is a dummy indicating the period (0=baseline, 1=during) ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
When comparing the treatment effect on these sub-groups, we find that the 
program had a significantly negative effect on ethical behavior for the equal-to and 
above-median baseline ethicality shops, as indicated by the coefficient on the 
treatment variable in column 2. In contrast, the program has a positive but 
insignificant effect for the sub-group of N=22 shops with below-median baseline 
ethicality (column 1). However, when splitting the sample into (i) below- or equal-
to median vs. (i) above-median baseline ethicality sub-groups (columns 3-4), the 
negative effect for the latter group is smaller and no longer statistically significant. 
This result suggests that the negative effect observed in column 2 cannot be 
ascribed simply to shop baseline ethicality. If, indeed, shops with higher levels of 
baseline ethicality would react negatively to the program, one would expect to see 
an even stronger negative effect for the sample of above-median baseline 
ethicality. However, as shown in column 4, the treatment effect is not significant 
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for this sub-group. Another possibility is that it’s not the baseline average but 
rather the variance in ethicality that causes heterogeneous effects. The conjecture 
here is that the dilemma meetings unfolded differently in shops with few very 
unethical employees compared to shops with a more homogenous group. Although 
both groups may have the same baseline ethicality average, the former will have a 
greater variance. In the high variance shop, the more unethical employee may 
“drag down” the social norms and consequent ethical behavior of colleagues. 
Furthermore, this effect may be particularly strong in shops with equal- or below-
median baseline ethicality, since these shops are more likely to have at least one or 
two “highly unethical” bank employees. 
Since the main outcome measure “ethics score” is a dummy variable, we 
use the “perceived ethicality”, which is rated on a -3 to +3 scale, to construct a 
more fine-grained measure of baseline shop-level variance in ethicality. Using 
model 3.1, we then estimate the treatment effect for the group of shops with 
baseline perceived ethicality below median (column 1) vs. baseline perceived 
ethicality above median (column 2). We also estimate this model separately for 
shops with high vs. low baseline ethicality (columns 3-6). In line with our 
conjecture, we find that indeed, the treatment effect is negative for high-variance 
shops and positive for low-variance shops. For the full sample, the treatment effect 
is negative and highly insignificant at the 1% level for shops with above-median 
baseline variance in perceived ethicality (column 2), while the effect is positive 
but statistically insignificant for the shops with below-median variance. This 
differential effect is particularly strong and significant at the 5% level for shops 
with equal- or below-median baseline ethicality (column 3-4). For high baseline 
ethicality shops (column 5-6) the direction of the effect is similar, but the size of 
the effect is smaller and statistically not significant. The result for the main sample 
(i.e. columns 1-2) is also shown in graph 1.  
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Table 2.9 Treatment effect, by baseline ethicality 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Ethics response  
 
Full sample EB≤median EB>median 
 
Var<m Var>m Var<m Var>m Var<m Var>m 
Ethics program 0.092 -0.328*** 0.284** -0.426** 0.138 -0.159 
 
(0.109) (0.110) (0.124) (0.192) (0.305) (0.172) 
post 0.014 0.141* 0.023 0.272** -0.329 -0.077 
 
(0.071) (0.083) (0.107) (0.120) (0.241) (0.178) 
Constant 0.321 0.735*** 0.084 -0.325 0.201 1.161* 
 
(0.273) (0.238) (0.287) (0.470) (0.299) (0.608) 
Observations 528 504 312 288 216 216 
R-squared 0.493 0.510 0.653 0.583 0.751 0.749 
Nr of bank shops 44 42 26 24 18 18 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Shop FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Shopper FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Case FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OLS regression with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is whether the 
bank employee gave the more ethical response (1=yes, 0=no). EB≤median (EB>median ) indicates 
whether the fraction of ethical responses during the baseline was equal/below (above) median. 
Var<m (var>m) if the variance in the perceived ethicality during the baseline was below (above) 
median. Visit controls include: employee age, employee sex, other clients in shop (yes/no), other 
employees in shop (yes/no). Post is a dummy variable indicating the period (0=baseline, 1=during) 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
Survey 
To better understand the insignificant net effect of the ethics program, we turn to 
the results from the online survey. This survey was sent to all employees 
approximately one month after the ethics program. A total of N=198 employees 
from N=68 shops responded, divided equally between treatment (N=103 subjects, 
N=33 shops) and control (N=95 subjects,  N=35 shops).  
In this anonymous survey, employees were shown a list of statements and 
asked to indicate on a 1-7 scale the extent to which they agreed, with a value of 1 
corresponding to “I do not agreeing at all” and 7 to “I fully agree”. Statements 1-7 
concerned issues relating to employees’ awareness and knowledge of ethical 
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dilemmas with clients (“what is”), while statements 8-10 pertained to what 
employees think appropriate behaviors are (“what should be”).  
For statements 1-7, employees were asked to indicate the extent to which 
they themselves agreed, while for statements 8-9 they were asked the extent to 
which the people in their team agreed. The reason for this difference is that the 
bank management felt it was too suggestive to ask employees personal questions 
about ethical norms (i.e. statements 8-10). As a result, it remains somewhat 
unclear to what extent the responses to these latter statements reflect employees’ 
personal ethical views vs. their perception of their colleagues’ views.  
 
Table 2.10 Survey responses, treatment effects 
Level of agreement with statement  
(1-7 scale) 
Control Treatment 
Dif. 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Q1 
"Sometimes there is tension between what 
is best for the client vs. the bank" 
3.87 1.74 4.17 1.71 0.29 
Q2 
"Not every financial product is good for 
all clients" 
5.42 1.57 5.22 1.80 -0.20 
Q3 
"I know which questions to ask clients to 
understand what’s best for them" 
6.22 0.80 6.29 0.82 0.07 
Q4 
"I know the details about all products that 
clients ask me about" 
5.60 1.21 5.50 1.36 -0.10 
Q5 
"When I have doubts about how to best 
serve a client, I discuss with colleagues" 
6.47 0.85 6.21 1.07 -0.25* 
Q6 
"The bank gives me the freedom to serve 
clients in the way I see fit" 
5.73 1.14 5.26 1.30 -0.46*** 
Q7 
"The bank expects me to place the clients’ 
interests above meeting my targets" 
5.22 1.60 4.80 1.71 -0.43* 
Q8 
"The clients’ interests should be placed 
before the bank’s interests" 
6.19 1.14 6.09 1.19 -0.10 
Q9 
"Clients should know themselves if a 
financial product is suitable for them" 
3.37 1.57 3.13 1.45 -0.24 
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The results for questions 1-2 indicate that the ethics program did not have a 
significant effect on employees’ awareness of ethical dilemmas vis-à-vis clients. 
Second,  the results for questions 3-5 indicate that in addition, the ethics program 
did not have a significant effect on employees’ product knowledge and procedures 
for obtaining such knowledge. Surprisingly, there was even a marginally negative 
treatment effect on employees’ propensity to discuss doubts with their colleagues.  
Third, the results from question 6 indicate that the program undermined 
employees’ sense of autonomy: this corresponds to employees’ reluctance to 
implement the client greeting. In addition, this feeling of undermined autonomy 
might explain, at least partially, the ineffectiveness of the program. Furthermore, 
the response to question 7 indicates that the program had a moderately negative 
effect on employees’ perceptions of the importance the bank expects them to place 
on meeting targets vs. behaving ethically vis-à-vis the client. This result may 
indicate that the group meetings made employees more aware of these potentially 
opposing objectives. Another interpretation is that peer influences in the group 
meetings changed employees’ beliefs about the bank’s expectations, for example if 
a less ethical colleague tells them that it’s acceptable not to inform clients about 
certain things. 
 Fourth, the results from statements 8-9 indicate that the program did not 
have a significant effect on employees’ views regarding how they should behave 
vis-à-vis clients; if anything, there appears to be a slight negative effect, although 
not statistically significant. These results correspond with the findings from the 
audit study: although the program had a positive effect on the sub-group of shops 
with below-median average and variance in baseline ethicality, this effect is 
cancelled out by negative effects for other sub-groups.  
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2.4 Discussion  
Summary of main results 
We investigate how an ethics program influences the behavior of front-office 
employees in a large commercial bank. In particular, we considered employee 
behavior vis-à-vis clients in situations where it is in the employees’ interest to 
pursue a product sale, whereas it is presumably better for the client not to do so. 
To this end, we implemented an audit study, whereby professionally trained actors 
visited bank employees who were unaware of their identity as a so-called “mystery 
shopper”. The two-month program consisted of two parts. Firstly, employees were 
instructed to use a new client greeting, which served as a moral reminder. 
Compliance with this part of the program was very limited. Secondly, employees 
held weekly meetings where they discussed ethical dilemmas they encountered 
during their work. According to feedback from the bank and results from an ex-
post survey, compliance with this part of the program was high, with 85% of 
employees in treatment shops reporting they participated in a least one of the 
weekly meetings. Three main results emerge from our study: 
First, the overall level of employee ethicality - as measured using audit 
methodology - is low. Bank employees informed the client about potential 
problems with the product in less than 40% of the cases implemented during the 
baseline. This suggests that despite the various measures taken by governments 
and industry to promote integrity in the financial sector, unethical behavior among 
employees is still commonplace. Second, we find that the ethics program has no 
significant effects on employee behavior in terms of both objective and subjective 
measures of ethical behavior as collected in the audit study. Third, we find 
heterogeneity in the program effects.  In particular, the program has a negative and 
significant effect for shops with higher variance in baseline ethicality, whereas the 
program effect is positive – albeit not statistically significant for shops with low 
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baseline variance. Finally, for shops with below-median average and variance of 
baseline ethicality, the program actually has a positive effect. 
 
Interpretation 
Why do we find a negative treatment effect for shops with high variance in 
baseline ethicality? One possible explanation is related to the notion of 
conformism, where people adjust their behavior in the direction of the behavior 
they observe in others. Conformism is observed in various social behaviors, such 
as charitable giving (Alpizar et al., 2008), energy consumption (Schultz et al., 
2007) and  tax compliance (Bobek et al., 2007). Pierce and Snyder (2012) show 
that inspectors adjust the rate of passing vehicles – an indicator of ethical behavior 
– to the behavior of their co-workers (Pierce and Snyder, 2008). Similarly, Gino et 
al. (2009) show in a lab experiment that when people observe another person 
behaving unethically, they become more inclined to behave unethically themselves 
(Gino et al., 2009). 
In the context of our study, high variance in baseline ethicality implies that 
within a shop, some employees behaved ethically while others behaved 
unethically. In these shops, the group discussions implemented during the ethics 
program may have actually allowed the unethical employees to exert a negative 
effect on the ethical norms of their colleagues. This, in turn, may have caused 
these employees to actually behave less ethically towards clients. 
However, if this interpretation is correct, the question arises as to why the 
unethical employees would have “dragged down” the integrity of their colleagues 
during these meetings, rather than the ethical employees “pushing up” the integrity 
of their unethical peers? One possibility is that employees may seek motivations to 
justify self-serving tendencies and that the exposure to unethical peers provided a 
way for them to engage in “motivated reasoning” (Kunda, 1990). Given such 
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“excuse-driven” tendencies, employees may have selectively incorporated signals 
from unethical peers. 
This interpretation may also account for the positive treatment effect in 
shops with below-median variance, particularly in the sub-group of shops with 
below-median levels of baseline ethicality. According to this view, the positive 
effects of the group meetings in these shops – such as making the client’s interest 
more salient – were stronger than the negative conformity and contagion effects 
observed in the high variance shops.   
 
Limitations 
Several limitations and caveats apply to the findings of this study. First, the 
mystery shopping study method is predicated on the research subjects not being 
aware that they are being studied. We did, however, receive anecdotal reports from 
the bank headquarters that some bank employees had voiced suspicions. In 
particular, it was reported that one bank employee that had rotated to a 
neighboring shop had encountered the same mystery shopper twice, once in her 
main shop and once in the other shop. We cannot refute the possibility that this 
suspicion was shared with other colleagues. However, there are two reasons why 
we consider that these suspicions do not threaten the validity of our main results. 
Firstly, bank employees have encountered mystery shopping in the past, which is 
typically used by banks and other companies to test whether shops adhere to sales 
and marketing protocols. As such, we deem it unlikely that suspicions were 
directly linked to the topic of ethical behavior. Secondly, if indeed there had been 
widespread suspicions about such an audit, we would have expected to observe a 
strong increase in ethical behavior during the last weeks of the program. However, 
no such trend was observed. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that compliance with the program was 
imperfect. In particular, the new client greeting was only used by a very small 
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fraction of bank employees. Anecdotal feedback from the bank indicated this was 
because bank employees did not like being instructed in such a strict way on how 
to communicate with their clients, and that it undermined their sense of autonomy.  
 
Policy relevance and future research 
This study has a number of policy implications. Firstly, it indicates that there is a 
considerable degree of “misbehavior” in the financial sector, despite the 
implementation of various measures by government and industry. Although this 
study considered behavior of employees in one particular bank, and results cannot 
simply be taken as reflective of the industry at large, the finding that there is still 
considerable misbehavior does align with findings from several other recent 
studies (Egan et al., 2016; Mullainathan et al., 2012)  
Second, the insignificant average treatment effect suggests that ethics 
programs and other “soft measures” may not be a panacea for all misbehavior in 
the financial sector and other industries suffering from unethical behavior. In the 
absence of revisions of incentive schemes that can promote behavior that is 
harmful to clients, as illustrated by the recent Wells Fargo scandal, it remains 
questionable as to whether ethics programs will fully solve the problem of 
misbehavior in the financial sector. 
Third, the study suggests that the details matter when it comes to the 
manner in which ethics programs are implemented. For example, if employees 
have the feeling that the ethics program undermines their autonomy, or that it 
provides a signal about low levels of ethical behavior in the organization, these 
programs may actually have an adverse effect. This result aligns with the finding 
that ethical codes of conduct that are not enforced by the organization can be 
perceived by employees as window dressing, and cause a cynical response that 
leads to more unethical behavior (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). Interventions that 
require less active involvement from employees, such as  reminders sent per email 
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or text message (Konrath et al., 2015), might circumvent the negative sentiments 
and low compliance associated with programs that require active involvement of 
employees.  
Finally, our finding that the program did cause an increase in ethical 
behavior among employees in shops with low levels and variance in baseline 
ethicality suggests that such program do have potential to promote ethical 
behavior. And that this applies even in the presence of countervailing incentives 
and with imperfect program implementation. Given the possible “ethical 
contagion” in interventions that are implemented within groups, an interesting 
avenue for future research may be to test interventions that individual employees, 
such as daily “ethics reminders” send to employees via email or text message.  
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Appendix 2.1 Mystery Shopping Instrument 
 
Question Answer options 
Did the employee inform you about the potential downside of the 
product? 
yes/no 
To what extent do you think the employee acted in your interest?  1-7 scale 
To what extent did the employee ask questions to better understand 
your financial situation?  
1-7 scale 
How capable do you think the employee was? 1-7 scale 
How many other clients were present when you left the shop?   Open 
How many bank employees, including the one you spoke with, were 
present in the bank shop during your visit? 
Open 
How busy do you think the employee was? 1-7 scale 
Could other employees or clients hear the conversation?  yes/no 
What is the sex of the employee you spoke with? male/female 
How old do you think the employee was? 
<20 years, 21-30, 
31-40, 41-50, >50 
Did the employee say at the beginning of the conversation that they 
“placed your interest first” (or something similar)? 
yes/no 
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Appendix 2.2 Online Survey Instrument 
 
 
1. In which region/location do you usually work? (dropdown menu) 
2. How many others work in the shop where you typically work? (0-20) 
3. To what extent do you agree with the following statements (0=not at all, 6 =fully) 
a) Sometimes there is tension between what is best for the client vs. the bank 
b) Not every financial product is good for all clients 
c) Pressure at work sometimes makes it difficult to focus on the clients’ best interest 
d) I know which questions to ask clients to understand what’s best for them 
e) I know the details of all products that clients ask me about 
f) When I have doubts about how to best serve a client, I discuss with others in the 
office 
g) The bank gives me the freedom to serve clients in the way I see fit 
h) The bank expects me to place the client’s interest above meeting my targets 
4. To what extent do the people in your team agree with the following statements (0=not 
at all, 6 =fully) 
a) To advance one’s career in the bank one should be flexible on ethical standards 
b) The client’s interest should be placed before the bank’s interest 
c) Clients should know themselves if a financial product is suitable for them 
5. How ethically appropriate/inappropriate do the people in your team consider a bank 
employee acting as described in the scenario? (0=very unacceptable, 6=very 
acceptable) 
a) A client asks a bank employee several questions about travel insurance. While 
doing so, this client mentions that he is a member of the Automobile Association. 
Next, the bank employee recommends SNS travel insurance to the client without 
first asking if the client already has travel insurance via the Automobile 
Association. 
6. Finally, we would like to ask you a few questions about financial products: 
a) A client deposits € 10.000 in a SNS savings account which offers a 0.4% interest 
rate. How much interest will they have earned after 5 years? (A=<€ 200, B=€ 
200, C=>€ 200) 
b) A client has a travel insurance policy with SNS. During their holiday in France 
they accidentally break a vase in a museum. Are these damages covered by the 
insurance? (yes/no) 
c) A client’s income in 2020 will be double that of today, and the price of all 
products and services will have doubled as well. How much can they buy with 
their income in 2020? (A=more than today, B=the same, C=less than today) 
 
 
Recently, several shops participated in the pilot “From Oath to Client” 
7. Did your shop participate? (yes/no) 
If yes: 
8. Did you attend the kickoff during which a video message from the director was 
shown? (yes/no) 
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9. How frequently did you use the new client greeting/slogan? (0=never, 6=very 
often) 
10. How frequently did your colleagues use the new client greeting/slogan? 
(0=never, 6=very often) 
11. How many times did you attend a weekly meeting, during which you discussed 
ethical dilemmas? (0-20) 
12. Were there colleagues present from other shops in your sales region during the 
weekly meetings? (yes/no) 
13. How many times did you share a personal dilemma during the weekly meetings? 
(0-20) 
14. Did you mostly listen or mostly speak during the weekly meetings? (0=mostly 
listen, 6=mostly speak) 
15. How many colleagues (that is, excluding you) were typically present during the 
weekly meetings? (0-10) 
16. How time-consuming was participation in the program? (0 = not at all 6 = very 
much) 
17. Would you recommend the program to other shops or banks? (0 = not at all 6 = 
very much) 
18. What is the most important thing you learned from this pilot? (Open) 
19. If you could change one thing about this pilot, what would it be? (Open) 
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Appendix 2.3 Case Pilot Test mTurk 
A total of N=1198 subjects were recruited via Amazon mTurk to indicate for each 
of the six case scripts how ethically appropriate or inappropriate they found the 
described behavior of the bank employee. A scale ranging from -3 (very 
inappropriate) to +3 (very appropriate) was used for this purpose. As can be seen 
in table A1, the average ethicality rating was below zero in all six cases, and a 
majority of subjects rated the described response as ethically inappropriate. 
 
Table 2.11 Ethicality ratings, per case 
Case Average rating Fraction rated as unethical Obs. 
1 -0.588 0.552 1198 
2 -1.989 0.908 1198 
3 -2.428 0.945 1198 
4 -0.810 0.593 1198 
5 -0.552 0.532 1198 
6 -1.763 0.848 1198 
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Chapter 3  
 
 
Professional Expertise and the 
Reference Group Bias* 
 
 
“Experto credito” Virgil, 19 B.C. 
 (Trust me, for I have experienced) 
 
Abstract 
The amount of charitable funds allocated to disasters, diseases and other problems 
is disproportional to the number of people that are affected. One proposed 
explanation for this is the reference group bias, which is the tendency to place 
more weight on the fraction of people than on the absolute number of people that 
can be helped. Evidence for bias is derived from experiments with students. 
However, it is unclear whether professionals in charitable organizations are 
similarly prone to this bias. In two studies with students and professionals we find 
evidence for the reference group bias among both students and professionals. 
Furthermore, our second study shows that susceptibility to the bias, particularly for 
non-experts, is reduced when projects are evaluated jointly rather than separately. 
                                                     
*  Joint work with Dinand Webbink.  
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3.1 Introduction 
A large amount of charitable funds is allocated to problems that afflict relatively 
few people. For example, over $3 billion in charitable funds were collected in the 
U.S in the wake of the 2005 Katrina hurricane, which directly affected 
approximately 2 million people. In comparison, during the same year less than $1 
billion was allocated to fight malaria, a disease which annually affects over 300 
million people (Epstein, 2006). One proposed explanation for this disproportional 
allocation of funds is that people prefer helping a larger fraction of victims than a 
larger absolute number of victims (a “larger drop in a larger ocean”). It is further 
proposed that people are ‘psychologically numbed’ when faced with large 
numbers of victims and that this numbing has resulted in a failure to motivate 
action in the face of mass murders and genocide (Slovic, 2007).  
This tendency to discount the value of lives of people that are part of large 
groups of victims is known as the ‘reference group effect’ or ‘proportion 
dominance effect’ and has been demonstrated in a number of lab experiments with 
student populations (Baron, 1997; Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997; Friedrich et al., 
1999; Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997; Slovic et al., 2007). 
 In practice however, a large fraction of charitable funds are allocated to 
specific projects by professionals in foundations, governments and development 
agencies. As various studies show that results from behavioral experiments with 
student populations do not correspond to results obtained with other non-student 
populations (Falk et al., 2013; Gaudecker et al., 2012; Peterson, 2001; Stoop et al., 
2012) this raises the question whether these professionals are similarly prone to 
the reference group bias. 
In this study we test whether professionals from the charitable sector are 
similarly prone to the reference group bias as student populations in previous 
studies. To this aim, we conduct two studies with both students and professionals 
in the charitable sector. Subjects were presented with a set of hypothetical cases 
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about funding proposals for charitable projects that addressed various life-
threatening problems. This is the same approach as in previous studies on 
proportion dominance and the reference group bias (Bartels, 2006; 
Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997; Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997; Small et al., 2007). 
The cases varied in terms of both the absolute number of lives that could be saved 
and the size of the reference group.  We find that both studies that experts and 
non-experts display the reference group bias, although experts are somewhat less 
biased in the second study.  
Furthermore, we study whether enabling subjects to evaluate projects in a 
comparative rather than sequential manner can alleviate the reference group bias. 
This part of our study builds on previous research on preference reversals between 
separate and joint evaluation (Hsee and Zhang, 2010; Ritov and Baron, 2011), 
which indicates that attributes which are hard to evaluate in isolation, such as 
absolute numbers, have greater decision weight in joint evaluation because this 
makes it easier to evaluate these features. In line with this research we expected 
that in joint evaluation modus subjects would be less susceptible to the reference 
group bias. Furthermore, we were curious whether the effect of joint evaluation 
differed between experts and non-experts. If experts would feel more compelled to 
maximize life savings, their susceptibility might be more strongly reduced by the 
joint evaluation modus than among non-experts. Our results indicate that indeed 
the reference group bias was reduced in joint evaluation, although this effect was 
not significantly greater for experts. A possible explanation for this is that already 
in the separate evaluation modus the experts were less susceptible to the reference 
group bias.   
As such, this study contributes to the literature on expert decision making 
and is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study to test the reference group bias 
among professionals. Furthermore, this study indicates that the evaluation 
framework can alleviate in part the susceptibility to the bias. Our findings suggest 
that the disproportionate allocation of charitable funds to identifiable victims is 
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partially caused by the proportion dominance bias in expert fund allocation. The 
paper proceeds as follows. In chapter 2 we provide an overview of the literature on 
the reference group bias and expert decision biases. In chapters 3 and 4 we 
describe the methodology, estimation strategy and results for our studies. Finally, 
in chapter 5 we conclude by discussing the results. 
3.2  Background 
 
Reference group bias   
People typically prefer to help specified victims, such as “two young 
children from Haiti named Maria and Jose whose parents were recently killed due 
to a flooding”, rather than statistical victims, such as an “as-of-yet unknown 
children somewhere in the tropics whose parents may soon die from a curable 
disease such as HIV-AIDS”. This preference is attributed to multiple factors (Jenni 
and Loewenstein, 1997). Firstly, identifiable victims are more vivid: people can 
observe them and thus their empathy can be invoked more, whereas they cannot 
observe a statistical victim. However, identifiability of victims does not always 
lead to more willingness to allocate vaccines to hypothetical victims (Wiss et al., 
2015). Another reasons why people tend to prefer to help specific rather than 
statistical victims is that the latter are by definition uncertain – although it is likely 
that many children will soon be orphaned due to HIV-AIDS it is not absolutely 
certain. Thirdly and relatedly, identifiable victims are considered after they have 
become victims, whereas statistical victims are considered as such before they are 
actually victims. Finally, identifiable victims are often framed as stand-alone cases 
such as in the “Maria from Haiti” example, whereas statistical victims are by 
definition part of a larger problem. As such, people thus typically prefer saving 1-
out-of-1 identifiable victims over saving 2-out-many statistical victims. Of these 
various dimensions along which identifiable and statistical victims differ, the 
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reference group dimension has been shown to have the greatest effect on people’s 
willingness to save lives (Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997).  
This ‘reference group’ bias was replicated in various subsequent 
experiments.  For example, Baron (1997) found that people’s willingness to pay 
for hypothetical cases of treatment of sick people was lower for cases where the 
number of people that could not be cured was higher, even when the number that 
could be cured was kept constant. In a second experiment, willingness to pay for 
reducing deaths for various causes was insensitive to whether the live savings 
were as framed as percentages or absolute quantities (Baron, 1997).    
Comparable results were found in several other experiments. For example,  
Fetherstonhaugh (1997) measured preference over pairs of hypothetical 
government programs that aimed at providing drinking water to save the lives of 
4500 Rwandan refugees suffering from cholera. The programs only differed in the 
total size of the refugee camp (11,000 vs. 250,000 lives) and subjects preferred 
programs for the smaller camps (Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997).  Friedrich et al. 
(1999) also replicated the reference group bias by an experiment with hypothetical 
cases about life-saving antilock brake requirement in which support for this 
requirement decreasing in the size of the reference group (Friedrich et al., 1999). 
Next, Slovic et al. (2007) asked people to state their support for purchasing of 
equipment to save lives in the case of airplane crashes. One group was informed 
that this could save 150 lives in such an event. Other groups were informed that it 
could respectively save 98%, 95%, 90% & 85% of the 150 lives. The willingness 
to contribute was higher for the latter groups, even though in those groups the 
absolute number of lives saved was lower (Slovic, 2007). 
The reference group bias is a manifestation of a more general 
psychological tendency for people to place more decision weight on attributes that 
can be more easily evaluated (Hsee and Zhang, 2010).  People typically find it 
easier to evaluate proportions than absolute quantities, especially in a context 
where they lack prior knowledge,. For example, continental Europeans will find it 
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difficult to assign a prize to 0.043 gallons of beer (an absolute quantity). However, 
when asked about a half-full regular-sized glass of beer (a proportion) it will be 
much easier to make this evaluation. As such, proportions are typically given more 
weight in decisions than absolute numbers. 
However, when multiple options are evaluated simultaneously, absolute 
quantities can be compared and thus became easier to evaluate. As a result, 
preference reversals can occur when people shift from separate to joint evaluation. 
To demonstrate this, Fetherstonhaugh (1997) asked subjects to rank treatments for 
diseases which saved different absolute and relative numbers of people. While 
subjects gave higher rankings to projects that saved higher proportions of lives 
under separate evaluation, in the joint evaluation mode this preference switched to 
treatments that saved more lives in absolute terms (Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997).  
 However, all lab-experiments about proportion dominance and the 
reference group bias that have hitherto been conducted made use of student 
populations. Bartels (2006) notes that undergraduates are usually not used to 
making policy choices about life-and-death cases and suggests that lack of 
expertise might contribute to their susceptibility to the reference group bias 
(Bartels, 2006). This thus raises the question if professionals in charitable 
organizations are similarly susceptible to the reference group bias when allocating 
funds to projects.  
 
Expert decision making 
In certain domains experts are less susceptible to cognitive bias. For 
example, Marteau (1989) shows that medical students, when deciding between 
treatments, are less susceptible to a framing bias when they were asked to take the 
perspective of a patient than in the doctor’s perspective Furthermore, susceptibility 
to cognitive biases also differs between groups of professionals and depend on 
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various factors, including whether the decision task can be decomposed in smaller 
tasks (Shanteau, 1992)..   
In tasks that involve social comparisons, expertise does not always lead to 
better judgment and decision-making. In a seminal study (Kruger and Dunning, 
1999) show that unskilled individuals tend to overestimate their own ability 
whereas skilled individuals are more likely to underestimate their ability.  In a 
similar vein, expertise has been shown to affect how well people are able to 
estimate the level of knowledge of others. (Hinds, 1999) shows experts 
(salespeople) score worse than intermediate users (customers) in terms of 
predicting the performance of novices in a complex task involving advanced 
cellphone technology. Bromme et al., (2001) however show that IT professionals 
are better in predicting the level of knowledge about computer related topics 
among students than are laypersons.  In the domain of finance, (Kaustia and 
Knüpfer, 2008a) find a negative relation between expertise and financial returns, 
as investors overweigh personal experience compared to rational Bayesian 
learning.  .  In the case of charitable donations, this could mean that professionals 
are sensitive to cognitive biases when allocating funds on behalf of donors than 
they would be when allocating their own money.  
There are also a number of studies that show that cognitive biases are 
insensitive to professional experience. Kahneman and Klein (2009) review the 
literate on expert judgment and highlight various studies in which people who 
have extensive expertise in their respective fields incorrectly apply various 
heuristics, resulting in errors and biases in their decision making.  They show that 
faulty statistical intuitions manifest even in experienced statisticians, in an 
experiment on choosing the number of cases for a psychological experiment. 
Similarly, Camerer and Johnson (1991) review the literature on expert decision 
making in clinical and medical domains and conclude the following: “the 
depressing conclusion from these studies is that expert judgments in these domains 
are no more accurate than those of lightly trained novices”.   Northcraft and Neale 
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(1987) show that real-estate agents’ estimates of the value of various properties 
was biased towards the starting-list prices, an effect known as the anchoring bias.  
Another bias to which both students and professionals are susceptible is the 
confirmation bias; the tendency to selectively search for- and attach more weight 
to- pieces of data supporting pre-existing beliefs. This bias was displayed in lab 
experiments by students (Jonas et al., 2001; Jones and Sugden, 2001; Nickerson, 
1998) as well as by employees of the World Bank (2015). Furthermore, World 
Bank employees were also susceptible to the sunk cost bias – the tendency to base 
decisions about future actions based on costs incurred in the past that cannot be 
changed and undone anymore (ibid).  
Given this mixed evidence it is thus unclear ex-ante whether professionals 
in charitable organizations are less likely to display the reference group bias in 
allocating funds than novices.  
 
3.3  Study 1 
Participants  
The first session was conducted during an annual conference of the Dutch 
charitable sector in Rotterdam, the Netherlands in September 2011. Most 
participants at this conference were professionals from charitable institutions in 
the Netherlands. During the conference they could sign up to take part in the 
experiment; 89 individuals participated in the experiment. The second session was 
conducted in 2012 with undergraduate students of the Erasmus School of 
Economics. In this experiment 46 students participated. The third experiment was 
conducted in 2013, through an online survey with participants of the 2013 annual 
conference of the Dutch charitable sector in Rotterdam. In this session 60 
individuals participated. The first two experiments were conducted in a lab setting; 
the first experiment was conducted in an auditorium during a conference about 
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philanthropy at Erasmus University, the second experiment was conducted in a 
classroom with economics students. In both these sessions a hardcopy version of 
the survey cases was used.  
Background characteristics on gender, age and occupational sector 
were collected in a short questionnaire. Moreover, individuals were asked 
about the expertise in allocating funds to social projects, see appendix 2. 
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the three experiments and for the 
treatment groups within each experiment. The second experiment was done 
among students at the Erasmus School of Economics which explains the 
age difference with the other two experiments. More than half of the 
participants in the first and third experiment reported to have professional 
experience in allocating funds to social projects: these subjects were 
classified as ‘experts’. The second experiment focused on a sample of 
students and therefore, does not contain experts.  
We tested whether there were differences in the covariates between 
the treatment groups within each session. The p-values in the Table 2 show 
that there were no statistically significant differences in gender, age and 
expertise between the sessions, implying that the random assigned to the 
two treatment groups was successful.  Information on expertise was missing 
for 14 observations, which were discarded in the regression analyses. For 
observations for which age and gender information was missing (10 and 9 
observations respectively) we imputed the sample averages, and we 
included a dummy for these imputed values in the analyses.  
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics per session 
    
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Full sample 
  
Group Mean P-val.  Mean P-val. Mean P-val. Mean P-val. 
Male (%) 1 0.47 
0.45 
0.67 
0.92 
0.58 
0.11 
0.55 
0.18 
 
2 0.39 0.68 0.36 0.45 
Age (years) 1 45.04 
0.54 
21.79 
0.26 
48.08 
0.21 
40.91 
0.16 
 
2 43.27 21.00 43.76 37.83 
Expertise 
(%) 
1 0.67 
0.25 
0.00 
0.00 
0.58 
0.36 
0.49 
0.16 
 
2 0.55 0.00 0.45 0.39 
Nr. of obs. Total 89   46   60   195   
 
Materials and procedures 
To investigate the relationship between professional expertise and the 
susceptibility to the proportion dominance bias we conducted three experiments 
where we measured subjects’ willingness to contribute (WTC) to various 
hypothetical health projects targeting victims and potential victims of various 
diseases in several countries in Sub-Sahara Africa. A detailed description of these 
cases is provided in the next section.  
As is common in studies on the reference group bias we made use of 
hypothetical cases. Subjects were asked to imagine that they were in charge of 
evaluating proposals that required a subsidy of €50,000 from a large philanthropic 
institution. They were informed that the philanthropic institution had enough funds 
to grant each proposal but that a critical evaluation of each individual proposal was 
requested. Next, they were informed that they would be shown a number of 
proposals in sequential manner and asked to state for each of these their 
willingness to grant the subsidy on a 10 point scale.  Subsequently, participants 
were given eight consecutive proposals for funding for public health programs in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The proposals varied on the following dimensions: type of 
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disease, region, number of lives that could be saved, and size of reference group. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two groups. Subjects in both groups 
were presented eight cases with between group variation in the number of lives to 
be saved and the size of the reference group.  This randomization allows for 
differentiating between the effects of the case specifics (country and disease) and 
the effects of the absolute and relative number of lives on subjects’ willingness to 
support the projects. An overview of the cases is shown in table 1, for wording of 
the vignettes please see appendix 3.3.  
 
Table 3.2 Characteristics of cases for subsidy applications 
Case Group 1 Group 2 
 
Nr. Disease Country Lives  Reference 
group  
Lives  Reference 
group  
 
1 Shigellosis Uganda 500 1.000 500 500.000 
 
2 Typhoid Tanzania 750 50.000 500 1.000 
 
3 Noma Zambia 500 1.000 750 20.000 
 
4 Cholera Cameroun 500 150.000 500 1.000 
 
5 Kala-azar Nigeria 750 500.000 500 1.000 
 
6 Trypano Ethiopia 500 1.000 750 150.000 
 
7 Dengue Sudan 500 1.000 500 50.000 
 
8 Lassa Mali 500 20.000 500 1.000 
Subsequently, the proposals were handed out in hard-copy for the first two 
experiments, and online for the third experiment. In the first two experiments, 
participants were asked to evaluate the proposals in the order in which these were 
presented. It was stressed that each case was to be assessed independently. 
Participants were asked to imagine that the hypothetical budget, although 
sufficient to fund each proposal, was finite and that they hence should assess each 
case critically and specify their WTC for each case accordingly.  
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Empirical strategy 
To identify the effect of the reference group we first estimate the following model: 
 
Yij = β0 + β1Lij + β2Rij + ε (3.1) 
 
in which Yij, represents the willingness of individual i to contribute to case j 
(WTC), L is the absolute number of lives that can be saved, and R is the (natural 
logarithm) of the reference group size, ε are unobserved factors and β0, β1, β2 are 
parameters to be estimated16. The parameter β2 represents the reference group bias. 
Estimates of the parameter β2 can be interpreted as the causal effect of the size of 
the reference group because the cases, which have different combinations of L and 
R, are randomly assigned to individuals. Hence, it is unlikely that unobserved 
factors will be correlated with R. 
Next, we study whether there are difference in the allocation decisions of 
experts and non-experts. This is done by adding a dummy variable E for being an 
expert and by interacting expertise (E) with the absolute number of lives saved (L) 
and with the size of the reference group (R): 
 
Yij = β0 + β1Lij + β2Rij + β3Ei + β4Ei*Lij + β5Ei*Rij + εij   (3.2) 
 
As a robustness test, we estimate the model in equation (3.2) by adding additional 
controls for age, gender, case specifics (country and type of disease), and the 
experimental session. Furthermore, we test the robustness of the results for 
excluding the last case as we observed in our data that individuals had a higher 
willingness to contribute to the last case.  As a final robustness test we include 
individual fixed effects, denoted by αi, as specified in equation:  
                                                     
16 We use the natural logarithm because the reference group size increases non-linearly (1, 20, 50, 
150, 500 thousand).  
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Yij = β0 + β1Lij + β2Rij + β3Ei*Lij + β4Ei*Rij +αi + εi   (3.3) 
 
We start by estimating these models for the pooled data of all three experiments, 
and subsequently we estimate equation (3.3) separately for each of the three 
experiments. 
 
Results 
Figure 3.1 shows the average willingness to contribute to the projects (WTC) 
according to the number of lives that can be saved (500 or 750), for both experts 
and non-experts. We observe that non-experts are more likely to contribute to 
projects than experts. Remarkably, the willingness to contribute seems to be 
independent of the number of lives that can be saved. This holds both for experts 
as for non-experts; the differences are statistically insignificant.  
 
Figure 3-1 WTC and absolute number of lives 
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Figure 3-2 shows the relationship between the willingness to contribute (WTC) 
and the size of the reference group, both for experts as for non-experts. For both 
groups we observe that the WTC decreases with the size of the reference-group. 
This suggests that both experts and non-experts suffer from reference-group bias. 
 
Figure 3-2 WTC and reference group size 
 
 
In all specifications of the regression model in equation (3.1) we observe that 
willingness to contribute decreases in the size of the logarithm of the reference 
group (P<0.01)17. The results from the model specification in equation (3.2) show 
that, although willingness to contribute is lower for experts, there are no 
differences between experts and non-experts terms of in susceptibility to the 
reference group effect, as indicated by the non-significant coefficients on the 
“reference group*expertise” interaction variable (p>0.1). These findings are robust 
                                                     
17 Detailed results of the regression analysis described in this section are provided in appendix 3.1. 
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to adding controls and to excluding observations from the eighth case as outlined 
in equation (3.3).  
As a next step in the analysis we investigate the effects within each 
session. In all three experiments we find a negative effect of the size of the 
reference group on the willingness to contribute. Statistically significant effects are 
found for the second experiment (p<0.1) and third experiment (p<0.01). Again, we 
find no difference between the decisions of experts and non-experts. Hence, the 
results for the separate experiments are consistent with the results for the pooled 
sample.  
At the end of the survey, after individuals had decided on the allocation of 
funds over the cases, they were asked to rank the importance of the following 
factors in their evaluation of the cases: (i) absolute number of lives saved, (ii) 
relative number of lives saved, (iii) other contextual factors (disease, region and 
country).  Table 3 shows the answers of experts and non-experts.  
 
Table 3.3 Self-reported decision criterion 
Main criterion18 Experts Non-experts 
Lives, absolute 27.9% 32.2% 
Lives, relative 24.6% 31.2% 
Other19 47.5% 36.6% 
Total 100% 100% 
 
Almost half of the experts reported contextual factors (country, region, disease) as 
the main criteria for their allocation decisions, whereas non-experts more 
frequently listed the absolute number of lives. This difference is statistically 
significant (t(194)=-1.823, P=0.068).  Furthermore, non-experts were more likely 
                                                     
18 This table includes the observations for which the survey question on decision criteria (see 
appendix 1) was fully filled out (159 out of 195 observations) and for which the three respective 
classes of criteria were ranked: observations for which some or all criteria were equally ranked (154 
out of the 159). 
19 Other factors are: (i) country, (ii) region, (iii) disease 
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than experts to list (i) the absolute number of lives and (ii) the relative number of 
lives as the main decision criteria, but these differences are not significant at the 
10 %-level.  
 Next, we explored whether this self-reported ranking of decision criteria 
corresponds to actual choices, and whether expertise affects this correspondence. 
To this purpose we estimated Equation (3.3) according to the reported decision 
criteria. We find that the ranking does correspond with actual choices: for 
individuals that listed “absolute number of lives” as the main criterion WTC 
increases in absolute number of lives (P<0.01) but does not increase significantly 
in the size of the reference group, For subjects that ranked “relative number of 
lives” as main decision criterion the results are the opposite: WTC decreases in the 
size of the reference group (P<0.01) but is not affected by the absolute lives. 
Finally, for subjects that ranked “context” as the main criterion the coefficients on 
absolute or relative number of lives are statistically not significant. Again we find 
that the estimated effects on the interaction terms “expertise*lives saved” and 
“expertise*reference group” are statistically insignificant in all regressions. 
3.4 Study 2 
In order to calculate the cost-effectiveness of projects, for example in terms of 
lives saved, it is essential for donors to have an indication of the total costs. 
However, in reality the costs of projects are not always clear ex-ante. This was 
reflected in the vignettes used in the first study, in which estimated project costs 
were only mentioned at the beginning of the instructions. A concern with this 
approach is  that professionals – based on their working experience – made 
different inferences and estimates of the project costs, which in turn could have 
influenced their reported “willingness to contribute” to these project, independent 
of the absolute and relative number of lives that could be saved. To address this 
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issue we conducted a second study in which we explicitly stated the costs for each 
project that subjects were asked to evaluate.  
Furthermore, our first study asked subjects to evaluate individual projects, 
whereas in reality donors as well as professionals often evaluate several projects 
simultaneously, and make their evaluation in a comparative manner. Research 
shows that shifting from a separate- to joint evaluation modus can cause 
preference reversals, whereby the attention of the decision maker is shifted from 
choice attributes that are easier to assess in the separate evaluation to attributes 
that become easier to assess in the joint evaluation modus (Hsee and Zhang, 2010). 
This so-called evaluability bias has been shown to occur in various contexts. For 
example, (Ritov and Baron, 2011) find that a shift from separate to joint evaluation 
of public policies moves the focus from emotions that are aroused by the projects 
towards the more cognitive rating of the priority of the policy. In a similar vein, 
(Caviola et al., 2014) find that in the context of charitable donations, moving from 
separate to joint evaluation shifted focus from overhead expenses towards cost-
effectiveness.  
These results suggest that the reference group bias might be mitigated by 
joint evaluation of projects. The rationale here is that in the separate evaluation 
modus people focus more on the size of the reference group, whereas in the joint 
evaluation condition the number of lives that can be saved becomes an easier-to-
evaluate attribute, which in turn would shift preferences towards projects with 
greater cost-effectiveness. This further raises the questions whether the magnitude 
of such a preference reversal differs between novices and experts. For example, it 
could be that experts are more trained to compare projects in terms of cost-
effectiveness, in which case the comparison modus would have a greater effect on 
their evaluations. To explore this question, we include in our second study first a 
series of projects that are evaluated separately, followed by second part where 
these projects are presented in pairs. Through this within-subject design, we study 
whether joint evaluation reduces susceptibility to the reference group bias and 
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whether this possible preference reversal is more pronounced among 
professionals.  
 
Participants 
The second study was conducted among a group of students at Erasmus University 
and among a group of professionals with experience in the allocation of funds 
towards social projects.  Both groups were invited per email, students via the 
University mailing list for economics experiments and professionals via an 
emailing list of the Erasmus Centre of Strategic Philanthropy.  The experiment 
was conducted through an online survey and each subject could participate in this 
survey once. The responses were collected in the period Sep. 2016 – April 2017. A 
total of 121 students and 39 professionals participated in this online survey 
experiment. Background characteristics on gender, age and occupational sector 
were collected in a short questionnaire. Moreover, individuals were asked about 
their experience in allocating funds to social projects, see annex V. Table 3.4 
shows summary statistics for the experiments grouped by subject type. As 
expected, the average age of professionals was significantly higher. We control for 
this in our regression analyses.  
 
Table 3.4 Subject characteristics, study 2 
 
Session 1 
 
Group Mean P-val. 
Male (%) Non-experts 50.1 
0.28 
 
Experts 48.7 
Age (years) Non-experts 25.5 
0.00 
 
Experts 42.2 
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Materials and procedures 
Subjects received a short email inviting them to participate in a short study on 
decision-making. This email contained the link to the online survey. Furthermore, 
to promote the response rate, subjects in both groups were informed that among 
the first 100 participants a total 10 gift vouchers with value of €25 would be 
randomly assigned. After clicking on the survey link, subjects were guided to the 
online survey which started with instructions in which subjects were asked to 
imagine that they were working for an organization that provides support to 
refugees in developing countries. Our vignette survey was based on the instrument 
used by (Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997). Subjects were instructed to evaluate 
proposals from organizations that try to provide clean drinking water to sick 
people in refugee camps in South-Sudan. Subjects were instructed that the delivery 
of clean drinking water would save these patients’ from near-certain death 
otherwise. It was explicitly noted to subjects that all projects costs approximately 
€50.000 (for a detailed overview see appendix XI).  The vignettes indicated for 
each project the respective location of the refugee camp, the number of lives 
threatened by the disease, the percentage of lives that could be saved without the 
project, and the percentage of lives that could be saved with the project. Table 5 
provides an overview of the projects. Subjects were first presented these projects 
separately, and were asked for each project to indicate how the perceived benefits 
of this project on a 0-8 scale, and whether or not they would be willing to provide 
a €50.000 subsidy to the project. Subsequently, they were presented with pairs of 
projects (p1-p3, p2-p4, p5-p7, p6-p8) and asked to indicate which project they 
would prefer on a seven-point scale ranging from “strong preference for project 
A” to “strong preference for project B”.  
The projects were paired such that the absolute number of lives that could 
be saved was equal within each pair. According to evaluability bias theory, this 
joint evaluation modus is expected to make subjects (more) indifferent between 
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the projects within these pairings, as it becomes easier to see that both projects 
have the same cost-effectiveneness. At the end of these tasks, subjects were asked 
to fill out a short survey with questions about demographics, as well as several 
questions to check their understanding of the projects, and a 10-item instrument to 
measure whether their thinking style was more “rational” or more “experiential” 
(the REI-10 inventory, see appendix V). This instrument was used since previous 
research (Bartels, 2006) has shown that susceptibility to the reference group bias 
strongly correlated with scores on this instrument, with a more “rational” thinking 
style being associated with lower susceptibility to the reference group bias.  
 
Table 3.5 Overview of cases, study 2 
Project City Number of lives 
threatened by 
disease 
% of lives saved 
without project 
% of lives 
saved  
with project 
1 Gok Machar 10,000 5% 50% 
2 Melut 10,000 50% 95% 
3 Abiemnom 225,000 5% 7% 
4 Bentiu 225,000 93% 95% 
5 Ghaat 5,000 5% 50% 
6 Paloich 5,000 50% 95% 
7 Geigar 112,500 5% 7% 
8 Marial Bai 112,500 93% 95% 
 
Empirical strategy 
To estimate the effect of expertise on susceptibility to the reference group bias we 
use the same regression models as specified in the first study (models 3.1-3.3). To 
estimate the effect of switching from separate to joint evaluation of projects we 
first compute the differences between the ratings for the two separate projects that 
were paired in the joint evaluation modus, as to be able to determine whether 
subjects preferred project A or project B. In each pairing, the absolute number of 
lives that could be saved was identical, whereas the reference group was smaller in 
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project A. This ranking variable is denoted as variable Yij. Each pair of cases is 
denoted by the subscript j. For example, project 1 (reference group of N=10.000) 
was paired with project 3 (reference group of N=225.000). If a subject gave a 
higher rating to project 1 the dependent variable was assigned value=1, whereas if 
the rating of was lower or equal the dependent variable was assigned value=1. 
To estimate the effect of the joint evaluation modus we use an OLS model 
in which we regress variable Yij on the variable “joint evaluation” (Jij) with value 
equal to one if the projects were presented jointly and zero if separately.  We 
interact this joint evaluation variable with expertise (J*Eij) to test if experts benefit 
more from the joint evaluation modus. As a robustness check we control for age, 
gender and thinking style as measured with the REI-10 inventory: 
 
Yij = β0 + β1Jij + β2J*Eij + αi + εij   (4.1) 
 
Results 
Figure 3.3 indicates the preference rating for professionals and non-professionals, 
according to the absolute number of lives to be saved. For both groups the project 
ratings is higher in projects where 4.500 lives can be saved than in cases where 
2.250 lives can be saved. A two-sample t-test shows that these differences are 
statistically insignificant for non-experts (Pr(|T|>|t|) = 0.1289) and only significant 
at the 10 percent level for experts (Pr(|T|>|t|) = 0.0730). The results from our 
regression analyses similarly indicate that project rating increases in number of 
lives, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficients on the variable “lives 
saved” in all specifications, both for the OLS and fixed effects models 
(P>|t|<0.01). Furthermore, we find no significant difference between experts and 
non-experts in terms of this effect, as indicated by the insignificant coefficient on 
the variable “expertise*lives saved”. 
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Figure 3-3 Project rating and number of lives saved, study 2
 
Next, we investigate sensitivity to the reference group bias. As reflected in figure 
3-4 both experts and non-experts give lower ratings to projects with larger 
reference groups. These differences are significant both for non-experts (Pr(|T|>|t|) 
= 0.0000) and experts (Pr(|T|>|t|) = 0.0387). Similar results are found when 
comparing responses to the question in which subjects are asked whether or not 
they wish to support the project. In line with these results we find that both groups 
are susceptible to the reference group bias, as indicated by the positive coefficient 
on the variable “reference group size” (P>|t|<0.01) in both the OLS and fixed 
effect model specifications. Furthermore, we find that experts are slightly less 
susceptible to the reference group bias (P>|t|<0.1), as indicated by positive 
coefficient on the interaction term “expertise*reference group size” in OLS 
specification 4 and FE specification 3.  
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Figure 3-4 Project rating and reference group, study 2 
 
We then turn to the issue how the evaluation mode influences project assessment. 
In the separate evaluation mode subjects are shown eight individual projects 
sequentially. In the joint evaluation mode subjects are shown these same eight 
projects grouped in four pairings. Each pairing consists of two projects that differ 
in the size of the reference group, but have the same absolute number of lives that 
can be saved. In order to compare the assessment of cases across these two 
evaluation modes, we construct a variable with value=1 if subjects preferred the 
project with a smaller reference group, and value=0 if otherwise. For example, if 
in the separate evaluation modes the subject gave a rating of 6 to project 1 (small 
reference group) and a rating of 1 to project 3 (large reference group) the 
dependent variable “preference for project with smaller reference group” is 
assigned value=1. Similarly, if in joint evaluation mode the subject rated project 3 
as being more favorable than project 1 the dependent variable is assigned value=0.  
 Our main result is that joint evaluation of projects significantly reduces the 
propensity to prefer projects with a smaller reference group in situations where the 
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absolute number of lives that can be saved is the same. This result is found in 
Mann-Whitney test (z-score=4.627, Pr.>|z|=0.00) as well as in the first OLS 
regression with subject fixed effects as presented in appendix 3 (coefficient= -
0.137, robust standard error=0.038). In other words, we find that the joint 
evaluation mode makes people less susceptible to the reference group bias. 
Subsequently, we investigate whether the effect of the joint evaluation mode on 
susceptibility to the reference group bias is different for experts and non-experts.  
Our results indicate that the effect is stronger for non-experts.  The results from 
our second and third model specifications show a positive, albeit statistically 
insignificant, coefficient on the variable “Joint evaluation*expertise” 
(coefficient=0.145, robust standard error=0.089). This indicates that non-experts 
benefit more from the joint evaluation mode. This result could be related to the 
fact that non-experts subject in this experiment were slightly more susceptible to 
the reference group bias to begin with, so they had more to gain from having the 
cases presented to them in pairs. 
 
Figure 3-5 Evaluation mode,  expertise and bias 
  Preference for smaller reference group 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Joint evaluation -0.137*** -0.177*** -0.177*** 
 
(0.038) (0.042) (0.042) 
Joint evalation*expertise 
 
0.145 0.145 
  
(0.089) (0.089) 
Pair controls No No Yes 
Constant 0.565*** 0.565*** 0.569*** 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.025) 
Observations 1,136 1,136 1,136 
R-squared 0.033 0.040 0.044 
Number of subjects 142 142 142 
OLS regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is whether or not for a 
pair of projects, which were presented first sequentially and later jointly,  subjects had a preference 
for the project with the smaller reference group (1=yes, 0=no). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.5 Conclusion 
In this study we investigate the role of the reference group bias in the 
disproportionate allocation of charitable funds to projects that target victims in 
relatively small populations, rather than victims in wider populations. In line with 
previous studies we use hypothetical cases with variation in the absolute and 
relative number of lives that can be saved.  We find that project evaluations are 
indeed more strongly affected by their potential for relative life savings rather than 
their potential for absolute live savings. Through a series of experiments with 
students as well as professionals from the charitable sector in the Netherlands we 
find that this bias occurs in both experts and non-experts. It is worth noting that 
the reference group bias is just one potential driver for the disproportionate 
allocation of funds to certain causes, next to factors such as social distance 
between donors and recipients (Engel, 2011a) and purported urgency of the 
respective problems (Sargeant, 1999). Furthermore, we find that among this 
professionals with experience in the allocating of funds to social projects are only 
slightly less susceptible to the bias than professionals without this expertise. This 
finding is in line with studies that show that cognitive biases are displayed by 
professionals in a range of domains, including medicine, finance and international 
development. 
Subsequently, we find that susceptibility to the reference group bias can be 
reduced through joint- rather than separate evaluation of projects. This finding is 
in line with previous studies that show that subjects attach more decision weight to 
choice attributes as these attributes become easier to evaluate through between-
option comparison (Caviola et al., 2014; Ritov and Baron, 2011). In sum, our 
study provides evidence that the tendency to favor relative life savings over 
absolute life savings is pervasive both among students as among professionals 
within organizations that allocate funds to charitable projects.  
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Appendix 3.1 Results and Instructions (study 1) 
 
Regression tables 
 
Table 3.6 OLS-estimates of reference group effect, pooled data 
  Willingness to Contribute 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Reference group (log) -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.108*** -0.083** -0.100** 
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.037) (0.039) (0.041) 
Number of lives saved 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 0.001** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Expertise 
 
-1.246*** -0.998* -0.367 -0.506 
  
(0.265) (0.593) (0.640) (0.658) 
Expertise*ref.group 
  
0.011 0.000 0.008 
   
(0.052) (0.053) (0.053) 
Expertise*lives 
  
-0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
   
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Subject controls No No No Yes Yes 
Case controls No No No Yes Yes 
Session controls No No No Yes Yes 
Last case excl. No No No No Yes 
Observations 1,556 1,556 1,556 1,548 1,354 
R-squared 0.008 0.072 0.072 0.144 0.134 
OLS regression with robust standard errors in parentheses, The dependent variable is the reported 
likelihood of support the project on a 1-10 scale. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.7 Fixed effects estimates of reference group effect, pooled data 
  Willingness to Contribute 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reference group (log) -0.103*** -0.108*** -0.081** -0.081** 
 
(0.026) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) 
Number of lives saved 0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Expertise*ref.group 
 
0.012 -0.000 0.000 
  
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Expertise*lives 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Case controls No No Yes Yes 
Excl. last case No No No Yes 
Observations 1,556 1,556 1,556 1,361 
R-squared 0.021 0.021 0.073 0.038 
Number of subjects 195 195 195 195 
OLS regression with robust standard errors in parentheses, The dependent variable is the reported 
likelihood of support the project on a 1-10 scale. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.8 Fixed effect estimates of reference group effect, per session 
  
  Willingness to Contribute (WTC) 
 
Session 1 
(profesionals & 
students,lab) 
Session 2 
(students,lab) 
Session 3 
(professionals, 
online survey) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Reference group (log.) -0.051 -0.067 -0.090 -0.085 -0.127** -0.123* 
 
(0.067) (0.071) (0.068) (0.066) (0.063) (0.063) 
Nr of lives saved  0.000 0.000 0.002** 0.002** 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Expertise*ref. group 0.001 0.012 
  
0.052 0.056 
 
(0.078) (0.081) 
  
(0.080) (0.077) 
Expertise*lives  0.000 0.000 
  
-0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Case effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Last case excl. No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 711 622 365 319 480 420 
R-squared 0.119 0.060 0.069 0.043 0.085 0.089 
Number of subjects 89 89 46 46 60 60 
OLS regressions with individual fixed effects, robust std. errors in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is the reported likelihood of support the project on a 1-10 scale. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Survey Instrument 
 
Can you please provide the following information about yourself? 
1) What is your age? (years) 
2) What is your gender? (F/M) 
3) What type of organization do you work for? (private sector, public sector, 
non-profit, other) 
4) In your work, are your involved with grants/investments for social 
projects? (yes/no) 
 
Can you please indicate how you rank the following criteria of social projects in 
your assessment of the cases in the experiment (1=least important, 3=most 
important)? 
 Absolute number of lives saved (e.g. 500 people) 
 Relative number of lives saved (e.g. 500 out of de 150.000) 
 Other factors (disease, country, region) 
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Wording of cases 
 
The section below is the English translation of the first two cases that was presented to the subjects 
in group one. Other cases, for both groups, followed the same structure and wording. The description 
about the disease was taken from Wikipedia. The information about the number of people in the 
respective region and number of people suffering from the disease is hypothetical. 
 
CASE 1 (Group 1) 
Each year over 1000 people in the Ugandan region Luweero die from Shigellosis. This is an infection 
with bacteria of the Shigella genus. This species typically multiplies in the intestines. Infection with 
the rod-shaped gram-negative Shigella bacteria is a common cause of dysentery. The disease is 
usually contracted in overpopulated areas with limited hygiene. The main treatment consists of 
administering oral rehydration salts to combat dehydration. A Dutch NGO that works in this region 
requests a grant to provide oral rehydration salts to the local population. With the proposed project an 
estimated 500 lives will be saved in the saved in the region in the upcoming year. 
 
On a 1-10 scale, how likely is it that you would honour this grant?  
(1 means very low chance, 10 means very high chance) 
  
 
CASE 2 (Group 1) 
Sleeping sickness is caused by a protozoan parasite, Trypanosoma Brucei, which is spread by the 
tsetse fly. This disease can be dormant until the parasite has entered the brain. Every year around 
50.000 people in Africa die as a result of sleeping sickness. Patients in the advanced stages of the 
disease can be cured with the recently developed medicine ‘Eflornithine’. A Dutch NGO active in 
the Tanzanian region Ruvuma request a grant to distribute the medicine there. With the proposed 
project an estimated 750 lives will be saved in this region in the upcoming year. 
 
On a 1-10 scale, how likely is it that you would honour this grant?  
(1 means very low chance, 10 means very high chance) 
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Appendix 3.2 Results and Instructions (study 2) 
 
Regression tables 
 
Table 3.9 OLS-estimates of reference group effect, pooled data 
  Project rating 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of lives saved  0.860*** 0.860*** 0.790*** 0.607*** 
 
(0.077) (0.077) (0.084) (0.146) 
Reference group (log) -0.423*** -0.423*** -0.467*** -0.496*** 
 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.057) (0.076) 
Expertise 
 
-0.296 -1.031** -0.776 
  
(0.304) (0.452) (0.533) 
Expertise*lives 
  
0.275 0.074 
 
  
(0.192) (0.181) 
Expertise*reference group 
  
0.170* 0.177 
   
(0.101) (0.110) 
Subject controls No No No Yes 
Case controls (incl. order) No No No Yes 
Observations 1,212 1,212 1,212 1,072 
R-squared 0.103 0.106 0.110 0.140 
OLS-regression, robust std. errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the rating of the project 
benefit on a 0-8 scale (8=high benefit). Subject controls include: age, gender, REI (rational vs. 
experiential inventory) score. Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.10 Fixed effects estimates of reference group effect, pooled data 
  Project rating 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of lives saved  0.860*** 0.860*** 0.790*** 0.584*** 
 
(0.077) (0.077) (0.084) (0.149) 
Reference group (log) -0.423*** -0.423*** -0.467*** -0.498*** 
 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.057) (0.075) 
Expertise 
 
-0.296 -1.031** -0.783 
  
(0.304) (0.452) (0.540) 
Expertise*lives 
  
0.275 0.085 
 
  
(0.192) (0.181) 
Expertise*reference group  
  
0.170* 0.177 
   
(0.101) (0.110) 
Subject controls No No No Yes 
Case controls (incl. order) No No No Yes 
Observations 1,212 1,212 1,212 1,072 
R-squared 0.103 0.106 0.11 0.14 
OLS-regression with fixed effects, robust std. errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the rating 
of the project benefit on a 0-8 scale (8=high benefit). Subject controls include: age, gender, REI 
(rational vs. experiential inventory) score. Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Survey instrument 
 
1) Was it clear to you that projects 1-4 were the same in the sense that 4500 
lives could be saved (45% of 10,000 or 2% van 225,000), and similarly 
that projects 5-8 were the same in the sense that 2250 lives that could be 
saved (45% van 5,000 or 2% van 112,500)?  (Yes/No) 
2) According to you, how does the value of a human life in smaller refugee 
camp compare to the value of a human life in a larger refugee camp? 
(Same value regardless of camp size, Larger value in larger camp, Larger 
value in smaller camp) 
3) In case you think the value of a human life depends on the camp size, can 
you explain why you think this is the case? (Open question) 
4) Did you think that in large camps there would be more chance of 
conflicts?  (Yes/No) 
5) Was it clear to you that patients in the camp couldn't infect others (as the 
disease was non contagious)? (Yes/No) 
6) What is your age? (Years) 
7) What is your sex?  (F/M) 
8) Do you donate to charities? (Yes/No) 
9) What do/did you study? (Economics, Natural Sciences/Mathematics, 
Social Sciences, Law, Medicine, Other) 
10)  Are you currently a student? (Yes/No) 
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11) Do you have professional experience in providing subsidies to 
projects/programs? (Yes, in deciding which program/projects receive 
subsidies; Yes, in supporting these decisions (e.g. preparing documents); 
Yes, in a different way (fund raising, admin etc); No) 
12) Do you have professional experience specifically with projects aimed at 
refugee camps? (Yes/No) 
13) Finally we will show you a few statements Can you please indicate to 
what extent you agree with these statements (1=completely disagree, 
5=completely agree) 
 I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking  
 I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about 
something  
 I prefer to do something that challenges my thinking abilities 
rather than something that requires little thought  
 I prefer complex to simple problems  
 Thinking deeply gives me little satisfaction  
 I trust the first impressions I have in people  
 I believe I can trust my feelings  
 My first impression of people is usually correct  
 In terms of trusting others I can usually follow my instincts  
 I usually feel if people are right or not, even though I can’t 
explain 
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Wording of cases 
 
Instructions 
Imagine, you are working for a charitable foundation that provides support to refugees in developing 
countries. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) there is a threat of a humanitarian disaster in refugee camps in South-Sudan. 
Many refugees in the refugee camps have contracted a disease that results from drinking 
contaminated water. The disease is not infectious. Those refugees will die quickly if they will not get 
access to clean drinking water. You are asked to consider a number of projects that provide clean 
drinking water to the refugees in the refugee camps in South-Sudan. All projects provide clean 
drinking water with a Dash-8 airplane. Once the plain arrives at the refugee camps, local aid-workers 
will distribute the water to the designated patients, as a result of which the patients' lives are usually 
saved. All projects cost about € 50.000. However, the charitable organization does not have enough 
funds to finance all projects. Now we would like to ask you a few questions about eight specific 
projects. 
 
Example case, separate evaluation mode 
In the city of Paloich in South-Sudan there are about 5.000 refugees suffering from the lethal disease. 
Currently, with the available amount of clean drinking water in the Paloich refugee camp 50% of the 
patients will be saved. If the Dash-8 waterplane is sent to Paloich, 95% of the patients will be saved.  
 What would be the benefit of sending the Dash-8 waterplane to this refugee 
camp? (slider bar: 0=extremely low benefit, 8=extremely high benefit) 
 Given the benefit you indicated, would it be worth the €50.000 subsidy to send 
the plane to this camp? (yes, no) 
 
Example case, joint evaluation mode 
 Project A) In the city of Ghok Machar in South-Sudan there are approximately 10.000 
refugees that are suffering from the lethal disease. Currently, with the available amount of 
clean drinking water in the Ghok Machar refugee camp 5% of the patients will be saved. If 
the Dash-8 water-plane is sent to Ghok Machar, 50% of the patients will be saved  
 Project B) In the city of Abiemnom in South-Sudan are about 225.000 refugees suffering 
from the lethal disease. At the moment, there is clean drinking water in the Abiemnom 
refugee camp to save 5% of the patients. Once we allow the Dash-8 airplane to go to 
Abiemnom, 7% of the patients will have access to clean drinking water, so they will be 
safe.  
 Which project do you prefer?  (slider bar) 
o strong preference for project A 
o preference for project A, 
o slight preference for project A, 
o no preference, 
o slight preference for project B, 
o preference for project B,  
o strong preference for project B 
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Chapter 4  
 
Free to help? 
An experiment on free will belief and altruism* 
 
 
“We must believe in free will, we have no choice.” 
- Isaac Bashevis Singer –  
Abstract 
How does belief in free will affect altruistic behavior? In an online experiment we 
undermine subjects’ belief in free will through a priming task. Subjects 
subsequently conduct a series of binary dictator games in which they can distribute 
money between themselves and a charity that supports low-income people in 
developing countries. In each decision task, subjects choose between two different 
distributions, one of which is more generous towards the charity. In contrast to 
previous experiments that report a negative effect of undermining free will on 
honest behavior and self-reported willingness to help, we find an insignificant 
average treatment effect. However, we do find that our treatment reduces 
charitable giving among non-religious subjects, but not among religious subjects. 
This could be explained by our finding that religious subjects associate more 
strongly with social norms that prescribe helping the poor, and might therefore be 
less sensitive to the effect of reduced belief in free will. These findings indicate 
that the effects of free will belief on prosocial behavior are more nuanced than 
previously suggested. 
                                                     
* Joint work with Kellie Liket, John Protzko and Vera Schölmerich.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Free will belief and social behaviors 
Do humans have free will? This is the topic of an ancient debate that remains 
unresolved up to this day (Aquinas, 1981; Aristotle and Book, 1933; Dennett, 
2015; Schopenhauer, 1839). The implications of this debate extend beyond the 
intellectual realm. Despite the lack of consensus in the academic community, 
people young and old across the world believe that they have free will (Kushnir, 
2012; Sarkissian et al., 2010) and most people even believe they have more free 
will than others (Pronin and Kugler, 2010). Some scholars argue that widespread 
belief in free will has evolved as it allows for larger and more complex societies to 
function and thrive (Baumeister and Monroe, 2014). Instilling in people a sense of 
control over their actions, this belief has allowed for the justification of rules and 
institutions that punish anti-social behavior and reward pro-social behaviour. Thus, 
rather counter-intuitively, the belief in free will is proposed to have enabled 
humans to become better at adhering to social norms.  
Greater belief in free will has been associated in observational research 
with a range of positive outcomes, including better career prospects and higher job 
performance (Stillman et al., 2010). Furthermore, experimental evidence also 
points towards benefits of greater belief in free will, for example by promoting 
appreciation towards acts of kindness by others, who were “free” to also be unkind 
(MacKenzie et al., 2014).  
However, the level of people’s belief in free will and their locus of control 
[i.e. the extent to which people attribute control to themselves vs. their 
environment] have been declining in recent decades (Twenge et al., 2004). Belief 
in free will and locus of control are strongly correlated (Stillman et al., 2010) and 
conceptually related: without a belief in free will it is more difficult to attribute 
control to oneself. The decline of these beliefs coincides with the popularization of 
insights from neuroscience, for example the famous Libet experiments (Libet, 
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1993) which conclude that free will is an illusion (Harris, 2012; Montague, 2008). 
Neuroscience experiments by Libet and others demonstrate that information about 
brain activity can be used to predict decisions before the decision-maker becomes 
aware of making a decision. Various philosophers contest the claim that free will 
does not exist (Bourget and Chalmers, 2013; Dennett, 2015). Regardless of 
whether the inferences from neuroscientific evidence to the supposed impossibility 
of the existence free will are correct, the changing attitudes in society about free 
will and self-control have been shown to influence various social behaviours. 
Various lab experiments have undermined people’s belief in free will by 
priming tasks, in which subjects read texts about neuroscientific evidence 
implying the non-existence of free will. These studies tend to show that exposure 
to such primes undermines honesty and willingness to help others. One study 
shows that undermining belief in free will causes increased cheating in tasks 
where subjects could earn more money by lying (Vohs and Schooler, 2008b). A 
study by Baumeister and colleagues 2009 finds that experimental reduction of 
belief in free will through a reading task lowers people’s likelihood of reporting to 
be willing to help others in various hypothetical scenarios (Baumeister et al., 
2009). It should be noted that this study did not look into the relationship between 
free will disbelief manipulations and actual helping of others. This question has 
yet to be empirically investigated.  
Next to their experimental findings, Baumeister and colleagues 2009) also 
reported that subjects with a stronger disbelief in free will were less likely to sign 
up for volunteer work absent of experimental manipulations). One interpretation 
for these findings is that a disbelief in free will gives people an excuse to justify 
their selfish tendencies (Smilansky, 2000). In other words, people can refrain from 
engaging in prosocial behavior and then justify this by explaining that they have 
very little control over their own behavior. Further supporting these findings, 
studies show that undermining free will belief reduces people’s ability to control 
themselves (Baumeister et al., 1994; Baumeister and Vohs, 2007; Vohs and 
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Heatherton, 2000). This reduced self-control would, in turn, diminish people’s 
willingness to act prosocially (Baumeister et al., 2009). Taken together, the current 
evidence to support the view that free will disbelief undermines prosocial behavior 
is still rather limited.  
While studies have shown that undermining free will belief leads to 
increased cheating and reduced likelihood of reported willingness to help others, 
other studies have found that undermining free will belief can actually promote 
sympathy for others. For example, lowered free will beliefs have been shown to 
reduce the attribution of blame of criminal offenders (Krueger et al., 2014; Shariff 
et al., 2014). This finding suggests that undermining people’s belief in free will 
increases their perception that other people are shaped by forces outside of their 
own control, such as their genetic composition or their upbringing. Indeed, another 
experiment shows that the tendency to blame others depends on the perceived 
level of control that others have. In this experiment (Monroe et al., 2016), subjects 
were shown a video in which an ‘active’ person interacted with another ‘passive’ 
person, from whom they could steal money. In both treatments the active person 
stole the entire endowment [$10] from the passive person. In one treatment, this 
action was the result of a random process outside of the control of the active 
person [die roll], whereas in the other treatment it was the result of an active 
choice made by the passive person. The observing subject was then asked to judge 
the blameworthiness of the active person, and the authors [ibid] found that more 
blame was attributed in the condition were an active choice was made. In a similar 
vein, Fong (Fong, 2007) finds that people, even those that perceive themselves as 
being unconditionally altruistic, donate more to welfare recipients if they are 
informed that these recipients are actively looking for work as opposed to waiting 
for a work opportunity to arise. The results of these suggest that undermining free 
will belief may also promote prosocial behavior by increasing people’s perception 
of the lack of control other people have on their own lives and consequently 
increasing their willingness to help.    
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Another open question is whether the effects of free will beliefs on social 
behavior are homogenous across different groups. Various studies have shown that 
a range of behavioral patterns observed in lab experiments with college students 
do not generalize to other populations that are less educated, rich and westernized 
(Arnett, 2008; Henrich et al., 2010b). Since all previous experiments with free will 
manipulations were conducted among college students, it remains unclear how 
universal the effects of free will beliefs on social behavior are. One group that 
might respond differently to free will manipulations are religious people, as belief 
in free will is higher among religious people. Various studies have shown that 
religious affiliation is associated with higher charitable giving (Bekkers and 
Wiepking, 2011), higher propensity to volunteer to help the poor and elderly 
(Phillips et al., 2011) and higher giving to charities in dictator games – an activity 
where subjects are given a sum of money and can decide how much they want to 
donate to another subject (Nahmias et al., 2014). It should be noted that these 
studies apply to western countries where Christianity is the main religion. 
Furthermore, experimental studies provide causal evidence to support the theory 
that religious primes can promote honesty and prosocial behavior, both in the lab 
(Mazar et al., 2008; Shariff and Norenzayan, 2007) and in the field (Duhaime, 
2015). Moreover, there is some evidence that religious primes have different 
effects on social behaviors according to the religious status of subjects. For 
example, the willingness to engage in costly punishment of free-riders in a public-
goods game was increased by a religious prime, but only among subjects that had 
previously made religious donations (McKay et al., 2011).  
To summarize, there is currently mixed evidence on whether undermining 
free will belief will lead to more prosocial behaviour, it is not clear how this effect 
will play out amongst a diverse population, and there is no experimental evidence 
on whether undermining free will belief influences people’s actual likelihood of 
helping others. In this study we tested the effects of free will manipulations on 
actual behaviour among a diverse population. We did this by conducting an online 
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experiment using a dictator game with subjects recruited via the Amazons mTurk 
platform.  
One of the most commonly used methods to study actual [as opposed to 
self-reported] prosocial behavior is the dictator game. In this two-player game, one 
subject – the dictator - is given a sum of money, and can decide how much of this 
money they want to donate to the other person playing – the recipient. This 
recipient is passive and can do nothing but accept whatever fraction of the sum of 
money they are given. Under conditions of anonymity, the rational strategy for a 
purely selfish dictator is to give nothing, but a meta-analysis with data from 
hundreds of dictator game experiments shows that people donate on average 
between 25-30% of their money (Engel, 2011b). Given its simplicity, the dictator 
game is a useful tool to study the factors that shape prosocial behavior.  
The Amazon mTurk platform allows people to earn money by completing 
small tasks see Methods - Procedures for more details and is increasingly used in 
social science experiments (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Casler et al., 2013) and 
provides access to a more population that is more diverse than college students in 
terms of demographics, socio-economic and cultural background. For example, an 
experiment on mTurk used a dictator game with subjects in the U.S. and India, and 
found that the latter group were more sensitive to the size of the endowment 
(Raihani et al., 2013). Another dictator game experiment with subjects from 
different countries recruited through mTurk found substantial heterogeneity in 
dictator game play across cultures (Raihani and Bshary, 2012). Furthermore, such 
experiments can be used not only to test whether behavior in standardized 
experiments differs across groups, but also whether these various groups respond 
differently to experimental manipulations.  
Our paper aims to address the following question: “How does 
undermining belief in free will affect altruistic behavior?” We measure altruism in 
terms of behavior in a binary dictator game where subjects can divide money 
between themselves and a charity. In line with several previous experiments about 
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free will belief, we hypothesize that undermining belief in free will make people 
less inclined to engage in charitable giving. Furthermore, we hypothesize that this 
manipulation could have different effects among a more diverse sample of 
subjects. 
4.2 Methods   
Procedure 
Subjects were recruited via Amazon mechanical Turk (mTurk), a crowdscourcing 
website that is increasingly used in the social sciences. Although providing less 
control over experimental conditions than lab experiments, various studies show 
that results obtained through mTurk are comparable to results from the lab (Crump 
et al., 2013; Horton et al., 2011; Paolacci et al., 2010). At the onset of the 
experiment subjects were informed that the study was about the effect of exposure 
to text on happiness. The purpose of this was to reduce socially desirable 
responses due to observer bias and to prevent subjects from making a connection 
between the manipulation we performed and our dependent variable. Following 
the introduction to the experiment, subjects were asked to rate their happiness on a 
1-10 scale. Subsequently, subjects were exposed to the treatment or control text. 
To ensure that subjects read this text, they could only click to the next page one 
minute after opening the page with the treatment or control text. Furthermore, 
subjects were requested to write a short summary of the text and they were 
informed that their payment could be affected if they did not do so. They were 
then again asked to rate their happiness. Subsequently, they continued to a set of 
24 decision tasks, followed by a short survey.  
 
Treatment  
The treatment consisted of subjects being asked to read a 1-page article from the 
popular science journal “NewScientist” in which neurological scientific evidence 
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is presented to support the notion that humans do not have free will. The control 
group was shown another 1-page article from the same magazine about sustainable 
energy technologies (see S1 Appendix for the full text of both treatment and 
placebo). Subjects were asked to write a 1-2 sentence summary of the text in order 
to demonstrate that they had carefully read the text. This manipulation has 
successfully been previously (Shariff et al., 2014). 
 
Decision task 
In a second step of this experiment, subjects were told that they could allocate 
monetary tokens to themselves or to GiveDirectly, a charity that provides direct 
cash transfers to low-income households in sub-Saharan Africa. Subjects were 
informed that these cash transfers would be given to “people like Beatrix”, 
followed by a short description of this woman’s situation accompanied by a 
photograph of the illustrative recipient and her two children. This information was 
taken from the website of the charity. The exact wording to describe the example 
recipient was as follows: “An example of a family benefiting from GiveDirectly is 
Beatrice (31yrs) and her two young children, living in Kenya.” Subjects then 
completed 24 binary Dictator Games (DGs), which are a widely used tool to 
measure social preferences (Krajbich et al., 2015; Schulz et al., 2014). In our 
experiment, each binary DG consisted of two different distributions of tokens 
between the subject (i.e. the dictator) and the charity. For example, subjects could 
choose between option A) keep 50%, give 50% to charity or option B) keep 0%, 
give 100% to charity. Henceforth, we refer to each DG as a ‘decision task’. The 
number of experimental tokens that could be earned per task ranged between 0-60, 
with a conversion rate of 1 dollar cent/token. In other words, subjects had the 
chance of earning up to 60 cents per task. Previous research on mTurk has shown 
that dictator games with stakes of max. $1 yield similar outcomes to higher stakes 
(Raihani et al., 2013) To ensure that subjects had an incentive to reveal their true 
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preference in each task as they were informed that one of the games would be 
randomly selected at the end of the experiment and then paid out according to the 
choices the dictator made (Becker et al., 1964). The order of the decision tasks was 
randomized to control for order effects. Subjects were informed that they had 10 
seconds per task. They were also informed that if they would not choose within 
this timeframe, then they or the charity would not receive any money in case this 
task was randomly selected to be played for real money at the end of the 
experiment.  
In each decision task, one of the two options provided a higher payoff to 
the charity but a lower payoff to the dictator (see Table 1). In our analysis, we 
classify this as the more altruistic option. The first 12 decision tasks consisted of 
choices between an equal distribution and an unequal distribution. For example, 
the fair allocation for task 1 is option A: 50% dictator/50% charity and the unfair 
allocation is option B: 100% dictator/0% charity. The second set of 12 tasks 
consisted of choices between two unequal allocations. For example, task 13 option 
A was 100% dictator/0% charity and option B was 0% dictator/100% charity.  
Decision tasks also differed in terms of whether the more altruistic option 
consisted of the same, less or more money than the less altruistic option. By 
varying the size of the allocation we wanted to investigate whether the treatment 
effect was greater for options where the less altruistic option was more efficient, 
i.e. resulted in larger potential earning. Moreover, we varied whether or not both 
options provided at least some payoff to both players. In this way we wanted to 
investigate whether the treatment had a greater effect when dictators could 
“excuse” their selfish behavior by selecting an option that provided at some payoff 
to the charity.  
Table 4.1 Overview of decision-tasks 
Task 
Option A 
(self, charity) 
Option B 
(self, charity) 
Task 
Option A 
(self, charity) 
Option B 
(self, charity) 
1 (50,50) (100,0) 13 (100,0) (0,100) 
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2 (50,50) (80,20) 14 (100,0) (20,80) 
3 (50,50) (20,80) 15 (80,20) (0,100) 
4 (50,50) (0,100) 16 (80,20) (20,80) 
5 (60,60) (100,0) 17 (100,20) (0,100) 
6 (60,60) (80,20) 18 (100,20) (20,80) 
7 (60,60) (20,80) 19 (80,40) (0,100) 
8 (60,60) (0,100) 20 (80,40) (20,80) 
9 (40,40) (100,0) 21 (80,0) (0,100) 
10 (40,40) (80,20) 22 (80,0) (20,80) 
11 (40,40) (20,80) 23 (60,20) (0,100) 
12 (40,40) (0,100) 24 (60,20) (20,80) 
 
Questionnaire 
After the decision tasks, subjects were asked to indicate their sex, age, and 
perceived socio-economic status. In addition subjects were asked whether they 
identified with a religion: Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, 
other, or no religion. Subjects who responded to not identify with a religion were 
labelled as non-religious. After presenting these survey questions we also asked 
subjects to indicate their self-reported level of free will, measured on a 100-point 
scale. This question served as a manipulation check. In addition, subjects were 
asked if they considered whether recipients of the charity had control over their 
personal situation and whether they thought that “one ought to help” people such 
as these recipients (see ‘Mechanisms’ in the Results section for exact phrasing). 
This last item allowed us to investigate whether adherence to social norms might 
moderate the effect of the free will disbelief treatment on altruistic behavior. For 
more details about these items please see S1 Appendix. 
 
Subjects and randomization 
Subjects were recruited from U.S. members of Amazon mTurk in August 2016. As 
can be seen in the ‘Full sample’ column of table 2, a total of 108 subjects 
participated. This sample consisted of 64% females. The average age was 34.2 
years. Approximately half of our subjects considered themselves religious, the 
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majority of religious subjects subscribing to various Christian denominations. 
Moreover, most subjects report to perceive their own socio-economic status to be 
right in the middle between most and least successful. Differences between 
treatment and control group in terms of age and sex were not statistically 
significant. A Mann-Whitney U-test shows that our random assignment did result 
in a higher fraction of non-religious subjects being allocated to the treatment group 
(Pr.>|z=0.0075) as well as a higher level of self-perceived socio-economic status 
in the treatment group (Pr.>|z=0.0928). To account for this imbalance we add 
these variables as controls in our regressions. 
 
Table 4.2 Summary statistics 
  Control Treatment Full sample 
  Obs. Mean SD Obs. Mean SD Obs. Mean SD 
Female (1=yes) 51 0.59 0.5 57 0.68 0.47 108 0.64 0.48 
Age (years) 51 33.53 11.59 57 34.81 10.3 108 34.2 10.89 
SE status (0-10) 51 4.94 1.61 57 5.47 1.6 108 5.22 1.62 
Religious (1=yes) 51 0.37 0.49 57 0.63 0.49 108 0.51 0.5 
 
Ethics statement 
All participants in the experiments reported in the manuscript were informed: first, 
about the protocols of the study that ensure anonymity and confidentiality; second, 
about the content of the experiment (and the potential monetary earnings) prior to 
participating. Written consent was obtained from all participants included in this 
paper. Only those who accepted completed the experiment. Those who did not 
accept did not continue the experiment. Anonymity was preserved as participants 
signed up through their Amazon mTurk account number. No association was ever 
made between their real names/addresses and the results. As is standard in socio-
economic experiments, no ethic concerns are involved other than preserving the 
anonymity of participants. This procedure (including the consent process) was 
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checked and approved by the Office of Research and Human Subjects at the 
University of Santa Barbara, the institution hosting the experiments.  
4.3 Results  
Manipulation check  
For the full sample, the average level of free will belief was 69.9 on a 0-100 scale 
(SD=23.6), with 100 indicating total agreement with the statement "I fully believe 
I have free will", and zero indicating full disagreement. The average level of free 
will belief in the control group was 72.2 (SD=22.2), and in the treatment group it 
was 67.8 (SD=24.8). To estimate the effect of the treatment on self-perceived free 
will, we run an OLS regression of the treatment on the free will measure, 
controlling for religiosity, demographics and self-perceived socio-economic status. 
In line with previous studies (Shariff et al., 2014), we find that our treatment 
reduced belief in free will by 8.9 points on a 0-100 scale, as shown in table 3.  
 
Table 4.3 Manipulation check 
   Free Will Scale (0-100) 
Treatment "free will disbelief" -8.930** 
  (4.115) 
Constant 37.306*** 
  (9.827) 
Observations 108 
R-squared 0.264 
OLS regression with robust standard errors clustered on subjects in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is the level of agreements subjects reported on a 0-100 scale to the statement "I fully belief I 
have free will". Controls for age, sex, religiosity and socio-economic status.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
 
Treatment effects 
First, we estimate the effect of the treatment on the fraction of decision tasks in 
which the more altruistic distribution was chosen.  
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Table 4.4 OLS regression of treatment effects 
  Fraction of altruistic choices  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  full sample religious non-rel. 
Treatment "free will disbelief" -0.016 -0.058 0.091 -0.214** 
  (0.061) (0.062) (0.087) (0.087) 
Level of free will belief  0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Controls  No Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.694*** 0.370*** 0.609*** 0.196 
 
(0.107) (0.134) (0.183) (0.167) 
Observations 107 107 54 53 
R-squared 0.001 0.186 0.293 0.299 
OLS regression with robust standard errors clustered on subjects in parentheses.  The dependent 
variable is what fraction of subjects’ choices was for the more altruistic option.  Controls include 
age, sex, religiosity and socio-economic status. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
Figure 4-1 Treatment effect, by religiosity 
 
 
As can be seen in table 4.4, the treatment did not have a significant effect for the 
pooled sample.  However, as shown in columns 3-4, we find that the treatment did 
result in a statistically significant decrease in altruistic choices for the non-
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religious subjects, of more than 21 percentage points (P<0.05). This result is also 
reflected graphically in figure 4-1. 
We then consider the subjects’ choice behavior for each individual choice 
task. To this purpose we use a random effects probit model, with robust standard 
errors clustered on individuals. The main outcome variable in these regressions is 
a dummy variable indicating whether or not the subject selected the more altruistic 
of the two options (1=yes, 0=no).This model allows us to test not only the 
treatment effect, but also control for specifics of the choices task. In particular, we 
control for: (i) whether the choice was between two unequal distributions or 
between an unequal vs. an unequal distribution, (ii) whether one of the choices 
was more efficient in terms of the total amount to be distributed, (iii) the cost of 
altruism – i.e. how much extra the subject could earn from selecting the less 
altruistic option, (iv) the benefit of altruism – i.e. how much extra the charity could 
earn if the subject selected the more altruistic option. Furthermore, we control for 
subject characteristics and task order In additional analyses, we also control for 
moral self-licensing effects as studied in a 2013 paper by Brañas Garza et al. 
(Brañas-Garza et al., 2013) by including a lag of the variable “altruistic choice” as 
a control variable in a probit model without random effects. However, we find that 
no indication of moral self-licensing, as the coefficient on the lag variable is 
significant and positive. 
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Table 4.5 Probit regression of treatment effects 
  Altruistic choice  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  full sample religious 
non-
religious 
Treatment "free will disbelief" 0.001 -0.096 0.070 -0.254** 
  (0.084) (0.076) (0.080) (0.105) 
Level of free will belief  0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Unequal vs. unequal 
 
0.119*** 0.103*** 0.128*** 
    (0.030) (0.039) (0.046) 
Selfish option efficient 
 
-0.067*** -0.055*** -0.076*** 
    (0.016) (0.017) (0.028) 
Cost of altruism 
 
-0.000 0.000 -0.001** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Subjects 108 108 55 53 
Observations 2,532 2,532 1,292 1,240 
Wald χ2  0.19 77.54 50.49 36.80 
Marginal effects of probit model with subject random effects. The dependent is whether or not the 
subject selected the more altruistic distribution (value=1 if yes). Standard errors clustered at the 
subject-level. Observations where subjects did not make a decision within 10 seconds (n=60) were 
excluded from this analysis. The variable “unequal vs. unequal” has value=1 if both options 
consisted of unequal distributions, (e.g. 100/0 vs. 0/100) and value=0 if only 1 option consisted of an 
unequal distribution (e.g. 50/50 vs. 100/0). The variable “selfish option” efficient has value=1 if the 
total number of tokens to be distributed was greater in the less altruistic option, and value=0 if the 
amount of tokens was equal in both options. The variable “cost of altruism” indicates the difference 
between the two options in terms of the number of tokens that could be earned by the dictator. 
Controls include: age, sex, religiosity, socio-economic status, and task-order. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In line with the results from the OLS regression model we find that only among 
the sub-group of non-religious subjects did the treatment reduce the propensity of 
subjects to choose the more altruistic distribution, as can be seen by the negative 
coefficient on the variable “Treatment free will disbelief” in table 5, column 4. 
The treatment reduces the propensity of non-religious subjects to select more 
altruistic option by over 25% (significant at P<0.05), whereas for religious 
subjects the treatment had no significant effect. Furthermore, we find that subjects 
were more likely to choose the altruistic distribution in choices between two 
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unequal distributions – one favoring the dictator and one favouring the recipient - 
than in choices between one equal and one unequal distribution. In addition, we 
find that subjects are less likely to choose the more altruistic distribution when this 
option is inefficient - in terms of the total size of the pie – in comparison to the 
other distribution. This effect occurs for both religious and non-religious subjects. 
Finally, we find that among non-religious subjects altruism is also influenced by 
the size of its costs (to the subject), as indicated by the coefficients in column 4 on 
the variable “cost of altruism”. 
 
Thou Shalt Help?  
Subjects were asked to indicate which of the following two statements they most 
agreed with: (i) “One ought to help people such as Beatrix” or (ii) “People such 
as Beatrix ought to help themselves”. Using the probit regression analyhsis shown 
in table 4.6 we find that non-religious subjects are approximately 10% less likely 
to adhere to the helping norm than their religious counterparts (P>|z|=0.098).  
 
Table 4.6 Probit analysis of determinants of helping norm 
  Adherence to helping norm  
Treatment "free will disbelief" -0.083 
  (0.065) 
Free will scale -0.002 
  (0.001) 
Religious (1=yes) 0.101* 
  (0.061) 
Controls  Yes 
Observations 108 
Pseudo-R2 0.1857 
Marginal effects of probit estimation with robust standard errors clustered on subjects in parentheses. 
The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the subject identified more with the statement 
“one ought to help poor people” (value=1) or with the statement “poor people ought to help 
themselves” (value=0). Controls include: age, sex and socio-economic status 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.4 Discussion 
With this experiment we aimed to explore how undermining belief in free will 
affects altruistic behavior in terms of charitable giving. On the basis of previous 
studies (Baumeister et al., 2009; Vohs and Schooler, 2008b) that found free will 
disbelief to be associated with reduced prosocial behavior we expected that 
undermining people’s belief in free will would reduce the probability that subjects 
would select the more generous distribution. Our results indicate, however, that 
this was not the case. While our treatment did reduce belief in free will by 8.9 
points on a 100-point scale, this did not significantly influence the likelihood of 
subjects selecting the more generous distribution. This null result is robust to 
controlling for sex, age, perceived socio-economic status, task characteristics and 
the order in which the decision tasks were presented.   
Contrary to previous experiments on the effects of free will beliefs, we did 
not work with a sample of college students, but included a more diverse 
population. Whereas the average treatment effect was insignificant, our results 
indicate that the treatment did significantly reduce charitable giving among non-
religious subjects. We considered several possible explanations for why religious 
people seem to be buffered from the treatment effect of our experiment. One 
possible explanation is that religious people are less open to scientific evidence, 
and thus less easily influenced by the free will disbelief treatment, which consisted 
of the presentation of neuroscientific evidence. However, this does not seem 
plausible as the treatment equally affected the belief in free will among both 
religious and non-religious subjects. Another explanation we explored is related to 
religion-based social norms. In line with previous studies that show an association 
between religious affiliation and the socialization of social norms promoting the 
helping of others (Batson et al., 1985; Benson et al., 1989; Ritzema, 1979; Youniss 
et al., 1999), our results indicate that religious subjects had a stronger adherence to 
the social norm of helping the poor. More strongly identifying with this norm 
110 
 
might buffer religious people against the effect of undermining belief of free will 
on charitable giving. Since our treatment was equally effective in reducing belief 
in free will amongst religious and non-religious people, we conclude that among 
religious subjects the negative effects of free will disbelief on charitable giving 
were cancelled out by their adherence to religion-based helping norms. The notion 
that religion-based helping norms affect giving behavior is further supported by 
our finding that only non-religious subjects’ choices are influenced by the 
opportunity cost of the more altruistic option compared to the other option, 
whereas  religious subjects’ decisions are not influenced by this opportunity cost.  
 
Limitations and strengths  
Several limitations apply to our study. Firstly, we have limited insight into 
the mechanisms by which religious affiliation might moderate the influence of free 
will beliefs. Although our data point towards the role of helping norms, we cannot 
exclude the possibility that other aspects of religious affiliation play a role. Future 
research in which both free will beliefs and the salience of religion-based helping 
norms are manipulated could shed more light on this. Compared to the main other 
study that used an experiment to investigate the effect of free will belief on 
altruistic behavior, by Baumeister and colleagues (Baumeister et al., 2009), our 
study has the advantage that it measures actual behavior rather than self-reported 
behavior in hypothetical scenarios. As previous research has indicated a significant 
bias in self-reported donation behavior (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2010), we think 
our study design offers a more reliable estimate of the effect of free will beliefs on 
charitable giving.  
 
Practical implications and future research 
Our results warrant further caution for drawing the simplistic conclusion 
that a reduction of free will beliefs will automatically undermine pro-social 
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behaviors. For one, our null result suggests that the previously reported finding 
that undermining free will belief reduces pro-social behaviors reported might be 
more nuanced. Second, our finding that this effect only occurs among non-
religious subjects suggests that beliefs regarding free will do not operate in 
isolation, but rather interact with pre-existing social norms and religious beliefs. 
As our sample of religious subjects consisted largely of Christians, it would be 
interesting to test the effect of free will belief manipulation among other subjects 
adhering to other religions. Furthermore, as free will disbelief can promote 
appreciation for the lack of control others have over their situation, another 
interesting avenue for future research would be to investigate how free will 
disbelief affects social preferences towards others that vary in perceived 
“helplessness”, along the lines of an experiment where subjects could donate 
towards different kinds of welfare recipients that varied in their degree of 
perceived deservingness of welfare aid (Fong, 2007). 
In sum, our study shows that undermining free will beliefs reduces 
charitable giving in binary dictator games, but that this effect only applies to non-
religious subjects. Our results suggest that religion-based adherence to helping 
norms might interact with belief in free will and jointly shape altruistic behavior. 
Future research should shed further light on how belief in free will interacts with 
pre-existing social norms, such as the norm to help the poor. 
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Appendix 4.1 
 
Subjects were shown the following screens during the experiment which was 
conducted online through the Amazon mTurk platform: 
 
Page 1 (Welcome and informed consent) 
Principal Investigator: Dr. Jonathan Schooler, Department of Psychology, University of California, 
Santa Barbara Phone: (805) 893-5969      
You have been asked to participate in a 2-part study, supervised by Dr. Jonathan Schooler, a 
psychology professor at the University of California at Santa Barbara. The first part of the study is 
about differences in mood following exposure to passages of text. You will then engage in a second 
study in which you can earn money. We will provide you with specific instructions prior to the 
starting the study.      
The study will take approximately 10 minutes and you will receive $1 in exchange for your 
participation. Additionally, there is also the opportunity for you to receive up to an additional $1 
based on the outcome of the second part of the study (Rewards will be granted through M-Turk's 
"Bonus" system at the same time the Hit is approved). You will only get an opportunity to receive 
this money if you have filled out all questions.      
Your participation in this research will be kept strictly confidential. To preserve your 
anonymity, you will be provided with a Participant ID number. Any information that you provide 
will be available only to members of the research team for approved research purposes. If you feel 
uncomfortable at any time during the study please inform us immediately. Participation in this study 
is voluntary and you are free to discontinue your participation at any time.       
If you decide not to participate, your refusal will involve no penalty and you will still receive 
full compensation. If you have any questions about this research or concerns about your 
participation, please contact the Human Subjects Committee at (805) 893-3807 or 
hsc@research.ucsb.edu. Or write to the University of California, Human Subjects Committee, Office 
of Research, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-2050        
Participation in research is voluntary. Checking the box below will indicate that you have 
decided to participate as a research subject in the study described above. You may request an original 
and dated copy of this form to keep. Checking the box below indicates that you consent to participate 
in this study. 
 
 By checking this box I agree that I have read and understood the terms and conditions above 
and certify that I am at least 18 years of age or older 
 
Page 2 (Happiness question) 
How happy do you feel at this very moment?    Please indicate with the slider below your current 
level of happiness (0=very unhappy, 10=very happy) 
______ Current happiness 
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Page 3 (Treatment group) 
We now ask you to read the following passage from the magazine "New Scientist"   Please read it 
carefully as we will afterwards ask you to write a short summary of the text. If your summary doesn't 
relate to the text this might affect your payment.             
 
---        
 
--- 
 Please write a very short summary of the text (1-2 sentences): 
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Page 3 (Control group) 
We now ask you to read the following passage from the magazine "New Scientist"   Please read it 
carefully as we will afterwards ask you to write a short summary of the text. If your summary doesn't 
relate to the text this might affect your payment.             
 
---        
 
 
Please write a very short summary of the text (1-2 sentences): 
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Page 4 (Happiness question) 
Please consider again how happy you feel at this very moment (0=very unhappy, 10=very happy) 
______ Current happiness 
 
Page 5 (Instructions to decision task) 
We will now proceed to a part of the study where you can earn additional money. You can earn up 
to 100 tokens, each token being worth 1 dollar cent.     There are 24 decision-tasks. In each task you 
are asked to select 1 out of 2 possible allocations. By selecting an allocation, you decide how tokens 
are divided between you and another person.      This other person is a poor person in a developing 
country, who will be selected by the charity “GiveDirectly”. This charity directly sends cash to 
impoverished people in developing countries. An example of a person that is supported 
by GiveDirectly is Beatrice (31years) from Kenya, who has two young children and no income.       
[Here, subjects are shown a picture of Beatrice and her children] 
At the end of the study, 1 decision-task from the list of 24 decision-tasks will be randomly selected to 
be paid out in real money. Based on which allocation you selected in this choice, both you and/or the 
poor person will receive some amount of money. It is thus important that you pay close attention in 
all 24 choice-tasks!   You have 10 seconds for each decision-task. If you fail to make a choice within 
this time neither you nor the poor person can receive any money in case this choice is 
selected.                 
 
Before we begin with the decision-task please answer a few questions to confirm that you have 
understood the instructions. Your answers to these questions do not influence your payment. 
 
Can you earn real money with the decision-tasks? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
You will allocate money between yourself and another person. Who is this other person? 
 A poor person in a developing country 
 Another m-Turk participant in this experiment 
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Page 6 (Decision tasks) 
 
 [Example screenshot below, full series of decision-tasks shown in table1] 
 
[After these checks, subjects proceed to decision tasks 1-20] 
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Page 7 (Survey) 
 
What is your age? 
 18-29 
 30-39 
 40-49 
 50-59 
 60 and above 
 
Are you a male or female? 
 Male 
 Female 
 
Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination? 
 No 
 Yes, Roman Catholic 
 Yes, Protestant 
 Yes, other Christian denomination 
 Yes, Jewish 
 Yes, Muslim 
 Yes, Hindu 
 Yes, Buddhist 
 Yes, other, please specify: 
 
Please consider the following ladder. The bottom represents the least successful people in society, 
the top represents the most successful people.    Where do you see yourself on this ladder (0=least 
successful, 10=most successful)? 
Position on ladder (0-10) 
 
To what extent you agree with the following statement: "I fully believe I have free will"  
______ 0=totally disagree, 100=totally agree 
 
When deciding how much to donate to GiveDirectly, did you consider whether Beatrice has any 
control over her lack of income? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Thinking about it now, how much control do you think Beatrice has over her lack of income?  
______ 0=no control, 100=complete control 
 
Which of the following two statements do you most agree with? 
 One ought to help people such as Beatrice 
 People such as Beatrice ought to help themselves 
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Chapter 5  
 
Choosing for Colleagues  
Experimental from the Field* 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Decisions in small businesses, which commonly involve uncertainty, are often 
made on behalf of others. A growing literature shows that people exhibit different 
uncertainty preferences depending on whether they decide for themselves or for 
others. In this study, we investigate self-other differences in risk and ambiguity 
preferences among entrepreneurs in Bangladesh. We apply a between-subject 
design and use a vignette to elicit risk and ambiguity preferences in both self- and 
other-decisions. The results indicate lower ambiguity aversion in other-choices, 
but only for a sub-group of entrepreneurs that believe the ambiguous probability to 
be lower than fifty percent. Furthermore, we find that entrepreneurs are more risk 
averse when choosing for others. Finally, our results indicate that social distance 
does not drive self-other differences in ambiguity attitudes.  
                                                     
*Joint work with Haki Pamuk and Karen Maas.  
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5.1 Background 
 Ambiguous returns to business training 
Firms in developing countries are much less productive than their northern 
counterparts. This productivity difference is attributed in part to lower human 
capital (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010). This human capital can be increased by 
investments in external advice and business trainings, which have been shown to 
promote firm productivity and employment creation both in developed countries  
(Robson and Bennett, 2000) and in developing countries (Bloom et al., 2013; 
Karlan and Valdivia, 2010; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2014).  Consequently, many 
governments and donors have implemented subsidized business training and 
entrepreneurship programs for small firms in developing countries.  
This begs the question why not more firms invest in business training? 
One factor that is likely to play a role here is that most small firms in developing 
countries have limited financial resources as well as limited access to credit (Beck 
and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2006). However, access to finance is likely not the only 
constraint. After all, if firms do not know the potential benefits of business training 
they might be unwilling to invest in it even if they have the financial resources.   
In order to investigate this possibility, (Higuchi et al., 2015) conducted a 
field experiment with entrepreneurs in Vietnam. Their results show low demand 
for the business training prior to the random assignment of a business training 
program, but a significant increase in demand afterwards, through learning 
experiences from program participation. The authors suggest that this finding 
indicates that lacking knowledge about the potential benefits training benefits is 
one reason for low investments in business training. In other words, whereas the 
benefits of business training are ambiguous ex-ante, experience resolves – at least 
in part – this ambiguity, and consequently increases demand.   
It is important to note here the difference between risk and ambiguity, 
where the latter involves probabilities and outcomes that are vague and cannot be 
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quantified (Knight, 2012). As first demonstrated through the famous “urn 
experiments” conducted by (Ellsberg, 1961) people typically prefer risky 
prospects the probabilities associated with payoffs can be quantified, to ambiguous 
prospects where these probabilities are unknown. For example, most people are 
ambiguity averse in the sense that they prefer a lottery with a fifty percent chance 
to win some prize to a lottery where the chance of winning this same prize is 
unknown.  This conceptual distinction is also reflected in the fact that different 
parts of the brain are associated with processing risky and ambiguous prospects 
(Huettel et al., 2006). 
There is an extensive literature on the role of risk preferences in business-
related decisions such making investments, developing products and hiring 
employees (Burmeister-Lamp et al., 2012; Caliendo et al., 2009; Cramer et al., 
2002; Ekelund et al., 2005; Elston and Audretsch, 2011; Forlani and Mullins, 
2000; Gloss et al., 2017; Kan and Tsai, 2006). However, the role of ambiguity 
attitudes in such decisions has only become a topic investigation in empirical 
research more recently. Given that most business-related decisions involve 
probabilities that cannot be easily quantified a deeper understanding in the role of 
ambiguity attitudes can provide valuable insights in a range of questions about 
business decision-making. 
For example, (Barham et al., 2014) show that among farmers in the U.S., 
those with higher levels of ambiguity aversion are more inclined to adopt 
genetically modified crops, which reduce the uncertainty associated with pest 
damages. Similarly, (Engle et al., 2011) show that among Peruvian farmers those 
with higher ambiguity aversion are less likely to diversify to new crops for which 
it was more difficult to assess the risk of harvest failure. However, it’s not only 
entrepreneurs that dislike ambiguity, this aversion seems to be pretty similar 
between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs.  In a study among Chinese subjects, 
(Holm et al., 2013)find that whereas entrepreneurs are more tolerant towards 
uncertainty in strategic interactions, such as negotiating with another person, they 
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are equally ambiguity averse as non-entrepreneurs in non-strategic decision-tasks, 
such as choosing between risky and uncertain lottery. Similarly, (Koudstaal et al., 
2015) study a population of entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs in the 
Netherlands and find no differences between these groups in terms of ambiguity 
aversion in non-strategic tasks. 
These studies all consider ambiguity attitudes in choices that people make by 
themselves. However, there are also many ambiguous outcomes about which 
people in small firms make decisions on behalf of others. For example, consider a 
manager that has to decide on behalf of his team whether the company should 
invest in acquiring new knowledge, e.g. through a business training, of which the 
potential gains are uncertain.  
In such other-decisions, the outcome is not merely a result of personal 
ambiguity attitudes, but also depends on the attitudes projected onto the other 
person on whose behalf the decision is made. Furthermore, since other-decisions 
involve psychological distance between the decision-maker and the subject of the 
decision, it has been argued that this mode of decision-maker promotes more a 
more abstract and generalized mode of thought (Polman, 2010; Trope and 
Liberman, 2010). Indeed, these differences between self- and other-decisions are 
reflected in a number of studies.  
 
Deciding for others 
For example, (Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2006) ask subjects to consider various active 
medical treatments and passive strategies of non-intervention, either from the 
perspective of the patient (i.e. the self-perspective) or from the perspective of a 
doctor (i.e. the other-perspective). They find that when choosing from the self-
perspective people display are more willing to accept risks that result from non-
intervention than risks resulting from treatment, whereas in the other-perspective 
this bias is less prevalent. In a similar fashion (Polman, 2012) and (Andersson et 
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al., 2013) find that subjects display lower levels of aversion - the tendency to 
overweight the negative impact of losses relative to the positive impact of 
equivalent gains - when making decisions on behalf of others.  
Differences in self-other decision have also been observed in the domain 
of decision-making under uncertainty. (Pollmann et al., 2014) find that people are 
less risk averse when they make investments for others than for themselves. They 
also find that this self-other difference in risk aversion disappears when the 
decision-maker can be held accountable by a reward to be made by the principal, 
the owner of the money, after the agent, the investor of the money, made the 
investment. A similar pattern of reduced risk aversion in other decisions is 
observed in other studies (Chakravarty et al., 2011; Polman, 2012). Two other 
studies that also make use of a similar investment task however find increased risk 
aversion when choosing for others (Füllbrunn and Luhan, 2015; Kvaløy et al., 
2014). Although it remains unclear how these seemingly contradictory results can 
be reconciled, there is a growing literature pointing to important self-other 
differences in various domains of decision making. 
Less is known about potential self-other differences in decision making under 
ambiguity. To our best knowledge, the only paper that considers this question was 
published by (König-Kersting and Trautmann, 2016a). In contrast to the literature 
on self-other differences in the domain of risk, the authors do not find significant 
differences in ambiguity attitudes between self- and other-decisions. This results 
stands in contrast with (Charness and Gneezy, 2010) who find lower ambiguity 
aversion in group decisions as compared to individual decisions, suggesting that 
there may be a normative appeal to ambiguity neutrality. However, the results of 
(König-Kersting and Trautmann, 2016a) does correspond to earlier work by 
(Trautmann et al., 2008) which shows that being observed by others results in 
increased ambiguity aversion. In sum, it remains unclear under which conditions 
ambiguity attitudes differ between self- and other-decisions, and how this may 
influence business-related decisions.  
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Research question 
This study builds on the following two results described in the previous section. 
First, small firms’ demand for business training and other technologies with 
uncertain benefits is limited by ambiguity aversion. Second, it remains unclear 
under which conditions people exhibit self-other differences in choices that 
involve risk and uncertainty. We thus seek to answer the following question: 
- Is demand for business training with ambiguous returns higher when 
people choose on behalf of others than when they choose for themselves? 
5.2 Methods 
Setting 
The experiment was conducted among a population of owners, executive and 
high level managers of the registered businesses from information technology (IT) 
and information technology enabled services (ITES) sector in Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
The experiment was embedded in a larger study about an international 
development program which provided business support to small and medium sized 
enterprises in various countries. Our subjects were selected from the businesses 
that did not participate or applied to this business support program.20  From a total 
of 861 entrepreneurs that were called to arrange an interview for the survey, 441 
participated in the survey, and out of 441 survey participants 371 subjects 
participated in the experiment. The majority of subjects are males, with on average 
6.5 years of work experience after they were graduated from school. The largest 
group consisted of owner-managers (38.8%) with the second and third largest 
                                                     
20 We excluded from our experiment those firms that participated or applied to- and/or participated in 
the business support program since these firms might have confused our experiment with the actual 
business trainings offered to them in the consulting program. These businesses constitute about 10 
percent of total population. 
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groups being owners (30.7%), and executive managers (24.8%). Finally, another 
5.7% of respondents had different types of managerial functions in their company.  
 
Table 5.5.1 Respondent characteristics 
  Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Respondent gender (1=male) 371 0.96 0.2 0 1 
Tenure (years) 371 7.24 5.38 0 41 
Position Owner / exec. manager 371 0.39 0.49 0 1 
 
Owner 371 0.31 0.46 0 1 
 
Exec. manager 371 0.25 0.43 0 1 
  Manager, other 371 0.06 0.23 0 1 
 
Procedure 
The experiment was implemented by Bangladeshi enumerators in the local 
language Bengali. These enumerators were trained by the research team. Each 
enumerator visited subjects in April-May 2016 at their offices to conduct a face to 
face interview that took about an hour. Each enumerator first directed questions to 
the respondents to collect information about subject and business characteristics, 
and then passed to the experiment section. In our experiment we were especially 
concerned about religious tensions for questions involving uncertain outcomes in a 
predominantly Muslim country. In the beginning of the experiment section, each 
enumerator therefore first read an informed consent script prepared by research 
team and asked subjects if they would like to answer questions about uncertain 
outcomes. After getting the consent from survey participants to participate in the 
experiment, they started to implement the experiment by explaining the decision 
task in the experiment.21  
 
                                                     
21 Out of 440 respondents to the surveys 371 respondents accepted to participate in the experiment. 
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Decision task 
To measure attitudes towards risk and uncertainty we used a survey instrument 
based on a double multiple price list (DMPL) instruments. This instrument 
consists of two lists. The first list consists of choices between a certain and an 
ambiguous option. The second list consists of choices between a certain and a 
risky option (see figure 2). Given that attitudes towards risk and ambiguity have 
been found to be positively correlated (Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Bossaerts et al., 
2010; Charness and Gneezy, 2010)22 this instrument allows for the estimation of 
ambiguity attitudes net of risk attitudes.  
In contrast to commonly used DMPL instruments in which choices are financially 
incentivized, our experiment did not use financial incentives. The reason of this 
was twofold. First we wanted to construct an ecologically valid scenario pertaining 
to real-life business decisions. Second, we were worried that subjects may think 
that risk and ambiguity game involve gambling and this might have created 
religious tensions among the subjects, the majority of whom are Muslim,23 for 
these reasons, the choices in the prize list were embedded in a script about 
hypothetical business trainings.  
Subjects were asked to imagine they are asked by their director that they 
are given a choice between participation in two different trainings, both of which 
have the same characteristics (i.e. automatic passing of training, one-day duration, 
in their city of residence). It is explained to them that the payoffs associated with 
both training programs differ.  
  
                                                     
22 For a comprehensive review of the literature on ambiguity and risk attitudes see (Trautmann and 
van de Kuilen, 2015) 
23 Our concerns are similar to those experienced in other field studies, for example (Callen et al., 
2014) who elicit risk preferences in Afghanistan - another predominantly Muslim society -, using a 
DMPL similar to ours, without financial incentives. 
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Table 5.2 Decision tasks 
Price List 1: Ambiguity Attitude 
Task Training A Training B 
1 ?? chance to get 50K salary increase 100% chance to get 5K salary increase 
2 ?? chance to get 50K salary increase 100% chance to get 10K salary increase 
3 ?? chance to get 50K salary increase 100% chance to get 15K salary increase 
4 ?? chance to get 50K salary increase 100% chance to get 20K salary increase 
5 ?? chance to get 50K salary increase 100% chance to get 25K salary increase 
6 ?? chance to get 50K salary increase 100% chance to get 30K salary increase 
7 ?? chance to get 50K salary increase 100% chance to get 35K salary increase 
8 ?? chance to get 50K salary increase 100% chance to get 40K salary increase 
9 ?? chance to get 50K salary increase 100% chance to get 45K salary increase 
10 ?? chance to get 50K salary increase 100% chance to get 50K salary increase 
Price List 2: Risk Attitude 
Task Training C Training B 
1 50% chance to get 50K salary increase 100% chance to get 5K salary increase 
2 50% chance to get 50K salary increase 100% chance to get 10K salary increase 
3 50% chance to get 50K salary increase 100% chance to get 15K salary increase 
4 50% chance to get 50K salary increase 100% chance to get 20K salary increase 
5 50% chance to get 50K salary increase 100% chance to get 25K salary increase 
6 50% chance to get 50K salary increase 100% chance to get 30K salary increase 
7 50% chance to get 50K salary increase 100% chance to get 35K salary increase 
8 50% chance to get 50K salary increase 100% chance to get 40K salary increase 
9 50% chance to get 50K salary increase 100% chance to get 45K salary increase 
10 50% chance to get 50K salary increase 100% chance to get 50K salary increase 
 
In the first choice list (certainty vs. ambiguity) it is explained that 
choosing for training A will result in an increase of monthly salary of 50.000 
Bangladeshi Taka (approximately 600€). It is further explained that the probability 
of this salary increase actually occurring is unknown, and it depends on an 
uncertain prospect that the firm wins a contract for a project. In contrast, 
participation in training B - which prepares for work on a project that has already 
been secured - will result in a certain increase in monthly salary, varying from 10-
50.000 BDT. The second choice list has the same structure, but the uncertain 
probability of a 50K payoff to training A is replaced with a 50% probability of this 
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payoff. In both these choice lists, the point at which subjects switch from the 
option with ambiguous/risky payoff, i.e. training A, to the option with certain 
payoff is used as an indicator of their ambiguity and risk attitudes. For example, 
consider a subject who prefers in the first price list training A for tasks 1-2 and 
switches to a preference for training B in tasks 2-9. This subject, as well as and 
any other subjects that switch to Training B before task 4 can be classified as 
ambiguity averse, since he/she only prefers the uncertain option if the expected 
payoff is higher than the certain payoff in option B. Similarly, risk attitudes can be 
derived from the switchpoint in the second choice list  
 
Treatments  
We randomly allocated a business code from 0 to 860 for each firm in our 
population of businesses before enumerators arranged the interviews with the 
firms and according to the firm business code each firm was assigned to one of the 
following treatment groups: 
 
1. Self if the firms’ business code ends on a “1”, “4”, “7” or “0”; 
2. Colleague/friend if the firms business code ends on a “2”, “5”, or “8”; 
3. Colleague the firms’ business code ends on a “3 “, “6”, or “9”. 
In the first group, subjects were asked to imagine they made the choice for 
themselves. The second group was asked to imagine making the choices for a 
colleague with whom they were also closely befriended (low social distance). The 
third group was asked to imagine making the choices for a new colleague whom 
they did not know very well yet (high social distance). The exact wording of these 
instructions can be found in annex 1. The main focus in the paper is on comparing 
decisions in the self-condition (i.e. group 1) with the other-condition (i.e. group 2 
and 3).  
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We will compare groups 2 and 3 to explore whether ambiguity attitudes 
are moderated by the social distance towards the subject of the decision. Subject 
population of businesses were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental 
conditions, A total of 345 subjects were assigned to the self-condition, 258 
subjects to the colleague low social distance condition and 258 subjects to the 
colleague high social distance condition. Randomization was implemented with 
the random generation function of the Microsoft Excel.  
As can be seen in Table 3, of 371 subjects 159 subjects participated in the 
self-condition, 112 subjects participated in the colleague low social distance 
condition and 100 subjects participated in the colleague high social distance 
condition.  
Table 5.3 Randomization balance 
    
Self 
Low social 
distance 
High social 
distance 
  Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D. 
Male (1=yes) 159 0.96 0.21 112 0.97 0.16 100 0.95 0.22 
Tenure (years) 100 6.60 4.82 83 6.10 4.76 73 6.37 4.49 
Position 
   
  
 
  
   
 
Owner, exec. man. 159 0.39 0.49 112 0.38 0.49 100 0.39 0.49 
 
Owner 159 0.37 0.48 112 0.26 0.44 100 0.26 0.44 
 
Exec. Manager 159 0.18 0.38 112 0.30 0.46 100 0.30 0.46 
  Manager , other 159 0.06 0.24 112 0.05 0.23 100 0.05 0.22 
 
The randomization resulted in partial balance. In terms of gender and tenure the 
randomization was balanced. In terms of position in the firm the randomization 
was not fully balanced. Compared to the other-treatment (i.e. groups 2 and 3) the 
fraction of subjects that were firm owner but not executive manager was higher in 
the self-treatment, whereas the fraction of subjects that were executive manager, 
but not owner, was higher in the other-treatment. We control for imbalances by 
controlling for firm position (see next section). 
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Identification 
We estimate all models introduced in the previous paragraphs through OLS 
regression and report heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. To investigate 
whether entrepreneurs risk attitudes are different for self and other decisions we 
estimate following model and test α1≠0:  
 
Riski= α0+ α1Otheri + α’2Xi + ui      (3.1) 
 
where Riski is the inverse of the switchpoint in the second choice list for subject i 
that takes values from 1 and 10. As such this variable indicates the degree of risk 
aversion. Otheri equals to 1 (0 otherwise) if the participant is either in the low 
social distance (befriended colleague) or high social distance (colleague) group. If 
the entrepreneur deciding for others is more (less) risk averse than entrepreneurs 
deciding for themselves, then α1>0 (α1<0). Xi is a vector of subject characteristics 
including gender, tenure (years since graduation of highest completed education), 
position in the firm, and reported level of concern when choosing for others.  
Second, to probe whether entrepreneurs’ ambiguity attitudes are different for self 
and other decisions we estimate following model and test β1≠0:  
 
Ambiguityi = β0+β1Otheri + β2Riski + β’3Xi + εi (3.2) 
 
where Ambiguityi is the inverse of the switch-point in the second choice list for 
subject i that takes values from 1 and 10. As such this variable indicates the degree 
of ambiguity aversion. If the entrepreneur deciding for others is more ambiguity 
averse than subjects when he/she decides for others than when he/she decides for 
him/herself, then β1>0. To isolate ambiguity attitude from risk attitude we control 
for risk attitude by adding Riski. Again we control of subject characteristics 
through Xi.. Subjects might have formed different beliefs about the ambiguous 
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prospect for training A in the first choice list: the uncertain probability that the 
firm wins a contract for a project through which training A leads to a salary 
increase. Do subjects have different risk and ambiguity attitudes for self and other 
decision when they have different believes about the payoff probability in this 
ambiguous prospect? To answer this, after the experiment, we asked subjects 
whether they believed the uncertain probability of winning a contract for the 
project was either smaller, equal or greater than 50%.  
Through this we construct three sub-groups for subjects with smaller, 
equal or greater than 50% believes about uncertain outcome. We then estimate 
(3.2) for those three sub-groups and compare β1 estimates among groups. The 
rationale for this question is to allow us to control how beliefs about ambiguous 
probabilities might relate to self-other differences in ambiguity attitudes.  The 
intuition here is that if subjects believe that the ambiguous prospect occurs with a 
probability of exactly 0.5, their attitude towards this option should be identical to 
that in the risk task. In contrast, if subjects believe the probability to not be 0.50 
we suspect that self-other differences might be distinct from those observed in the 
risk task. Furthermore, this question links to the causes and implications of 
overconfidence among entrepreneurs (Forbes, 2005).  
Does increasing social distance mediate the difference between self and 
other decisions for trainings? Are entrepreneurs’ risk and ambiguity attitudes 
different when they decide for socially close friends and when they decide for 
socially distant other colleagues? To answer these questions we reformulate 
equations (3.1) and (3.2) as follows, estimate this model for two of the groups, 
namely (i) subjects deciding for socially distance colleagues and (ii) subjects 
deciding for socially closer colleagues, and test λ 1≠0 for risk attitudes and π1≠0 for 
ambiguity attitudes:  
 
Riski = λ0 + λ 1CloseCi + λ’2Xi + εi        (3.4), 
Ambiguityi = π0 + π1CloseCi + π2Riski + π’3Xi + εi (3.5) 
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where CloseCi equals 1 if the participant is deciding on behalf of a socially closer 
colleague and equals to 0 if deciding on behalf of a socially distant colleague. If 
entrepreneurs are more risk averse (lover) when they decide for socially close 
colleague than when they decide for socially distant colleagues, then λ1<0 (λ1>0). 
If entrepreneurs are more ambiguity-averse (ambiguity-loving) when they decide 
for colleagues in the lower social distance condition, then π1<0 (π1>0). 
5.3 Results  
Self-other decisions 
We then turn to regression results. Our main results regarding self-other decisions 
for risk and ambiguity attitudes are summarized in Table 4. Column 1 of the Table 
includes the coefficient estimates from the estimation of equation (3.1) where Risk 
aversion is the dependent variable. Columns 2-5 of the Table include coefficient 
estimates from the estimation of equation (3.2) where Ambiguity is the dependent 
variable. Columns 2-5 respectively report coefficient estimates for all 
entrepreneurs and three sub-groups including subjects with smaller, equal or 
greater than 50% believes about uncertain outcome of the project. We control for 
gender, tenure, position and concern for others. 
Several results are reflected in table 5-4. Firstly, as indicated in column 1, 
we find that entrepreneurs are more risk averse when they decide for others than 
when they decide for themselves. Second, as indicated in column 2, we find no 
strong evidence that – on average – ambiguity attitudes differ significantly 
between self and other decisions for entrepreneurs. In this column, the estimate for 
Other decisions is negative but not statistically significant. Furthermore, and in 
line with the literature (Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Bossaerts et al., 2010; Charness 
and Gneezy, 2010) we find that risk aversion – as indicated by the coefficient on 
the variable “switchpoint choice list 2” is a strong predictor of ambiguity aversion.  
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Table 5.4 Self-other differences in risk and ambiguity attitudes 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable 
Risk 
aversion 
Ambiguity 
aversion 
Ambiguity 
aversion 
Ambiguity 
aversion 
Ambiguity 
aversion 
Other 0.570* -0.285 -0.779*** 0.414 -0.224 
 
(0.308) (0.200) (0.258) (0.289) (0.395) 
Risk aversion 
 
0.682*** 0.507*** 0.695*** 0.723*** 
  
(0.041) (0.059) (0.100) (0.068) 
Constant 6.885*** 2.847*** 5.002*** 2.318** 1.871** 
 
(0.584) (0.511) (0.598) (0.940) (0.944) 
Observations 359 359 137 83 131 
R-squared 0.024 0.501 0.384 0.719 0.474 
Sample 
Full 
sample 
Full 
sample 
Belief 
payoff<0.5 
Belief 
payoff=0.5 
Belief 
payoff>0.5 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OLS regression of other-treatments (other friend/colleague and other colleague), comparing with 
self-treatment. Control variables: gender, tenure, position and concern for others. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
However, a more nuanced picture emerges when we test self-other 
differences in ambiguity attitudes according to subjects’ beliefs about the payoff 
probability in the ambiguous prospect. Columns 3 to 5 of the Table show estimates 
for group of subjects that believed the payoff probability in the ambiguous 
prospect to be less than 50%, equals to 50%, and more than 50%. We find that 
subjects that believed the payoff probability in the ambiguous prospect to be less 
than 50% are less ambiguity averse when they choose for others than when they 
decide for themselves. This finding corresponds with our hypothesis of lower 
ambiguity aversion for other-decisions. We find no strong evidence of difference 
between ambiguity attitudes in self and other decisions regarding decisions for 
subjects that believed the payoff probability in the ambiguous prospect to be equal 
or more than 50%. These results imply that depending on how entrepreneurs 
interpret the ambiguous prospect and its pay-off, they make different choices.  
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Social Distance 
We then turn to explore if perceived social distance towards the other differently 
influences ambiguity attitudes in the colleague/friend vs. colleague condition. We 
test whether entrepreneurs are less ambiguity averse when deciding for socially 
closer colleagues compared to socially distant colleagues. Our main results 
regarding social distance and risk and ambiguity attitudes are summarized below.  
 
Table 5.5 Social distance and risk and ambiguity attitudes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable 
Risk 
aversion 
Ambiguity 
aversion 
Ambiguity 
aversion 
Ambiguity 
aversion 
Ambiguity 
aversion 
Close colleague 0.232 -0.280 -0.690 0.332 -0.108 
 
(0.397) (0.284) (0.429) (0.488) (0.554) 
Risk aversion 
 
0.668*** 0.610*** 0.589*** 0.703*** 
  
(0.055) (0.059) (0.198) (0.095) 
Constant 7.538*** 2.759*** 3.482*** 2.233 2.212* 
 
(0.750) (0.636) (0.597) (1.718) (1.239) 
Observations 207 207 84 43 72 
R-squared 0.019 0.455 0.407 0.586 0.436 
Sample 
Full 
sample 
Full 
sample 
Belief 
payoff<0.5 
Belief 
payoff=0.5 
Belief 
payoff>0.5 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OLS regression of other-colleague/friend treatment, comparing with other-colleague treatment. 
Analysis excludes the subjects in the self-treatment group. Control variables: gender, tenure, position 
and concern for others. Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
Column 1 of table 5-5 includes the coefficient estimates from the 
estimation of equation (3.3) where Risk is the dependent variable. Columns 2-5 of 
the Table show the coefficient estimates from the estimation of equation (3.4) 
where Ambiguity is the dependent variable. Columns 2-5 respectively reports 
coefficient estimates for all entrepreneurs and three sub-groups including subjects 
with smaller, equal or greater than 50% believes about uncertain outcome of the 
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project. We again control for gender, tenure, position and perceived social distance 
to others in all estimates.  
In sum, we find no evidence that self-other differences in risk and 
ambiguity attitudes are moderated by social distance, neither for the full sample 
(columns 1 and 2) nor for sub-groups specified according to beliefs about payoff 
probabilities (columns 3-5).  
5.4 Discussion  
In this study with owners and managers of small firms in the IT-sector in 
Bangladesh we investigate if people are more willing to invest in business training 
with uncertain returns if they make such decisions on behalf of others in their 
company. In doing so, we aimed to contribute to the understanding of the role of 
ambiguity attitudes and self-other decisions in demand for new technologies with 
uncertain returns among small firms in developing countries (Engle-Warnick et 
al., 2007) Furthermore, given that small and medium sized firms constitute the 
largest part of the private sector in most developing countries (Ayyagari et al., 
2007) our study aims to contribute to the understanding of the mechanisms of 
economic growth in developing countries.  
Given the mixed findings on self-other differences in previous lab experiments 
on decision making under uncertainty (Chakravarty et al., 2011; Füllbrunn and 
Luhan, 2015; König-Kersting and Trautmann, 2016a; Kvaløy et al., 2014; 
Pollmann et al., 2014; Polman, 2012) we asked the question whether owners and 
managers in our sample would be more willing to invest in business trainings if 
the uncertain benefits would accrue to a colleague. 
Our results indicate that this is only partly the case. On the one hand we find 
that – for the full sample – ambiguity attitudes do not differ between self- and 
other-decisions. This finding aligns with a recent result obtained by (König-
Kersting and Trautmann, 2016a) who study ambiguity attitudes in an incentivized 
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lab experiment with students and find no differences between self- and other-
decisions. However, when accounting for beliefs about ambiguous probabilities, 
we find a self-other difference in ambiguity attitudes to occur among those who 
believe that payoff probability in the ambiguous prospect is lower than 50%. For 
this sub-group, constituting approximately 40% of the sample, ambiguity aversion 
is lower when choosing for others.  
In contrast, we find a higher level of risk aversion in other-choices. This 
finding is in line with previous studies that use incentivized tasks to measure risk 
attitudes in self- and other-decisions  
(Füllbrunn and Luhan, 2015; Kvaløy et al., 2014; Reynolds et al., 2011),  but 
differs from various others studies that find opposite results (Chakravarty et al., 
2011; Pollmann et al., 2014; Polman, 2012).  Taken together, these results 
correspond to the notion that risk and ambiguity are distinct phenomena, as 
reflected in the fact that different brain areas are involved in processing known vs. 
unknown probabilities (Huettel et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, we find that social distance between the agent and the 
subject of the decision, in our case either a befriended colleague or a new 
colleague, does not predict the level of ambiguity aversion. This result is in 
contrast to our expectation that self-other differences in ambiguity aversion are 
mediated by social distance. A potential reason for this finding is that because of 
the hypothetical nature of our survey instruments, subjects were simply not able to 
“imagine” different degrees of social distance depending on the specifications of 
the hypothetical subjects for whom they were deciding.  
 
Limitations and strengths  
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first experiment to investigate self-
other differences in ambiguity outside of lab a setting. Contrary to most previous 
studies on self-other differences that have been conducted with populations of 
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students in a laboratory context, our experiment specifically focuses on a group of 
entrepreneurs and managers in the IT-sector in Bangladesh. As such, our study 
contributes to a growing literature that takes standard behavioral economics 
experiments outside of the convenience populations in university labs to subjects 
from different countries, cultures and socio-economic backgrounds  (Henrich et 
al., 2001, 2010c; Herrmann et al., 2008). Furthermore, our study contributes to the 
literature on the role of ambiguity attitudes in the context of entrepreneurship. 
Various lines of research have shown that higher ambiguity tolerance can be 
beneficial for firms, including better coping with stress faced by entrepreneurs 
(Hai Yap Teoh and See Liang Foo, 1997) and higher willingness to adopt 
technologies of which the potential benefit is ambiguous, such as business training 
and improved crop varieties (Barham et al., 2014; Engle-Warnick et al., 2007; 
Higuchi et al., 2015). Whilst experiments on ambiguity attitudes commonly make 
use of financial incentives, we chose in our study to use vignettes instead. This 
approach has two main limitations. Firstly, there are no actual consequences – 
financial or otherwise – resulting from the subjects’ decision. Secondly, we rely on 
subjects’ capacity to imagine different levels of social distance for the 
colleague/friend vs. the colleague treatment. However, hypothetical scenarios have 
been used in numerous studies on ambiguity attitudes (Fox and Tversky, 1995; 
Ritov and Baron, 1990; Trautmann et al., 2008). A key benefit of using a vignette 
is that it allows for the construction of a decision-task with higher ecological 
validity and relevance to the entrepreneurial context in which our experiment was 
implemented. 
Another limitation of our study is that in the other-condition it cannot be 
fully ruled out that the decision also can have indirect economic consequences on 
decision-maker, other than direct psychological effects such as warm glow 
(Andreoni, 1990) that the decision-maker might derive from doing what they think 
will help the other person. For example, if the colleague benefits from having 
followed a training which was selected for them, it could be that they would feel 
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inclined to reciprocate and return the favour. The best way to exclude such effects 
would to use a fully anonymized lab experiment. However, this approach would 
again limit the ecological validity which we deem relevant for the study of 
ambiguity attitudes in an entrepreneurial context. Furthermore, it was made very 
explicit in our instructions for subjects in the other-treatment that the primary 
benefits – in the form of a salary increase – would accrue only to the colleague and 
not to the decision-maker.  
 
Policy implications and future research 
The main policy implications from this study is that in situations where ambiguity 
aversion can constrain demand for new services and technologies, such as for 
example in the case of business trainings (Higuchi et al., 2015) technology uptake 
may be promoted if decisions regarding its uptake are made not by the main 
beneficiary, such as the director, but rather by someone deciding on behalf of their 
behalf, such as the manager. 
In order to further explore how delegated decision-making in small firms 
can counter the tendency to underinvest in inputs with ambiguous returns, further 
research is warranted. Firstly, it would be valuable to further investigate whether 
our result holds under conditions in which there are real financial incentives at 
stake. Recently published work by (König-Kersting and Trautmann, 2016a) 
making use of a controlled lab experiment with incentivized choice tasks, finds no 
significant self-other differences in ambiguity attitudes. However, this study does 
not control for beliefs with respect to the ambiguous prospect. It would be 
interesting to study in future incentivized experiments whether the self-other 
differences in ambiguity attitudes do manifest for sub-sets of subjects that hold 
particular beliefs regarding the uncertain probability. 
Another direction for future research is to further explore the role of social 
distance in explaining self-other differences in ambiguity aversion. Whereas our 
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study failed to find such a relation, a more controlled manipulation of social 
distance between the decision-maker and the subject of the decision might serve to 
provide a more precise answer to this question.  
In sum, our experiments shows that entrepreneurs in Bangladesh display a 
lower level of ambiguity aversion when making decisions on behalf of colleagues 
compared to making such decisions for themselves. Our results do not support our 
expectation that social distance moderates this effect. Future research could 
investigate in more detail the mechanisms by which self-other differences in 
ambiguity aversion operate and influence entrepreneurial decisions. 
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Appendix 5.1 Instructions 
 
Enumerator read the text: Now we would like to ask you some hypothetical questions about choices 
under uncertainty. The research team will use this questions will be used to assess the demand for 
managerial training services from different support organizations   
 
H.0. Do you want to answer those questions? 
 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) Skip to Section I 
 
For enumerator   
 
 if the firm  ID code of the firm ends on  a “1”, “4”, or “7” or “0” we ask you to ask 
GROUP 1,  
 If the firm ID-code ends on a “2”, “5”, or “8” we ask you to go to  GROUP 2 
 If the firm ID-code ends on a “3”, “6”, or “9” we ask you to go to GROUP 3 
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Group 1: Self 
 
Choice 1 (CERTAINTY vs. AMBIGUITY) 
Please imagine that you are asked by your company to participate in one of the following two 
management trainings offered by a training company. Both trainings take place in Dhaka, last one 
day. All participants will pass the training automatically. Depending on which training you follow, 
you will be qualified to work on different projects, each of which will be awarded by your company 
with a different level of salary increase.   
 
Training A 
 Employees that follow training A will be invited to work on project GREEN.  
 Your company is currently trying to obtain the contract for project GREEN 
o The chance that your firm will obtain this contract is unknown. For example, it could be 
that the chance is only 10%, or it could be 50%, or it could be 90% etc. To summarize, 
the chance that your firm will obtain the contact is unknown. 
 Your company promised that all employees that follow training A can work on project GREEN 
& will receive a 50.000BDT salary increase, if your company gets the contract for this project. 
If your company does not get the contract your salary will stay the same. 
 
Training B 
 Employees that follow training B will be invited to work on project BLUE.  
 Your company recently obtained the contract for project BLUE.  
o The chance that your firm will obtain this contract is 100% 
 Your company promised that all employees that follow training B can work on project BLUE & 
will receive a 5.000BDT salary increase 
 
 Please indicate which training you would choose? (A or B) 
 
Q. Training A Training B 
Choice  
(A or B ) 
1 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 5K BDT salary increase   
 
 Now imagine the salary increase for training B is not 5K BDT but 10K. For training A it is 
constant like before. Now which training would you choose? (A or B) 
 
Q. Training A Training B 
Choice  
(A or B ) 
2 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 10K BDT salary increase   
3 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 15K BDT salary increase   
4 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 20K BDT salary increase   
5 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 25K BDT salary increase   
6 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 30K BDT salary increase   
7 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 35K BDT salary increase   
8 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 40K BDT salary increase   
9 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 45K BDT salary increase   
10 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase   
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Choice 2 (CERTAINTY vs. RISK) 
Please imagine that you are asked by your company to participate in one of the following two 
management trainings offered by a training company. Both trainings take place in Dhaka, last one 
day. All participants will pass the training automatically. Depending on which training you follow, 
you will be qualified to work on different projects, each of which will be awarded by your company 
with a different level of salary increase.   
 
 
Training C 
 Employees that follow training C will be invited to work on project ORANGE.  
 Your company is currently trying to obtain the contract for project ORANGE 
o The chance that your firm will obtain this contract is 50%. 
 Your company promised that all employees that follow training C can work on project 
ORANGE & will receive a 50.000 BDT salary increase, if your company gets the contract for 
this project. If your company does not get the contract your salary will stay the same. 
 
 
Training B 
 Employees that follow training B will be invited to work on project BLUE.  
 Your company recently obtained the contract for project BLUE.   
o The chance that your firm will obtain this contract is 100%. 
 Your company promised that all employees that follow training B can work on project BLUE & 
will receive a 5.000 BDT salary increase 
 
 Please indicate which training you would choose? (C or B) 
 
Q. Training C Training B 
Choice  
(C or B ) 
1 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 5K BDT salary increase   
 
 Now imagine the salary increase for training B is not 5K BDT but 10K. For training A it is 
constant like before. Now which training would you choose? (A or B) 
 
Q. Training C Training B 
Choice  
(C or B ) 
2 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 10K BDT salary increase   
3 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 15K BDT salary increase   
4 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 20K BDT salary increase   
5 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 25K BDT salary increase   
6 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 30K BDT salary increase   
7 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 35K BDT salary increase   
8 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 40K BDT salary increase   
9 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 45K BDT salary increase   
10 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase   
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Group 2: Colleague/Friend 
 
Choice 1 (CERTAINTY vs. AMBIGUITY) 
Please imagine that another employee in your company, who is also a close friend of yours and have 
the same monthly income with you, is asked by your company to participate in one of the following 
two management trainings offered by a training company. Both trainings take place in Dhaka, last 
one day. All participants will pass the training automatically. Depending on which training your 
colleague will follow, he/she will be qualified to work on different projects, each of which will be 
awarded by your company with a different level of salary increase.   
 
Training A 
 Employees that follow training A will be invited to work on project GREEN.  
 Your company is currently trying to obtain the contract for project GREEN 
o The chance that your firm will obtain this contract is unknown. For example, it could be 
that the chance is only 10%, or it could be 50%, or it could be 90% etc. To summarize, 
the chance that your firm will obtain the contact is unknown. 
 Your company promised that all employees that follow training A can work on project GREEN 
& will receive a 50.000BDT salary increase, if your company gets the contract for this project. 
If your company does not get the contract your friend’s salary will stay the same. 
 
Training B 
 Employees that follow training A will be invited to work on project BLUE.  
 Your company recently obtained the contract for project BLUE.  
o The chance that your firm will obtain this contract is 100% 
 Your company promised that all employees that follow training A can work on project BLUE & 
will receive a 5.000BDT salary increase 
 
 Please indicate which training you would choose? (A or B) 
 
Q. Training A Training B 
Choice  
(A or B ) 
1 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 5K BDT salary increase   
 
 Now imagine the salary increase for training B is not 5K BDT but 10K. For training A it is 
constant like before. Now which training would you choose? (A or B) 
Q. Training A Training B 
Choice  
(A or B ) 
2 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 10K BDT salary increase   
3 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 15K BDT salary increase   
4 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 20K BDT salary increase   
5 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 25K BDT salary increase   
6 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 30K BDT salary increase   
7 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 35K BDT salary increase   
8 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 40K BDT salary increase   
9 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 45K BDT salary increase   
10 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase   
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Choice 2 (CERTAINTY vs. RISK) 
Please imagine that an employee in your company, who is also a close friend of yours and have the 
same monthly income with you, is asked by your company to participate in one of the following two 
management trainings offered by a training company. Both trainings take place in Dhaka, last one 
day. All participants will pass the training automatically. Depending on which training your 
colleague will follow, he/she will be qualified to work on different projects, each of which will be 
awarded by your company with a different level of salary increase.   
 
 
Training C 
 Employees that follow training C will be invited to work on project ORANGE.  
 Your company is currently trying to obtain the contract for project ORANGE 
o The chance that your firm will obtain this contract is 50%. 
 Your company promised that all employees that follow training C can work on project 
ORANGE & will receive a 50.000 BDT salary increase, if your company gets the contract for 
this project. If your company does not get the contract your friend’s salary will stay the same. 
 
 
Training B 
 Employees that follow training C will be invited to work on project BLUE.  
 Your company recently obtained the contract for project BLUE.   
o The chance that your firm will obtain this contract is 100%. 
 Your company promised that all employees that follow training B can work on project BLUE & 
will receive a 5.000 BDT salary increase 
 
 Please indicate which training you would choose? (C or B) 
 
Q. Training C Training B 
Choice  
(C or B ) 
1 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 5K BDT salary increase   
 
 Now imagine the salary increase for training B is not 5K BDT but 10K. For training A it is 
constant like before. Now which training would you choose? (A or B) 
 
Q. Training C Training B 
Choice  
(C or B ) 
2 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 10K BDT salary increase   
3 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 15K BDT salary increase   
4 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 20K BDT salary increase   
5 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 25K BDT salary increase   
6 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 30K BDT salary increase   
7 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 35K BDT salary increase   
8 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 40K BDT salary increase   
9 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 45K BDT salary increase   
10 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase   
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Group 3: Colleague 
Choice 1 (CERTAINTY vs. AMBIGUITY) 
Please imagine that another employee in your company, whom recently joined the company, whom 
you don’t know so well yet, and who have the same monthly income with you, is asked by your 
company to participate in one of the following two management trainings offered by a training 
company. Both trainings take place in Dhaka, last one day. All participants will pass the training 
automatically. Depending on which training your colleague will follow, he/she will be qualified to 
work on different projects, each of which will be awarded by your company with a different level of 
salary increase.   
 
Training A 
 Employees that follow training A will be invited to work on project GREEN.  
 Your company is currently trying to obtain the contract for project GREEN 
o The chance that your firm will obtain this contract is unknown. For example, it could be 
that the chance is only 10%, or it could be 50%, or it could be 90% etc. To summarize, 
the chance that your firm will obtain the contact is unknown. 
 Your company promised that all employees that follow training A can work on project GREEN 
& will receive a 50.000BDT salary increase, if your company gets the contract for this project. 
If your company does not get the contract your colleague’s salary will stay the same. 
 
Training B 
 Employees that follow training B will be invited to work on project BLUE.  
 Your company recently obtained the contract for project BLUE.  
o The chance that your firm will obtain this contract is 100% 
 Your company promised that all employees that follow training B can work on project BLUE & 
will receive a 5.000BDT salary increase 
 Please indicate which training you would choose? (A or B) 
 
Q. Training A Training B 
Choice  
(A or B ) 
1 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 5K BDT salary increase   
 
 Now imagine the salary increase for training B is not 5K BDT but 10K. For training A it is 
constant like before. Now which training would you choose? (A or B) 
Q. Training A Training B 
Choice  
(A or B ) 
2 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 10K BDT salary increase   
3 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 15K BDT salary increase   
4 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 20K BDT salary increase   
5 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 25K BDT salary increase   
6 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 30K BDT salary increase   
7 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 35K BDT salary increase   
8 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 40K BDT salary increase   
9 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 45K BDT salary increase   
10 ?? chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase   
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Choice 2 (CERTAINTY vs. RISK) 
Please imagine that another employee in your company, whom recently joined the company, whom 
you don’t know so well yet , and who have the same monthly income with you, is asked by your 
company to participate in one of the following two management trainings offered by a training 
company. Both trainings take place in Dhaka, last one day. All participants will pass the training 
automatically. Depending on which training your colleague will follow, he/she will be qualified to 
work on different projects, each of which will be awarded by your company with a different level of 
salary increase.   
 
Training C 
 Employees that follow training C will be invited to work on project ORANGE.  
 Your company is currently trying to obtain the contract for project ORANGE 
o The chance that your firm will obtain this contract is 50%. 
 Your company promised that all employees that follow training C can work on project 
ORANGE & will receive a 50.000 BDT salary increase, if your company gets the contract for 
this project. If your company does not get the contract your colleague’s salary will stay the 
same. 
 
Training B 
 Employees that follow training B will be invited to work on project BLUE.  
 Your company recently obtained the contract for project BLUE.   
o The chance that your firm will obtain this contract is 100%. 
 Your company promised that all employees that follow training B can work on project BLUE & 
will receive a 5.000BDT salary increase 
 
 Please indicate which training you would choose? (C or B) 
Q. Training C Training B 
Choice  
(C or B ) 
1 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 5K BDT salary increase   
 
 Now imagine the salary increase for training B is not 5K BDT but 10K. For training A it is 
constant like before. Now which training would you choose? (A or B) 
 
Q. Training C Training B 
Choice  
(C or B ) 
2 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 10K BDT salary increase   
3 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 15K BDT salary increase   
4 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 20K BDT salary increase   
5 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 25K BDT salary increase   
6 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 30K BDT salary increase   
7 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 35K BDT salary increase   
8 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 40K BDT salary increase   
9 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 45K BDT salary increase   
10 50% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase 100% chance to get 50K BDT salary increase   
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Chapter 6  
 
Choice Complexity, 
Benchmarks and Costly 
Information* 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We conducted a lab experiment to investigate the effect of information 
interventions on decision-making in complex choices. Choice options were framed 
as financial products and could be objectively ranked, but time constraints made 
this impractical for subjects, forcing them to use more efficient heuristics. In our 
benchmark treatments, one option was revealed as having average values for all 
attributes, with attribute values presented either in relative or absolute terms. In 
our costly information treatment, two options were revealed as being suboptimal. 
We find that costly information and relative benchmarks improve decision quality. 
Finally, benchmarks have limited effects on demand for advice.  
                                                     
*Joint work with Mark Sanders and Stephanie Rosenkranz.  
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6.1 Introduction  
Many choices are complex. This complexity reflects not just the number of 
options, but also the number of attributes per option24. Such complex choices 
occur for example when consumers have to choose between mortgage products, 
financial retirement plans, health insurance policies, or mobile phone 
subscriptions. 
 Rational choice theory assumes that it is better to have more rather than 
fewer options. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that people have difficulties 
in selecting a suitable product when choices are complex.25 Recent studies found 
that complex choices result in choice inertia and reduced decision quality (Besedeš 
et al. 2012, 2010; Heiss et al. 2013; Huberman et al. 2007; Friesen and Earl 2015; 
Greifeneder et al. 2010), as well as lower satisfaction with the decision (Iyengar 
and Kamenica, 2006; Iyengar and Lepper, 2000).  
In this context, decisions concerning complex financial products are of 
specific interest, as mistakes in such decisions can be very costly for the individual 
as well as for society. Financial literacy seems to be key to financial well-being: 
financially literate individuals make fewer mistakes and are in better financial 
condition than financial illiterates (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011)26. However, many 
individuals generally score poorly on financial literacy, and it remains an open 
question what aids would effectively help these individuals make better decisions. 
Where increasing financial literacy may be first best, it is doubtful if this can ever 
materialize and be sufficient. Experimental research, however, has shown that in 
                                                     
1  Choice complexity is defined as the amount of information a choice involves: a choice between 
objects with one or two important attributes is simple, whereas a choice between objects for which 
many attributes are important is complex (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006) 
25 See Chernev et al. (2015) for an overview on empirical studies. In an experimental study, Besedeš 
et al. (2010) find that specifically for older subjects the probability of a person selecting the optimal 
option declines in the number of options, and that older subjects rely more on suboptimal decision 
rules. 
26 Many people have limited capacity to interpret numerical information and low numeracy is shown 
to be associated with suboptimal financial decisions (Kirsch and And Others, 1993; Reyna and 
Brainerd, 2007). 
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redesigning the choice architecture, decision quality can be significantly improved 
without removing options (Besedeš et al., 2010, 2012; Heiss et al., 2013). Building 
on this literature, the present paper provides novel evidence about a specific type 
of decision aid in complex choices; benchmarks. 
There seems to be an emerging literature testing interventions in choice 
architectures, but the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of such decision aids 
in complex choice situations remains scarce. Besedeš et al. (2015) study two forms 
of choice architecture which reduce a large decision problem into a series of 
smaller ones without reducing the choice set (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). The 
authors show that a tournament-style choice architecture, in which a large choice 
set is broken down in several smaller choice sets from which respective optimal 
options are selected into a final choice set, reduces choice overload and thereby 
improves decision making.  
Presenting subjects with different choice architectures Besedeš et al. 
(2015b) find that subjects’ preferences for choice architectures are negatively 
correlated with performance. This suggests that providing choice over 
architectures might reduce the quality of decisions. The authors cannot exclude 
that this problematic result is related to self-sorting, suggesting benevolent 
regulators should make that choice for them.  
Samek et al. (2016) test a somewhat different approach to promote 
improved decision-making in complex choices. The authors provide subjects with 
different presentation formats of a matrix representing the attribute values of 
different products. In one treatment, subjects could sort values per attribute 
(column), and in the second treatment all attributes were automatically ranked in 
descending order. Compared to a baseline where values are not and cannot be 
sorted, the second treatment caused a significant improved in decision quality and 
reduced decision time. In a related fashion, Peters et al. (2009) show that difficult-
to-evaluate attributes are taken into account more by decision makers when 
graphical decision aids make it easier to map these attributes on a good/bad scale. 
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And Agnew and Szykman (2005) find that subjects with higher levels of financial 
knowledge are less likely to suffer from choice overload when information about 
various products is presented in a table than when it is presented in a booklet 
format.  
In addition to these rather stylized architecture interventions, Soll et al. 
(2013) investigated the effect of the so-called “Credit Card Accountability 
Responsibility and Disclosure” (CARD) act, which forces providers to give 
information on the relationship between repayment amounts and loan duration in a 
prescribed format that makes the information easier to understand. In an online 
survey experiment the authors then found that this information indeed improves 
decision quality (it reduced people’s bias towards underestimating the duration of 
repayment periods). 
With the present paper we focus on two other approaches to improve 
decision making in complex choices; benchmarks and advice. In our individual 
choice task subjects make a sequence of 10 choices among four different multi-
attribute options, one of which being objectively optimal. Choices are incentivized 
and framed as a choice among financial products, and are made under a time 
constraint to mimic complexity27. One treatment variable is the provision of a 
benchmark. In the benchmark treatments we label one choice option as the 
“average product”, for which we use two different frames: in one frame the 
attributes of all other products are presented in absolute positive or negative 
deviations from the average product. In the other frame attributes for each option 
                                                     
27 The ranking of options does not depend on subjects’ risk preferences and but on the assumption 
that they are money maximizers. The full choice set is clearly defined, as is the value of each option. 
While the optimal option is always unique, its identity is concealed from subjects by manipulating 
the value of 5 attributes that need to be combined to calculate the value of each option. Complex 
decisions are typically made without a time constraint, but are characterized by a large number of 
alternatives, parameters, variables, and uncertainties, such that it is usually difficult to make the 
optimal decision. Setting a time constraint makes it difficult for subjects to make the calculations that 
are needed to find the optimal option with certainty. Several studies how that decision-making under 
time pressure indeed leads to suboptimal decision making (Ben Zur and Breznitz, 1981; Payne et al., 
1988). 
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are presented as relative deviations from the average product, for which all 
attributes are set to 10028. In all treatments we generated three products with 
random attributes and computed the attributes of the fourth as the average of the 
three randomly generated. This randomization allows us to control for product 
similarity29.  
Providing a benchmark option with average values for each attribute, 
changes the presentation of decision-relevant information without altering the 
actual choice set. With this treatment we change the presentation of the choice 
attributes, by explicitly providing a benchmark as a reference for comparison30. 
Rational decision making in complex choices over options with multiple attributes 
requires a comprehensive evaluation strategy. Often a high value for one attribute 
can compensate for a low value for another, as for example in the case of a phone 
subscription that consists of various costs components such as the co-payment for 
the phone, fixed monthly costs, flexible monthly costs, etc. In the face of 
constraints to time and cognitive capacity, decision-makers might benefit from a 
well-known benchmark or reference product as it makes it easier to compare the 
available options. By varying the way the information is presented and by 
identifying a benchmark, the decision-maker is steered towards using an 
elimination-by-aspects strategy.  
Alternatively, a decision-maker may be triggered to substitute a 
comprehensive evaluation strategy by simpler alternative strategies (weighted 
additive, satisficing, lexicographic), or by (e.g. fast and frugal) heuristics relying 
                                                     
28 Note, strictly speaking we thus reduce the available information in the relative benchmark 
treatment. 
29 Note that in this choice experiment the decision makers were asked to select the optimal product 
and pay-off depended on the rank of the product they selected, not how close or far the selected 
product was from the optimal choice. Very similar products make this task more complex as the 
optimal product is harder to spot in the short time given.  
30 Note that we do not claim that the benchmark product serves as a reference point in the sense 
of(Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). Our benchmark product is part of the choice set (which does not 
need to be the case for a reference point) and does not necessarily determine clear domains of gains 
and losses.  
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on only a few comparisons31. This strategy may be particularly effective for 
subjects who are less financially literate, i.e. individuals with higher cognitive 
costs. In line with the notion that presentation of information influences how easily 
it can be processed (Bettman and Kakkar, 1977), we conjecture that the relative 
benchmark treatment will be more effective, as it steers the decision-maker 
towards using a heuristic of comparing products in terms of the number of 
attributes with above- and below-average values. 
We contribute to the literature on decision aids with our finding that 
benchmarks promote decision quality, but only when attribute values of the 
products are expressed in relative terms. Our second treatment consists of subjects 
being given the option to buy information (which we label “advice”) about the 
relative profitability of various options that can be chosen. When advice is bought, 
the computer truthfully marks two of the suboptimal options, the worst and 
randomly one of the other non-optimal options, in the set of four. This information 
is costly and can be ignored but subjects are informed the advice is truthful. When 
the decision is taken randomly, the two scenarios with and without costly 
information differ only in the variance not in the expected value of the 
consequence of the decision, with the variance when information is acquired being 
lower.  
Providing the possibility to discard sub-optimal options from the choice 
set reduces the cognitive burden of the decision maker because fewer options need 
to be evaluated. With this treatment we target the structure of the choice task as we 
vary the number of relevant alternatives. However, we present the decision maker 
with the possibility to receive additional information on suboptimal options at the 
expense of the benefits of selecting the optimal option. The effectiveness of this 
approach relies on the assumption that people who request the additional 
information are benefited by it, and those who do not are benefited by the original 
                                                     
31 Regarding strategies in complex choices see (Thaler et al., 2014), (Gigerenzer et al., 1999) or for 
an overview (Payne et al., 1988). 
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choice set.32 A rational decision-maker following a comprehensive evaluation 
strategy should only make use of the advice option when the reduction in marginal 
cognitive costs - due to reduced difficulty of the decision task – more than 
compensates for the reduction in marginal benefits. The advice option is thus 
attractive for subjects who are less financially literate or who are susceptible to 
choice overload and thus have higher marginal cognitive costs, as this increases 
especially their chance to choose the optimal option.  
Our paper therefore also contributes to the literature on the effects of 
advice on decision quality. In an experimental study Gino and Moore (2007) show 
that demand for costly advice in complex choice tasks sub-optimally high while 
costly advice is underutilized in simple choice tasks. In a hypothetical choice 
experiment Hung and Yoong (2010) compare the effect of unsolicited and 
solicited advice. They find that unsolicited advice does not affect investment 
behavior, but when advice is optional, individuals with low financial literacy are 
more likely to ask for it and use it. The authors also find that notwithstanding this 
negative selection on ability, individuals who actively solicit advice indeed make 
better choices. Hackethal et al. (2012) find that self-selection largely explains their 
finding of better outcomes for advisees in the context of German Internet 
brokerage accounts. A robust finding in the literature is that individuals who 
receive unsolicited advice tend to significantly discount it (Bonaccio and Dalal, 
2006; Yaniv, 2004a, 2004b; Yaniv and Kleinberger, 2000). Furthermore, Gino 
(2008) shows that individuals are more likely to use decision-related information 
when they pay for this information compared to when they get it for free. In sum, 
while advice that is explicitly solicited and paid for is perceived as helpful, 
unsolicited and free advice is perceived as intrusive and might even lead to worse 
decisions (Deelstra et al., 2003; Goldsmith, 2000; Goldsmith and Fitch, 1997). Our 
                                                     
32 Note that providing costless information regarding the ranking of options, i.e. without affecting consequences, 
would simplify the decision problem for all decision makers in a trivial way without allowing us to differentiate 
between decision makers applying different choice strategies.  
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results indicate that access to advice improves decision making. Not only does it 
result in more optimal decisions and fewer suboptimal decisions, it also leads to a 
higher payoff even net of the advice cost. Furthermore, we find that subjects 
benefit more from the option to buy advice when the products presented are more 
similar and therefore harder to distinguish. Then simplifying the choice set to two 
options and reducing the cognitive effort needed for optimal decision making has 
greater marginal effect. 
We conduct the experiment with a 3 × 2 factorial design (relative, 
absolute, no benchmark × advice, no advice), allowing us to also study possible 
interaction effects of benchmarks and advice. We are especially interested in 
understanding whether these two approaches indeed improve decision making in 
complex choices, and whether the instruments are complements or rather 
substitutes. Thus, our study also contributes to the literature on the demand for 
financial advice. Various studies show that demand for financial advice, such as 
consultation of a bank advisor, is positively correlated to individuals’ level of 
financial literacy, even when controlling for income and education levels 
(Calcagno and Monticone, 2015; Hackethal et al., 2012). One interpretation of this 
result is that individuals with higher financial literacy better understand the 
potential benefits of seeking costly advice, for example to avoid even higher costs 
resulting from poor financial decisions (Robb et al., 2012). In contrast, Gino and 
Moore (2007) find that subjects are not more likely to seek even costless advice in 
a difficult version of the task compared to an easy version of the task.  
We find that absolute but not relative benchmarks increase the propensity 
to buy advice. This result corresponds with the finding that only relative 
benchmarks improve decision quality and suggest that absolute benchmarks were 
harder for subjects to use, thus driving increased demand for costly advice. This 
paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design, and 
procedures. Section 3 develops the hypotheses we test in our study and our 
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empirical strategy. Our results are presented in Section 4 and we discuss our 
findings and conclude in Section 5. 
6.2 Experimental design  
Design 
The experiment consisted of three parts. The first part of the experiment was an 
individual choice task, where subjects made choices among different options, 
which were framed as financial products. Subjects were presented a table with four 
different options, labelled product A, B, C and D, and were instructed and 
incentivized to select the option with the lowest total ‘costs’. To mimic decision 
making for complex financial products, the total costs of the products were not 
explicitly given, but the subjects were presented with five different cost elements, 
framed as costs and tax deduction, of each product. Subjects were informed that 
the product had a maturity of one year (12 months) and that it was the subjects’ 
task to determine which product has the lowest total costs. The optimal product 
could be calculated using the formula:  
 
Total cost = start costs + (12 x monthly costs) + maturity costs + management fee 
(percentage of start costs) - tax deduction (percentage of monthly cost)  
 
This formula was not given explicitly, but in the instructions all cost 
elements and their influence on the total costs were carefully explained (see the 
instructions in Appendix II). The values for the cost elements were randomly 
generated for three of the products while for the fourth product the cost elements 
were calculated as the average of the three randomly generated others. The 
intervals in which the cost elements were randomly varied were displayed on a 
whiteboard in the room. This design allows for an objective evaluation and 
ranking of options, independent of subjects’ tastes and risk preferences as long as 
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subjects are not satiated in money (see (Besedeš et al., 2012b). The products and 
an example of cost elements were presented as in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1 Example Payoff Matrix 
 Product 
 A B C D 
Starting costs 87 92 103 94 
Monthly costs 35 49 64 49 
Maturity costs 72 91 2 52 
Management fee (%) 15 31 16 21 
Tax deduction (%) 11 10 10 10 
 
The task of choosing the optimal product was repeated ten times, and each time 
the cost elements for three of the products were randomly determined. The 
position of the average product within the table was randomly assigned by the 
computer every round. The treatment to which subjects were assigned determined 
whether they were informed about the existence of this average product or not. 
Subjects had to perform the task of choosing the optimal product within 30-
seconds, which were presented by a timer counting down in the upper right corner 
of the screen. This time limit was introduced to simulate the complexity of the 
financial product choice. If a subject did not choose a product within these 30 
seconds, the computer automatically implemented the product with the highest 
total costs as the subject’s choice.  
We tested the effects of two benchmark treatments and one advice 
treatment, in a 3 × 2 factorial design. All treatments were employed in a between-
subject design. Regarding the benchmark we varied the information subjects had 
on the existence of the average product as well as the presentation of this average 
product. In the control treatment, subjects were not informed that the cost elements 
of one of the options reflected the respective average of the other three options. 
This information was also not revealed to them in the instructions. This average 
product was indicated by a blue font and it was also explicitly stated that the 
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respective product is an average product. In one set of treatments the other 
products were represented in absolute deviations from the average product 
(ABSOLUTE) while in another treatment (RELATIVE) the cost elements of all 
other products were presented in percentages relative to the average product. In 
RELATIVE the average product had all cost components set to 100 while cost 
components of other products were expressed relative to this. 
We varied the information regarding the ranking of the options by giving 
subjects in one set of treatments (ADVICE) the opportunity to have the worst 
option and another randomly chosen suboptimal option indicated by the computer 
before making a choice, against the payment of a fixed price. While this 
potentially left the subject with only two options, the advice could be ignored and 
the indicated suboptimal options could still be chosen. We framed this decision as 
‘buying advice’ and the price for this information was set such that the decision 
was only profitable if indeed the optimal option was selected. The choice on 
whether or not to purchase this information was to be made in each round before 
the options were presented. 
Payoffs are shown in Table 2. The subjects were rewarded based on how 
well they made their decisions. The options were ranked in order from optimal 
(cheapest) to worst (most expensive). Payoffs were directly linked to whether the 
optimal, second best, second worst or worst product was chosen. Subjects started 
with an initial endowment of €8 and the payment was added or deducted from this 
amount depending on the choices the subject made. Choosing the second best 
option after buying advice led to a payoff of zero, while choosing a worse product 
led to deductions from the endowment. Note that it was made clear that the worst 
option and one of the remaining suboptimal options would be indicated by the 
advice, such that it was not clear to subjects if the remaining worst option would 
be the second or third best option. For purely random choices the expected value 
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of buying advice is thus 0.5*5+0,5*(0,5*-2.5+0,5*2.5) – 2.5 = 0; identical to the 
expected value of not buying advice.33  
 
Table 6.2 Payoffs by choice 
Choice No advice Advice (cost=2.5) 
Optimal 5 2.5 
2nd best 2.5 0 
3rd best -2.5 -5 
Worst -5 -7.5 
 
At the end of the experiment one of the ten rounds was randomly drawn 
and used to determine the subjects’ actual monetary earnings. Subjects earned on 
average €9.16 in this part of the experiment. In the second part of the experiment, 
to assess participants’ risk aversion, a sequence of binary lottery decisions was 
administered, which was equivalent to the one introduced by (Holt and Laury, 
2002). The task asked the subjects to choose between two lotteries in ten different 
cases. The lottery choice screen is shown in Appendix II, Figure A7. The amounts 
that could be won did not change in the ten lotteries, only the probability of 
occurrence of each amount changed. One lottery paid either €3 or €0 and the other 
paid either €1.50 or €1. The switching point from one lottery to the other is the 
crucial point that reveals the individual’s risk aversion. Even when people switch 
back and forth between lotteries, the number of safe options gives a good 
indication of the subject’s level of risk aversion (Holt and Laury, 2002). After ten 
decisions were made, one of the ten lotteries was chosen randomly by the 
computer and played to determine the payoff for the subject in this round. The 
payoff received in this part of the experiment was added to the amount the subject 
earned in the first part. Subjects earned on average €1.74 in the lottery part.  
                                                     
33 Note that a risk-averse decision-maker employing such a random choice strategy should acquire information as 
this reduces the variance of the expected outcome. 
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Note that we deliberately abstracted from heterogeneity in subjects’ tastes. 
Of course this limits the external validity of our findings. However, this allowed us 
to implement a benchmark with an objective value that is independent of subjects’ 
tastes and therefore increase internal validity by abstracting from subjective 
beliefs. The same argument holds for the absence of risk in the choices in our 
treatments. The possibility to objectively rank options allows us to observe 
decision quality without having to control for risk preferences. In the real world it 
would perhaps be more suitable to set benchmarks that satisfy the preferences of 
the average consumer. In our simplified choice situation with homogeneous tastes 
such a benchmark could obviously not be implemented. Nevertheless, we think it 
is important to study the psychological effects of the presence of a benchmark 
product in the simplest setting first. Finally, in the real world, complex decisions 
often have no time constraint, but rather require the assessment of uncertain 
absolute and relative merits of multiple attributes of available options. In order to 
be able to objectively determine decision quality in our lab setting we presented 
the options with attributes that were relatively simple to assess. However, adding a 
time constraint made it difficult for subjects to process all relevant information and 
possibly forced them to concentrate on the most important attributes. This 
evaluation strategy is similar to strategies employed in real complex choices 
(Payne et al., 1988).  
The experiment ended with a questionnaire on demographics, buying 
behavior, self-reported personality traits (BFI-10(Rammstedt and John, 2007) and 
attitudes regarding financial products (AFM, 2014). See Appendix III for these 
survey questions. The survey was not incentivized but anonymity was guaranteed. 
 
Experimental procedures  
The experiments were conducted in the Experimental Laboratory for Sociology 
and Economics (ELSE) at Utrecht University. They were programmed and 
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conducted with the experimental software ‘z-Tree’(Fischbacher, 2007). In seven 
sessions, a total of 158 subjects (average of 23 subjects per session) participated in 
the experiment.  
The subjects were mostly undergraduate students from various fields at 
Utrecht University and Hogeschool Utrecht. Over 1000 potential subjects from the 
pool of the ELSE lab were approached by email to participate in the experiment, 
using the ORSEE recruitment system (Greiner, 2015). Upon arrival in the lab, 
subjects were randomly assigned a seat behind a computer. Subjects were 
randomly divided into 3 groups, where each of the three groups played a different 
treatment34. Treatments with and without the option to buy advice were 
administered in different sessions but on the same days in alternating order. This 
allows for comparison of the differences between the treatments and control for all 
other factors as these stay the same between treatments. Before the start of every 
experiment, general written instructions in English were given, which were kept 
identical across sessions (see Appendix II). Additional instructions were displayed 
on the screen. The first part of the experiment started when all subjects had fully 
read and understood the instructions. One full experimental session lasted on 
average 45 minutes and subjects earned an average of €10.90. 
6.3 Hypotheses and estimation strategy 
Hypotheses 
Decisions in complex choices can be sub-optimal because of boundaries to 
cognitive abilities, decision time and/or tractability of the decision problem. As 
such, interventions that alleviate these constraints may improve decision quality. 
Our benchmark interventions, which provide subjects with information about the 
                                                     
34 For groups 1,3 and 5 some an IT-related problem caused in a reduced number of tasks being implemented in 
periods 9-10 of the experiment (10 missing obs./group for period 9 and 20 missing obs. for period 10). We have 
controlled for these missing observations by testing our regression models both with and without these periods 
and the results do not change significantly, We thus report the estimates for the large dataset including rounds 9-
10. 
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way in which attributes compare across products, is expected to improve decision 
quality by making the decision problem more tractable. 
Hypothesis 1: In the treatments with absolute and relative benchmarks, the 
number of optimal decisions is higher, the number of worst decisions is 
lower, and average payoffs are higher than in the treatments without a 
benchmark. 
 
Next, we expect that benchmarks are particularly effective at improving decision 
quality when attribute values are presented in relative terms compared to the 
“average product” rather than in absolute terms. The main reason for this is that 
the relative benchmark makes it easier for subjects to see in one glance if product 
attributes have a value above (>100) or below (<100) market average. 
Hypothesis 2: In the treatments with a relative benchmark, the number of 
optimal decisions is higher, the number of suboptimal decisions is lower, 
and average payoffs are higher than in the treatments with an absolute 
benchmark. 
 
Regarding the effect of the costly information treatment, we expect that advice 
will be bought mostly by subjects that find the decision problem particularly 
challenging and that this will consequently result in improved decision making: 
Hypothesis 3: In the treatments with the possibility to buy additional 
information (advice), the number of optimal decisions is higher, the number 
of suboptimal decisions is lower, and payoffs are higher than in the 
treatments without this option. 
 
Finally, regarding the effect of benchmark products on demand for costly 
information, the existing literature does not provide us with a clear direction of the 
expected effect. However, if indeed benchmarks make decision problems more 
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tractable and given that advice is costly, we would expect subjects to have lower 
demand for advice in the benchmark treatments.  
Hypothesis 4: In the treatments with absolute and relative benchmarks there 
is lower demand for costly information than in treatments without a 
benchmark. 
 
Estimation strategy 
We test these hypotheses using a series of-OLS regression analyses. Regarding 
hypotheses 1-3, we first test how payoffs – both gross and net – are influenced by 
the five treatment combinations (i) relative benchmark, (ii) absolute benchmark, 
(iii) advice, (iv) relative benchmark * advice, (v) absolute benchmark * advice. To 
this purpose we estimate the following regression model: 
 
Yij = β0 + β1Aij + β2BMij + β3BMij*Aij + β4Cij + εij     (3.1) 
 
in which Yij, represents the payoff individual i in decision-task j, BMij is a dummy 
for the benchmark treatment, Aij is a dummy for the advice treatment, BMij*Aij is 
the interaction of the benchmark and advice treatment, ε are unobserved factors 
and β0, β1, β2 are parameters to be estimated. Estimates of the parameter β2 can be 
interpreted as the causal effect of benchmark treatment, which is randomly 
assigned to individuals. In addition, we control for the possibility of non-random 
assignment of treatments to subjects by including a vector of subject-level control 
variables (Cij): age, gender, self-reported preferences with respect to financial 
products and self-reported psychological traits from the survey and risk aversion 
as measured with the Holt-Laury lottery task.  As we expect that subjects require 
some practice to get acquainted with the benchmark treatments we test for learning 
effects. To this purpose, we run separate regressions for the first part (round 1-6) 
and second part (round 7-10) of the experiment. 
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Having tested the effect of the treatment on payoffs, we then turn to 
exploring how the treatments affect the actual decision. To this purpose, we apply 
a probit model with same specification as 3.1.  This model is estimated for the 
following binary outcome variables: (i) best choice: if subject selects the most 
optimal, i.e. least expensive, product; (ii) worst choice: if subject selects the least 
optimal, i.e. most expensive, product; (iii) no choice: if subjects select no product 
within the allocated 30 seconds. In order to test hypothesis 2 – that relative 
benchmarks are more effective than absolute benchmarks – we run the 
same regression analyses to the sub-sample of subjects in either of these 
two treatments. By comparing the relative to the absolute benchmark 
treatment we can identify to what extent possible effects derive from the 
benchmark as such vs. from the format in which the information was 
presented. Finally, in order to test hypothesis 4 – that demand for costly 
information is lower in the benchmark treatments – we implement the same 
regression as specified in 3.1 while restricting the sample to the subjects in 
either of the two benchmark treatments. Setting the absolute benchmark as 
the reference category, we then estimate the effect of the relative 
benchmark compared to the absolute benchmark. 
6.4 Results  
Descriptive statistics  
Table 3 describes the demographics of the sample across all sessions and 
treatments. There are no statistically significant differences between groups, 
indicating that randomization was successful.  
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Table 6.3 Demographics by treatment 
Group # obs. Age (yr) Female % 
Control 27 23.03 0.60 
Advice 25 22.40 0.60 
Benchmark, absolute 27 23.17 0.52 
Benchmark, absolute + Advice 25 23.04 0.56 
Benchmark, relative 28 24.08 0.68 
Benchmark, relative + Advice 26 22.92 0.65 
Total 158 23.10 0.60 
 
Table 6.4 provides a summary of choices and performance per treatment. The total 
number of observations is larger than in table 3, given that each subject engaged in 
a series of choice tasks. The column “Decision time” indicates the average 
decision time in seconds, and the column “In-time” indicates the fraction of 
subjects who successfully made any decision within the allocated 30 seconds. The 
Column "Payoff" indicates the average payoff for subjects, and finally the Column 
"Net payoff" indicates the average payoffs corrected for the cost of buying advice. 
The Column "Best choice" indicates the percentage of subjects that chose the 
financial product with the lowest costs. The Column "Worst choice" indicates the 
percentage of subjects that chose the financial product with the highest costs. As 
can be seen for the groups in the non-advice treatment (Rows 1, 3 and 5) the 
payoff is equal to the net payoff, because no advice was available. 
We see several results in Table 6-4. First, the advice treatment is 
associated with improved decisions, as indicated by the high fraction of "best 
choices" and lower fraction of "worst choices" compared to the non-advice 
treatment groups. Second, the improved decision-making in the advice treatment 
also results in higher payoffs, even if corrected for the cost of buying advice, as 
can be seen by comparing payoffs and net payoffs for the treatment group with the 
advice-only group (second row). Third, we find that – in comparison to the control 
group - both the absolute benchmark (ABM) and relative benchmark (RBM) 
treatments are associated with higher payoffs, with a corresponding reduction in 
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the fraction of worst choices. Fourth, we observe that both payoffs and the fraction 
of optimal choices is higher in the advice treatment than in the benchmark 
treatments. Finally, we observe that the combined advice and benchmark 
treatments (ABM and RBM) are associated with somewhat lower payoffs, fewer 
optimal decisions and more worst decisions than the advice treatment. In the next 
section we test the statistical significance of these differences.  
 
Table 6.4 Decisions and payoffs by treatment 
Group Obs. Decision 
time  
Payoff  Payoff 
net  
Best 
choice  
Worst 
choice  
Control 240 22.58 1.13 1.13 0.53 0.32 
Advice 250 22.93 3.52 3.07 0.73 0.06 
Absolute benchmark (ABM) 238 22.69 1.99 1.99 0.53 0.21 
ABM + Advice 250 22.58 3.14 2.45 0.69 0.09 
Relative benchmark (RBM) 250 21.67 1.65 1.65 0.52 0.22 
RBM + Advice 260 20.33 3.08 2.45 0.65 0.08 
Total 1488 22.11 2.48 2.16 0.61 0.16 
 
Main estimation results 
We first test hypothesis 1; that benchmarks promote improved decision-making in 
complex choices. As can be seen in regression table 6.5, the relative benchmark 
(RBM) treatment has a significantly positive effect on payoffs, but only in the later 
rounds of the experiments, suggesting that subjects require some rounds of 
learning to becoming acquainted with the information presentation. Furthermore, 
the result in column 8 suggests that this effect is mainly driven by reduction in the 
fraction of worst choices. In contrast, the absolute benchmark (ABM) treatment 
does not have a statistically significant effect on payoffs, neither in the first and 
later rounds of the experiment, and only causes a marginally significant reduction 
in the fraction of worst choices.  
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Furthermore, as can be seen in tables 6.5 and 6.6, the advice treatment has 
a strong positive effect on decision quality and corresponding payoffs35. In 
addition, the advice treatment has a marginally significant negative interaction 
effect with the relative benchmark treatment in later rounds of the experiments, as 
indicated by the negative coefficient on the variable “A*RBM” in columns 2, 4, 
and 6. This indicates that in the presence of the relative benchmark, the advice 
treatment contributes less to improved decision-making. Moreover, the size of the 
coefficients is such that the positive effect of the advice treatment is absent in the 
RBM treatment.  
 
Table 6.5 Treatment effects on payoffs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Payoff Payoff (net) 
  Pt. 1 Pt. 2 Pt. 1 Pt. 2 
Advice (A) 2.025** 2.715*** 1.499* 2.065** 
 
(0.842) (0.925) (0.844) (0.939) 
RBM 0.133 1.946** 0.105 1.884** 
 
(0.881) (0.943) (0.867) (0.936) 
ABM 0.450 0.959 0.447 0.893 
 
(0.863) (0.921) (0.878) (0.932) 
A*RBM -0.649 -2.194* -0.812 -2.171* 
 
(1.106) (1.185) (1.096) (1.178) 
A*ABM -0.371 -1.567 -0.659 -1.726 
 
(1.143) (1.202) (1.144) (1.223) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 833 498 833 498 
R2 0.092 0.118 0.071 0.111 
Estimates from OLS regressions. RBM is relative benchmark. ABM is absolute benchmark. Pt. 1 
(part 1) refers to decisions rounds 1-6, pt.2 refers to rounds 7-10.  Controls include: age, sex, risk 
preference, self-reported personality traits and financial product preferences. Clustered robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                     
35 We do not control in our analysis for whether or not subjects used the advice that they purchased, since only 
N=7 subjects disregarded advice they purchased. Key results are robust to omitting these observations.  
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Hypothesis 2 states that the relative benchmark treatment leads to higher payoffs 
and better decisions than the absolute benchmark treatment. To test this 
hypothesis, we conduct the same set of regression analyses restricted to the subset 
of subjects in either of the two benchmark treatments. Again we compare the 
earlier and later rounds of the experiment. As indicated in table 6.7, column 4, we 
find that in comparison to absolute benchmarks, the relative benchmarks improved 
net payoffs.   
Table 6.6 Treatment effects on decision quality 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Choice best Choice worst No choice 
  Pt. 1 Pt. 2 Pt. 1 Pt. 2 Pt. 1 Pt. 2 
Advice (A) 0.183** 0.261*** -0.217*** -0.197*** -0.046 -0.119** 
 
(0.090) (0.092) (0.080) (0.066) (0.054) (0.057) 
RBM -0.008 0.124 -0.020 -0.128** -0.048 -0.064 
 
(0.085) (0.089) (0.063) (0.057) (0.052) (0.050) 
ABM -0.027 -0.016 -0.031 -0.085* -0.040 -0.012 
 
(0.087) (0.086) (0.061) (0.051) (0.053) (0.039) 
A*RBM -0.043 -0.240* 0.087 0.101 -0.069 -0.033 
 
(0.116) (0.126) (0.103) (0.100) (0.070) (0.080) 
A*ABM 0.040 -0.082 0.035 0.123 -0.027 0.038 
 
(0.121) (0.133) (0.107) (0.090) (0.080) (0.072) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 833 498 833 498 948 540 
Pseudo R2 0.069   0.074 0.117  0.170   0.076  0.185 
Marginal effects from probit regression. RBM is relative benchmark. ABM is absolute benchmark. 
Pt. 1 (part 1) refers to rounds 1-6, pt.2 refers to rounds 7-10.  Controls include: age, sex, risk 
preference, self-reported personality traits and financial product preferences. Clustered robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The previous result can be attributed to the fact that, in comparison to the ABM 
treatment, the RBM treatment reduced the number of decision tasks in which were 
no choice was made. This effect was statistically significant during the latter 
stages of the experiment, with a reduction of approximately 10 percentage points, 
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as outlined in the result in table 6.8, column 6. Relative to the ABM treatment, the 
RBM treatment does not have a significant effect on the probability of subjects 
selecting the best or worst options. 
 
Table 6.7 Treatment effects relative vs. absolute benchmarks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Payoff Payoff (net) 
 
Pt. 1 Pt. 2 Pt. 1 Pt. 2 
Advice 1.421*** 0.482 0.667 -0.204 
 
(0.468) (0.445) (0.451) (0.455) 
RBM -0.410 0.640 -0.347 0.778* 
 
(0.466) (0.471) (0.442) (0.460) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 568 337 568 337 
R2 0.084 0.125 0.075 0.158 
Estimates from OLS regressions. RBM is relative benchmark. Pt. 1 (part 1) refers to rounds 1-6, pt.2 
refers to rounds 7-10.  Controls include: age, sex, risk preference, self-reported personality traits and 
financial product preferences. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6.8 Treatment effects relative vs. absolute benchmarks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Choice best Choice worst No choice 
 
Pt. 1 Pt. 2 Pt. 1 Pt. 2 Pt. 1 Pt. 2 
Advice 0.160*** 0.037 -0.157*** -0.043 -0.038 -0.050* 
 
(0.050) (0.055) (0.038) (0.030) (0.034) (0.030) 
RBM -0.016 0.047 0.035 -0.045 -0.032 -0.107*** 
 
(0.051) (0.055) (0.041) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 568 337 568 337 636 362 
(Pseudo) R2  0.072  0.096  0.088  0.164  0.156  0.322 
Marginal effects from probit regressions. RBM is relative benchmark. Pt. 1 (part 1) refers to rounds 
1-6, pt.2 refers to rounds 7-10.  Controls include: age, sex, risk preference, personality traits and 
product preferences. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses,  
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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We now turn to the hypothesis that benchmarks lower demand for advice. To test 
this, we estimate a probit model in which we regress the dummy variable which 
indicates whether subjects purchased advice (1=purchased advice, 0=did not 
purchase advice) on the benchmark treatments. Results are presented in table 6.9. 
We find that absolute benchmarks have a marginally positive effect on demand for 
advice (column 1), whereas relative benchmarks do not have such an effect 
(column 2). However, when we compare the effect of the absolute to relative 
benchmarks we find that the difference is not statistically significant (column 3). 
Overall we thus find no significant effect of benchmarks on demand for advice.  
 
Table 6.9 Treatment effects relative vs. absolute benchmarks on advice demand  
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Absolute vs.  
none 
Relative vs. 
none 
Absolute vs. 
Relative 
Benchmark 0.140* 0.111 0.080 
 
(0.073) (0.111) (0.062) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.319 0.288 0.345 
Observations 500 510 510 
Marginal effects of probit regression. Dependent variable is if subjects purchased advice (1=yes) 
Controls for round (pre. vs post round 6), age, sex, risk attitude, self-reported personality and product 
preferences. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses,***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
6.5 Discussion  
In this experiment we investigate how different kinds of choice 
architectures affect the quality of decision-making in complex choices. Subjects 
are presented a series of decision-tasks where they are asked to select the cheapest 
of four products that each consist of five cost-components. In addition, a time 
constraint of 30 seconds is imposed to increase the cognitive load. This setup 
serves to simulate complex choices that are ubiquitous in economic life, for 
example selecting a complex financial product such as a mortgage, which often 
has numerous cost-components and small print conditions.  
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In our experiment we compare the effect of two types of interventions. In 
the benchmarks treatments subjects are informed about “market averages” of each 
attribute, where the values for the various cost-components are expressed either in 
absolute deviation from or relative to the “market average” set to one hundred. In 
the advice treatments subjects can receive information regarding the sub-
optimality of some of the options at a fixed cost. 
Our results indicate that absolute benchmarks do not affect quality of 
decision-making. In contrast, relative benchmarks do improve decision quality. 
This result builds on previous studies that show that information processing and 
decision-making can be steered by modifying attribute salience (Jarvenpaa, 1990; 
Lurie and Mason, 2007; Mandel and Johnson, 2002). The findings in our study 
suggest that relative benchmarks improve decision quality by making optimal and 
suboptimal cost-components more salient, enabling subjects to rank products in 
terms of their respective number of optimal and suboptimal cost-components. In 
particular, our findings align with Samek et al. (2016) who find that allowing users 
to see the ranking of all features of a product improves the quality of decision 
making in complex choices. In a similar vein, our results align with Ericson and 
Starc, (2016) who show that the standardization of health insurance plans leads 
consumers to more accurately differentiate between choice options, but also that 
changes in the choice set are complementary to changes in the information 
interface. 
Furthermore, we find that relative benchmarks not only affect decision 
quality, but also decision quantity, i.e. the probability that any of the four products 
is selected within the imposed time constraint. In line with results about decision 
quality, we find that the probability of a decision being made at all increases as 
products become more dissimilar in terms of the number of optimal and 
suboptimal attributes. This finding is line with previous studies that show that 
choice architecture can counter the problem of “choice inertia” without limiting 
the size of the choice set (Besedeš et al., 2015b). In light of the policy debate on 
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benchmarks and standard products our results allow for the tentative conclusion 
that their potential positive effect will depend on the specificities of the 
presentation and on product complexity and variety. Providing or imposing a 
(relative) benchmark is most likely to be effective in markets where a wide range 
of products with widely different attributes are being sold (i.e. phone contracts, 
health and pension plans and mortgages).  
Our results furthermore indicate that the option to buy information 
improves the quality of decision making. This finding suggests that financial 
advice – in the absence of misalignment of incentives between advisor and client – 
can be beneficial for consumers.  
In addition, we test how benchmarks affected the demand for advice. This 
research question is inspired by the fact that consumers that face complex financial 
choices, such as purchasing a mortgage, commonly have the option of purchasing 
advice from financial experts. Our results indicate that the provision of relative 
benchmarks does not affect the demand for costly information whilst absolute 
benchmarks have a marginally significant positive effect on the demand for 
advice.  
The results regarding the positive effect of the costly advice treatment 
should be interpreted with caution. In particular, it is to be noted that our 
operationalization of the costly information treatments differs from real-life advice 
purchasing in two important aspects. In our treatments, subjects were given the 
option to pay in order to have two of the three suboptimal options being revealed 
as such. In contrast to real-life advice purchasing, subjects had to make their 
purchase decision before the actual choice set was revealed. Moreover, this 
information was not provided by another person, but directly by the computer. As 
such, agency problems and trust between advisor and advisee should not play a 
role in our experiment whereas such factors have been shown to significantly 
affect demand for advice in real markets (Bonaccio and Dalal, 2006; Inderst and 
Ottaviani, 2012). Still, by offering trustworthy advice of a known quality (two 
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options will be eliminated), we have established that such advice would improve 
decision making across the board and if anything is complementary, not substitute 
to (relative) benchmarks.  
 In sum, our study shows that decision-making in complex choices can be 
improved through benchmarks if these are presented in relative terms. 
Furthermore, we show that such benchmarks have limited effect on demand for 
advice. This being the first study on benchmarks in the context of complex 
choices, further research is warranted to replicate our results in different contexts 
and subject pools, explore the role of contextual factors in this process, and to shed 
more light on the psychological mechanisms by which relative benchmarks aid 
decision-making. Moreover, to increase external validity, several subsequent steps 
could be taken. In a first step, our lab experiment could be repeated with a subject 
pool of representative financial services consumers. In case our findings are 
confirmed, a field experiment may be conducted to focus on complex financial 
decision making without time pressure, allowing for heterogeneous preferences 
and risk attitudes, and possibly also introducing the element of trust in financial 
advice. 
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Appendix 6.I Experiment screens 
Figure A1 - Sample choice screen CONTROL 
 
 
Figure A2 - Sample choice screen ADVICE 
 
 
Figure A3 - Sample choice screen ABSOLUTE AVERAGE
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Figure A4 - Sample choice screen ADVICE ABSOLUTE AVERAGE 
 
 
Figure A5 - Sample choice screen RELATIVE AVERAGE 
 
 
Figure A6 - Sample choice screen ADVICE RELATIVE AVERAGE 
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Figure A7 - Choice screen Lottery 
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Appendix 6.2 Instructions  
No advice treatments 
Welcome to this experiment! 
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS AND THE INSTRUCTIONS ON YOUR 
SCREEN VERY CAREFULLY AS IT WILL AFFECT YOUR PERFORMANCE AND PROFITS 
IN THIS EXPERIMENT. 
 
The experiment 
The experiment consists of three parts. In the first part you have to repeatedly choose a product. 
During the second part of the experiment you are asked to choose repeatedly in which lottery you 
want to take part. The last part of the experiment is a questionnaire. 
 
Part 1: Choosing the optimal financial product 
In the first part of this experiment you are presented a table with four different products (product A, 
B, C and D) and your goal is to select the optimal product. The optimal product is the product with 
the lowest total costs.  
 
Suppose the different products are financial products and that the maturity time of each product is 
one year. This means that you buy the product for a period of one year. The total costs of the 
products are not given, however you are presented with four different sub costs and a tax deduction 
of each product:  
1. Starting costs: you have to pay these costs once when you buy the product. 
2. Monthly costs: these are monthly costs which you have to pay every month for the duration 
of one year. 
3. Maturity costs: costs that have to be paid at the end of your contract. 
4. Management fee (presented as a percentage of starting costs): fee is paid once 
5. Tax deduction (presented as a percentage of monthly costs): a tax saving once a year 
 
These costs will be presented in a table similar to Table 1. 
Table 1 
 
 
Knowing only the sub costs of all four products, it is your task to determine within 30 seconds which 
product is the optimal product. The time limit is presented in the upper right corner of your screen. If 
you do not choose a product within this time constraint, the computer will automatically choose the 
product with the highest total costs.  
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Payoff of Part 1 
Your payoff depends on how well you make your decisions. You will be informed about how well 
you made your decisions only at the end of this part of the experiment. You are given an initial 
endowment of €8 and profits will be added to this when you choose optimal products and money will 
be deducted if you choose suboptimal products. At the end of the experiment the computer will 
randomly select one decision round and your decision in that specific round determines your payoff.  
 
Decision Payoff 
Optimal + €5 
Second best + €2.50 
Second worst -  €2.50 
Worst -  €5 
 
Screen instructions 
This hand-out sheet provides you with general information for the experiment. More specific 
information will be shown on your screen at the start of the experiment. Read these specific 
instructions very carefully as they influence your investment decisions.  
 
Part 2: Lottery 
In this part of the experiment 10 pairs of lotteries are presented to you and you have to choose in 
which lottery you want to take part in, lottery A or B. There is no time constraint in this part of the 
experiment. 
 
Payoff of Part 2 
The payoff you will receive in this part of the experiment is an extra payoff on top of what you 
already earned in the first part. The payoff depends on the lottery you participate in and on the 
outcome of the lottery. The outcome of the lottery is randomly decided by the computer. Also the 
payoff period is randomly determined. At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly 
select one of the pairs of lotteries and your decision for that specific pair determines your payoff. The 
possible payoffs are €3, €1.50, €1 and €0.  
 
Part 3: Questionnaire 
At the end of the experiment there will be a questionnaire for you to fill in. Please take your time and 
fill in this questionnaire truthfully. In the meantime we will prepare your payments from the previous 
parts of the experiment.   
 
Good luck! 
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Advice treatments 
Welcome to this experiment! 
 
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS AND THE INSTRUCTIONS ON YOUR 
SCREEN VERY CAREFULLY AS IT WILL AFFECT YOUR PERFORMANCE AND PROFITS 
IN THIS EXPERIMENT. 
 
The experiment 
The experiment consists of three parts. In the first part you have to repeatedly choose a product. 
During the second part of the experiment you are asked to choose repeatedly in which lottery you 
want to take part. The last part of the experiment is a questionnaire. 
Part 1: Choosing the optimal financial product 
In the first part of this experiment you are presented a table with four different products (product A, 
B, C and D) and your goal is to select the optimal product. The optimal product is the product with 
the lowest total costs.  
 
Suppose the different products are financial products and that the maturity time of each product is 
one year. This means that you buy the product for a period of one year. The total costs of the 
products are not given, however you are presented with four different sub costs and a tax deduction 
of each product:  
1. Starting costs: you have to pay these costs once when you buy the product. 
2. Monthly costs: these are monthly costs which you have to pay every month for the duration 
of one year. 
3. Maturity costs: costs that have to be paid at the end of your contract. 
4. Management fee (presented as a percentage of starting costs): fee is paid once 
5. Tax deduction (presented as a percentage of monthly costs): a tax saving once a year 
 
These costs will be presented in a table similar to Table 1. 
Table 1 
 
 
Knowing only the sub costs of all four products, it is your task to determine within 30 seconds which 
product is the optimal product. The time limit is presented in the upper right corner of your screen. If 
you do not choose a product within this time constraint, the computer will automatically choose the 
product with the highest total costs.  
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Buying advice 
Before the above table is shown you will be offered the opportunity to buy advice. The price of 
advice is €2.50 and this will be deducted from the payoff if you decide to buy advice. Buying advice 
will significantly increase your chances of choosing the optimal product, as the least optimal product 
is automatically eliminated and also another suboptimal product is indicated. This leaves you with 
only two options. Please note that advice is bought for each round separately. Buying advice in round 
1 will only provide you with advice for round 1. The choice to buy advice in round 2 will again be 
presented prior to round 2.   
 
Payoff of Part 1 
Your payoff depends on how well you make your decisions. You will be informed about how well 
you made your decisions only at the end of this part of the experiment. You are given an initial 
endowment of €8 and profits will be added to this when you choose optimal products and money will 
be deducted if you choose suboptimal products. At the end of the experiment the computer will 
randomly select one decision round and your decision in that specific round determines your payoff.  
 
Decision Payoff 
(with advice) 
Optimal + €2.50 
Second best + €0 
Second worst -  €5 
Worst -  €7.50 
 
Screen instructions 
This hand-out sheet provides you with general information for the experiment. More specific 
information will be shown on your screen at the start of the experiment. Read these specific 
instructions very carefully as they influence your investment decisions.  
 
Part 2: Lottery 
In this part of the experiment 10 pairs of lotteries are presented to you and you have to choose in 
which lottery you want to take part in, lottery A or B. There is no time constraint in this part of the 
experiment. 
Payoff of Part 2 
The payoff you will receive in this part of the experiment is an extra payoff on top of what you 
already earned in the first part. The payoff depends on the lottery you participate in and on the 
outcome of the lottery. The outcome of the lottery is randomly decided by the computer. Also the 
payoff period is randomly determined. At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly 
select one of the pairs of lotteries and your decision for that specific pair determines your payoff. The 
possible payoffs are €3, €1.50, €1 and €0.  
Part 3: Questionnaire 
At the end of the experiment there will be a questionnaire for you to fill in. Please take your time and 
fill in this questionnaire truthfully. In the meantime we will prepare your payments from the previous 
parts of the experiment.   
 
Good luck! 
Decision Payoff 
(without advice) 
Optimal + €5 
Second best + €2.50 
Second worst -  €2.50 
Worst -  €5 
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Appendix 6.3 Survey Instruments 
To measure preferences for financial products we used the following set of 
questions as developed by the Dutch Authority for Financial Markets (AFM)36. 
Respondents are asked to indicate whether they indicate more with the statements 
on the left or the right of the screen, using a seven-point scale. 
 
I acquire a lot of information   ∘∘∘∘∘∘∘ I try to limit the amount of information 
I spend a lot of time on it   ∘∘∘∘∘∘∘ I try to do it as fast as possible 
I consider all alternatives   ∘∘∘∘∘∘∘ I consider only a limited number of alternatives 
I research as much as possible on my own   ∘∘∘∘∘∘∘ I prefer that others do the research for me 
I trust advisors or intermediaries easily   ∘∘∘∘∘∘∘ I do not blindly trust the advice of advisors or agents 
I talk a lot about it with friends and family ∘∘∘∘∘∘∘ I do not talk about it with friends and family 
I search until I have found the best product   ∘∘∘∘∘∘∘ I stop searching when I find a satisfying product 
I am willing to make a bet   ∘∘∘∘∘∘∘ I play as much as possible on safe 
I like to try new products   ∘∘∘∘∘∘∘ I stay with the familiar products 
I prefer a simple product   ∘∘∘∘∘∘∘ It may also be a more complicated product 
 
To measures personality traits we used a ten-item version of Big Five Inventory, 
where subjects asked to indicate their agreement with the following statements 
(Rammstedt and John, 2007)37: 
 
I see myself as someone who.. disagree 
strongly 
disagree  disagree 
a little 
neither 
disagree 
nor agree 
agree a 
litle 
agree  agree 
strongly 
..is generally trusting (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
..tends to be lazy (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
..is relaxed, handles stress well (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
..has few artistic interests (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
..is outgoing sociable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
..tends to find fault with others (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
..does a thorough job (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
..gets nervous easily (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
..has an active imagination (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
                                                     
36 AFM (2004, December). Rapport: Kennismaking met de financiële consument. Retrieved from: 
https://www.afm.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/rapporten/2005/kennismaking-met-financiele-consument 
37 Due to a software problem, the results from the first BFI-10 survey question where not stored. 
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Chapter 7  
Conclusion 
 
 
 
7.1 Overview 
Why do humans behave selfishly in some cases and selflessly in other cases? 
These understanding of these so-called “social preferences” is relevant to many 
economic phenomena such as financial fraud and charitable donations. This 
dissertation presents five experimental studies about the drivers of social 
preferences, with a particular focus on bounded rationality. In particular, these 
studies focus on how social preferences are shaped by culture, beliefs and choice 
architecture. The studies presented in this dissertation apply lab-, online- and field-
experiments, which are increasingly recognized as complementary methods for 
studying the mechanisms of economic behavior (Charness and Fehr, 2015; Levitt 
and List, 2009).  The studies use data on knowledge, beliefs and attitudes as 
measured with surveys and vignettes, as well as behavioral data obtained through 
incentived economic games and field observations. Where possible, different data 
sources are triangulated to test robustness and investigate the interplay between 
knowledge, beliefs, attitudes and behaviors (Jick, 1979).  Subjects in these 
experiments include university students, bank employees, entrepreneurs and 
professionals in charitable organizations. Inspired by the vision of a unified 
science of behavior (Gintis, 2007) and employing methods from economics and 
psychology, this dissertation aims to contribute to a model of behavior which 
accounts for our inherent sociality and bounded rationality (Thaler, 2017). 
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7.2 Main conclusions  
Ethics interventions and bank employee behavior 
Chapter 2 presents a study about the effect of an interactive ethics program on the 
behavior of front-office bank employees vis-à-vis their clients. Applying a field 
experiment and a  novel mystery shopping method the study yield three main 
conclusions. First, in the majority of cases the bank employees did not provide 
advice which placed the clients’ interest central. This indicates that despite the fact 
that banks and governments have taken various policy measures, the financial 
sector is still facing a challenge with placing the client first. Second, the program 
did not have a statistically significant effect on employee behavior vis-à-vis the 
clients. This result is robust to several model specifications and holds both in 
terms of actual observed advice and in terms of the mystery shoppers subjective 
perception of the bank employees’ attitude towards the client.  Furthermore, the 
ex-post survey indicates that the program did not have significant effect on 
employees beliefs and attitudes regarding ethical behavior. Third, when comparing 
shops with high vs. low variance in pre-existing levels of client-focused behavior 
it is found that the program actually had a significantly negative effect for the 
former group, while for the group the effect is moderately positive – particularly 
among shops with lower average levels of pre-existing ethicality. These results 
suggest that the program, whilst having the potential to promote an ethical culture, 
may have inadvertently provided a platform for less ethical employees to exert a 
negative influence on their colleagues. In sum, these results suggests details matter 
in developing ethics programs for the financial sector. Further testing of other 
approaches, which is discussed in the next section, is thus warranted. 
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Professional expertise and biased fund allocation 
Chapter 3 presents a study about professional expertise and the allocation of funds 
to charitable projects.  Lab experiments with students show that subjects typically 
prefer to support projects that save larger relative numbers of lives, even if 
alternative projects can save larger absolute numbers of lives. We ask ourselves 
whether this bias to support projects that help large relative but small absolute 
numbers of lives is also displayed by people with expertise working in the 
charitable and social sector. This questions is relevant because many charitable 
funds are not allocated to the projects that could save most lives, and this 
discrepancy might be partly caused by the reference group bias in professionals 
that allocate these funds. Using a survey experiment with vignettes, we find that 
students and professionals are equally susceptible to this bias. Furthermore, we 
find that this bias is reduced when projects are evaluated not separately but in 
pairs. These result suggest that the reference group bias is not very sensitive to 
professional experience. In terms of practical relevance, this study suggests that 
joint- rather than separate evaluation of projects can contribute to funds being 
more effectively targeted. 
 
Free will belief and altruism 
Chapter 4 presents a study about charitable giving and the role of people’s belief 
in free will. This study builds on previous research which indicates that when 
belief is undermined people are more likely to cheat for personal gain. This study 
shows that that reducing of belief in free will indeed leads to reduced donations. 
However, the study also shows that this effect does not occur for religious 
subjects. This result is linked to the fact that religious people associate with norms 
that provide a moral imperative to help the poor. Consequently, it is argued that 
this subgroup is less susceptible to the effects of reduced belief in free will. In 
sum, this study extends the literature about the role of free will beliefs in altruistic 
behavior and suggests these effects depend on religiosity and social norms.  
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Ambiguity and choosing for others 
Chapter 5 presents a study about decisions that people make for others, and the 
role of ambiguity in such “other-decisions”. The subjects, IT entrepreneurs in 
Bangladesh were presented with a description of two business trainings, which if 
followed would result either in certain yet small salary increase or a large salary 
increase with unknown probability, i.e. the ambiguous case. Some subjects were 
asked to make these choices for themselves while others chose on behalf of a 
colleague. The results indicate that attitudes towards ambiguity were not 
significantly different for self- vs. other-choices. However, we do find 
significantly lower ambiguity aversion for other-choices in the subset of subjects 
that believed the winning probability was below 50% for the ambiguous case. In 
sum, the findings suggest that uptake of new knowledge technologies with 
uncertain benefits may be greater when such decisions are delegated to others. 
 
Complex decisions and choice architecture 
Chapter 6 presents an experiment about so-called complex choices, where people 
face multiple options that each consist of multiple attributes. Such complex 
choices are common in economic life, for example when consumers decide 
between mortgages and health insurance policies. In this lab experiments subjects 
are incentivized to select – under time pressure – the cheapest product from a list 
of products that each consist of multiple cost components. The treatment consists 
of subjects being presented with so-called “benchmark products” which provide a 
market average for each cost component. In one benchmark treatment attribute 
values were presented in absolute terms, while in the “relative benchmark” 
attribute values were expressed in relative terms to the market average which was 
set at 100. The results indicate that the relative but not the absolute benchmark 
leads to improved decisions. In turn, this suggests that a simple and low-cost 
information framing intervention can help consumers make improved decisions in 
complex choices.   
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7.3 Suggestions for future research 
Prosociality and bounded rationality 
This dissertation provides a number of suggestions for future research that pertain 
to the topic prosociality and how this is influenced by bounded rationality and 
cognitive biases. With respect to chapter 2 about bank employees behavior vis-à-
vis clients, it would be interesting to use a similar audit methodology to investigate 
the effectiveness of ethics reminders. Whereas the specific context of this study 
resulted in low compliance with the so-called “ethical client greeting”, whereby 
employees were instructed to use a particular slogan when greeting clients, simple 
“moral reminders” can be effective in promoting integrity (Shu et al., 2012). 
Various other types of reminders may have potential in the context of the banking 
sector. For example, employees may be requested to use a word with moral 
connotations when logging into their computer. A related strategy could be to send 
daily moral reminders to employees’ phone or show pop-up messages on their 
computer screen. Such an approach has been shown to be effective in promoting 
empathy and prosocial behavior (Konrath et al., 2015). As for group meetings, 
while these seem to have potential for promoting ethical behavior, there seems to 
be a risk of “contagion” of unethical norms. To counter this it may be useful to 
experiment with group sessions that are led by vocal employees that have a record 
for their commitment towards clients and who can inspire less client-oriented 
peers to adjust their behavior. 
Another related line for future research pertains to the role of cognitive 
biases in the allocation of charitable funds. In this context, one potentially 
interesting extension is to investigate experts’ susceptibility to other biases such as 
the aversion to high overhead costs. Although our findings and previous studies – 
such as Kahneman and Klein (2009) – suggest that expertise is not associated with 
reduced susceptibility to various cognitive biases, there are also studies that do 
identify differences between novice and expert decision-making (Kaustia and 
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Knüpfer, 2008). Thus it remains an open questions whether professionals in the 
charitable sector are susceptible to other cognitive biases and to what extent this 
stands in the way of more effective allocation of funds to social projects. 
Furthermore, the finding that joint evaluation significantly reduced susceptibility 
to the reference group bias – as well as other findings, such as the result that subtle 
differences in framing can reduce donors’ irrational aversion to overhead costs 
(Gneezy et al., 2014) – suggests that small changes in the choice architecture can 
promote more effective fund allocation. It would be interesting to explore other 
applications of this principle, for example the portioning the choice set in smaller 
subsets, which has been shown to improve decision making in complex consumer 
choices (Besedeš et al., 2015).  
 
Prosociality and beliefs 
Next, this dissertation investigates the implications of beliefs on prosocial 
behaviors, in particular in chapter 4 which concerns how belief in free will 
influences charitable donations. A potential avenue for future research is to 
investigate whether the interaction of free will beliefs and religion-based 
adherence to helping norms also extends to secular philosophies that promote 
helping norms, such as August Comte’s  “religion of humanity” which holds 
altruism as a central pillar (Comte, 1852). Another open question concerns the 
duration of the behavioral effects induced through priming free will disbelief. 
Whereas our experiment measured altruism directly after subjects were exposed to 
the reading task it remains unclear whether changes in beliefs and subsequent 
behaviors are longer-lasting.  Furthermore, it might be interesting to investigate 
the behavioral effect of more intensive and frequent exposure to ideas that could 
undermine the belief in free will, for example in the case of students participating 
in a course about neuroscience.  
In addition, this study also raises the question how beliefs about free will 
influence people’s attribution of responsibility to others? Whereas our result and 
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the previous literature has focused on the way in which free will disbelief can 
provide people with a “motivated reason” to justify their own selfish tendencies, it 
could also be argued that free will disbelief influences considerations about the 
responsibility and agency of others. Whereas a person with strong belief in will 
and personal agency might conclude that a homeless person has only himself to 
blame for his predicament, someone whose belief in free will and agency has been 
undermined may consider this homeless person a victim of circumstances.  It 
could be interesting to explore the behavioral effects of exposure to messages that 
highlight how the agency and free will of “victims” is constrained by forces 
outside of their control. Such a study would tie into a broader research agenda 
about the role of “just world beliefs” in shaping redistributive and political 
preferences (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006) and how such beliefs and preferences 
differ across cultures (Frank et al., 2015).  
 
Bounded rationality and individual decisions 
Finally, there are a number of suggestions for future research pertaining to 
bounded rationality and decisions where there are no direct tradeoffs between the 
self and others. Regarding chapter 5, one avenue for future research would be to 
investigate self-other differences in the context of incentivized decisions. There is 
already one recent incentived lab-experiment that shows no significant self-other 
differences in ambiguity attitudes (König-Kersting and Trautmann, 2016b), and 
extensions into relevant field settings would make a welcome contribution to this 
knowledge base. Furthermore, it would be interesting to explore the role of 
perceived social distance towards the “other” in self-other choices in the domain 
of risk and uncertainty.  Whereas our study found no difference in ambiguity 
attitudes between choices made for hypothetical others that were socially closer (a 
befriended colleague) vs. more distant (an unknown colleague), various other 
studies suggest that social distance is associated with reduced levels of risk 
aversion (Sun et al., 2017); impatience (Ziegler and Tunney, 2012) and loss 
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aversion (Andersson et al., 2013). It is suggested that when choosing for others 
that are further removed socially, emotions such impatience and fear play a lesser 
role compared to self-choices, which in turn leads to decisions that are more 
rational in terms of maximizing expected utility.  
Finally, the experiment presented in chapter 6 raises various questions. 
The main finding that relative but not absolute benchmarks improve decision 
quality suggests that subjects were steered towards using the heuristic of between-
product comparisons of attributes, rather than calculating costs for each separate 
products, as such comparisons are arguably easier in the relative framing. 
However, there may also be choice environments where such a heuristic is 
suboptimal, for example when certain cost components constitute a 
disproportionate fraction of total product cost. In such situations, a heuristic of 
counting per product the number optimally priced attributes may result in 
suboptimal decisions. Experiments with variation in cost function parametrization 
can shed more light on this question. Another avenue for future research would be 
to replicate this study with a sample of non-student subjects. Since numerical and 
financial literacy arguably plays an important role in complex choices such as in 
our experiment, the benefits of choice architecture interventions such as the 
relative benchmark treatment may be greater in the general population. Field 
extensions, for example in the domain of mortgages, could then be a next step in 
investigating this question. 
7.4 Policy implications for private and public sector 
The studies in this dissertation have a number of tentative implications for 
economic policy. The word tentative is used here because human behavior is 
strongly context-dependent, a point which is discussed in more detail below. As 
such, the results of empirical studies which consider behaviors in a particular 
context should not be extrapolated to other settings without caution. This being 
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said, the results of this dissertation have several implications for practitioners and 
policymakers.  
 
Putting behavioral assumptions to the experimental test 
First, the overall findings fit into the increasingly agreed-upon view that humans 
are neither fully rational nor fully selfish. This in turn implies that policymakers 
involved in modelling and predicting economic processes at the macro-level 
would benefit from accounting for these deviations from the classical assumptions 
of a fully rationality and self-interested homo economicus, which is still a central 
model for many policymakers.   
Next, this dissertation support the increasingly popular notion that field 
experimentation is a valuable tool for policymakers and practitioners that aim to 
influence human behavior. In recent years, various governments have started more 
systematic efforts to conduct behavioral experiments in order to improve policy 
effectiveness, with the notable example of the British “Behavioral Insights Team” 
whose experiments have resulted in improved policies in the domains of health, 
consumer finance, education and energy sustainability. The Netherlands is 
following a similar trend, with a network of behavioral scientists working within- 
and with ministries to experimentally test and improve policies in various domains 
(Dur, 2017).   
The rationale for this “evidence-based policy” approach is that many 
observational research fails to provide accurate estimates of the causal effect of 
policies due to unobservable differences between people exposed and not exposed 
to a policy. Such observable differences can be particularly relevant in the 
behavioral domain, for example if more motivated people self-select into a certain 
policy. This endogeneity problem can be solved by random assignment, as applied 
in lab- and field experiments, and sometimes by quasi-experimental methods that 
exploit variation around a precise cut-off, for example in education policies where 
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students with grades above a threshold are eligible for scholarships to study abroad 
(Oosterbeek and Webbink, 2011). 
In recent years, field experiments firms have also become more popular in 
firms (Bandiera et al., 2011; Delfgaauw et al., 2013; Levitt and Neckermann, 
2014), which increasingly wish to understand the causal effects of their activities 
(Maas and Liket, 2011). 
However, given the inherent context specificity of field experiments 
policymakers should not take results from individual studies as ultimate truths. For 
example, while our field experiment indicates that an ethics program has limited 
effects on the behavior of bank employees, it may well be that in another context – 
for example a context with less within-group variation – such a program could in 
fact be more effective. It thus seems appropriate for policymakers and 
practitioners to closely work together to develop, test and improve policies and 
interventions up to the smallest details. Furthermore, by conducting multiple 
experiments with similar interventions across different contexts a better 
understanding can be gained of the robustness of the effect of such policies. A 
notable example here pertains to policies to promote access to financial services 
for people in low-income countries. It was long thought that the provision of loans 
to low-income groups in developing countries would greatly reduce poverty, for 
example by helping people to start up their own business. The promise of this so-
called “microfinance” movement, for which Muhammad Yunus received the 2016 
Nobel prize, was put to the test in a number of field experiments across different 
countries and borrower groups. A recent review of six of these studies concluded 
that – despite initial enthusiasm from policymakers,  practitioners and academics – 
the microfinance programs only showed moderate effects (Banerjee et al., 2015).  
This finding in turn can help policymakers in allocating scarce resources to 
development programs. Similarly, it would be valuable to conduct multiple field 
experiments around interventions to promote ethical behavior in the financial 
195 
 
sector, such that policymakers and practitioners learn which type of interventions 
are most promising.  
 On a related note, it is also worth stressing here that people do not all 
behave and respond to policies and interventions in a similar manner. As Albert 
Camus said “we are all special cases”. The results from this dissertation align with 
this basic idea: different subgroups responded differently to programs in the field 
(see chapter 2) and treatments in the lab (see chapters 4 and 5). At the same time, 
experimentation with different groups of subjects can also help in discrediting 
common-sense ideas such as the notion that professionals are less susceptible to 
certain cognitive biases (see chapter 3). This all goes to show that policymakers 
would benefit from testing their cherished ideas, policies and preconceptions, 
whilst maintaining a critical perspective regarding the universality of findings 
from individual studies. While in the context of well-controlled physics 
experiments Einstein rightly pointed out that “…[no] amount of experimentation 
can ever prove me right; a single experiment can prove me wrong”, it may take a 
few more experiments in different settings, with different subject populations, to 
firmly reject the rational for economic policies. All the same, the bottom line is 
that the evidence should have the final word, and policymakers should reject or 
adjust policies which are shown – by experiment – to be ineffective. 
 
Promoting prosocial behavior 
Next, this dissertation provides a number of concrete policy implications regarding 
the promotion of prosocial behavior in various segments of the economy. The 
results from chapter 2 suggest that misconduct in the financial sector, in particular 
behavior whereby clients’ interests are not placed central, is still prevalent, despite 
the various policy measures that have been taken in recent years. This should 
motivate practitioners to test other measures to promote such client-focused 
behavior. Since the ethics training program tested in our experiment had limited 
success, and was even contra-productive for part of the bank shops, it is desirable 
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to test other approaches which are less sensitive to contagion of social norms by 
employees that are less concerned about the client. An example of such an 
alternative policy worth testing is the use of frequent ethical reminders that can be 
delivered to employees in a personal manner, for example through their mobile 
phone. The findings in chapter 3 indicate that charitable funds may be more 
effectively allocated if donors and professionals in charitable organizations 
evaluate projects not in isolation but rather in a comparative manner. This way, it 
becomes easier for decision-makers to identify which projects yield the greatest 
benefits in absolute terms.   Finally, the results from chapter 4 suggest that beliefs 
about agency and free will shape people’s willingness to help others. For 
policymakers and organizations that wish to promote support for certain forms of 
redistribution, for example development aid and charitable donations, it may be 
worthwhile to experiment with information and education interventions that 
highlight the limited agency or free will of victims, since this may promote 
support for such policies.  
 
Accounting for bounded rationality 
Subsequently, the results from chapter 5 provide less clear-cut policy 
recommendations, since self-other differences in ambiguity attitudes are only 
observed for a subset of subjects. However, since effects are observed for a 
considerable subset, and because delegated choices that involve uncertainty are 
common in many domains with policy relevance – for example in the case of 
teachers and parents making choices for their children – it would be worth to 
conduct further experiments in this domain. For example, in line with the social 
distance hypothesis, parents may be more inclined than teachers to stimulate their 
children to pursue a study which provides more certainty in terms of career 
perspectives, even though the expected benefit may be smaller.  Finally, the results 
from chapter 6 suggest that policymakers may wish to promote among consumers 
the use of benchmark tools that allow for easier comparison of product features in 
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the context of choices between large numbers of complex products, such as 
mortgages. However, caution is warranted here because the benefit of such tools 
may depend on the weights of the cost components. Either way, it would be 
recommendable to test such tools before large-scale implementation. 
7.5 Epilogue 
A nice thing about applying the scientific method to the study of social preferences 
and bounded rationality is that findings apply not just to others, but also to myself. 
Why do I sometimes behave quite selfishly yet help complete strangers at other 
times? Why do I keep postponing to switch to a better health insurance policy? 
Why do I give rational advice to my friends yet make silly mistakes myself? All 
these questions fall in the domain of behavioral economics, and I feel fortunate 
and thankful for having had the luxury to spend over four years working together 
with inspiring and helpful people to gain a better understanding of such matters. 
In the spirit of the ancient aphorism “know thyself” the writing of this 
dissertation has made me increasingly aware of my own bounded rationality and 
cognitive biases, such as my forgetfulness and tendency to discount or even avoid 
information that is contrary to my beliefs. Luckily, I am also prone to occasional 
over-optimism and self-deception,  so I can maintain a somewhat positive self-
image despite all these shortcomings.  
While there unfortunately still is much selfishness, stupidity and suffering 
in this world, the past years of research have given me hope that there is plenty of 
scope for influencing humans towards smarter and more social decisions. In 
contrast to what is sometimes assumed, our preferences and behaviors are not 
fixed and predestined, but dynamic products of evolution, culture, institutions, 
incentives, policies and interventions. It is my impression that economics and the 
social sciences are only just starting to unravel the fascinating interplay of these 
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factors, and that there are enough interesting problems to keep us busy for the 
foreseeable future. 
Moreover, the bounds to our sociality and rationality are expanding 
rapidly through cultural evolution, scientific advances and the development of new 
forms of intelligence, which can help “mankind 1.0” in gaining a better 
understanding of itself and the world.  How these developments will unfold – and 
how they will influence our beliefs, behaviors and the human condition – remains 
an open question far beyond the scope of this dissertation. For now, it is my hope 
that this dissertation can make a small contribution to a more selfless world in 
which people make better choices for themselves, and for others. 
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Waarom gedragen mensen zich soms onbaatzuchtig en coöperatief, en soms juist 
zeer egoïstisch? Dit is een centrale vraag in de economie. Denk bijvoorbeeld aan 
een verschijnsel als corruptie, waarvan de totale kosten circa 5 procent bedragen 
van het “gross world product” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2014). Tegelijkertijd zijn er genoeg voorbeelden van 
onbaatzuchtigheid, zoals blijkt uit het feit dat Nederlanders in 2015 naar schatting 
5.7 miljard euro doneerden aan goede doelen (Bekkers et al., 2017). Terwijl een 
verschijnsel als corruptie in lijn is met de klassiek economische assumptie van een 
door eigenbelang geleide mens, zijn andere verschijnselen zoals het doneren van 
geld aan vreemden in strijd met dit model van de “homo economicus”.  
Deels kunnen zulke schijnbaar onbaatzuchtige gedragingen gerijmd 
worden met het klassieke model door het verschijnsel van “warm-glow”, waarbij 
mensen zelf een plezierig gevoel overhouden aan het helpen van  anderen, zodat 
dit gedrag indirect toch als zelfzuchtig gezien kan worden (Andreoni, 1990). 
Hiernaast worden vanuit de evolutionaire biologie diverse vormen van altruïsme 
geduid als indirecte vormen van zelfzuchtigheid. Zo kan bijvoorbeeld het helpen 
van bloedverwanten onder bepaalde condities voordelen opleveren voor de eigen 
genen, en hiermee indirect toch weer als zelfzuchtig kwalificeren.  Het helpen van 
een niet-familielid die later weer een wederdienst verleent kan aldus niet als puur 
altruïsme worden beschouwd (Hamilton, 1964; Trivers, 1971).  
Echter, deze theorieën bieden slechts gedeeltelijke verklaringen. Zo geeft 
het warm-glow model geen antwoord op de vraag waarom mensen een plezierig 
gevoel overhouden aan het helpen van vreemden. En de evolutionaire modellen 
van “kin altruism” en “reciprocal altruism” verklaren niet  waarom mensen, zelfs 
in een volledig anonieme context zonder positieve effecten op hun reputatie, 
substantiële hoeveelheden geld doneren aan vreemden. 
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Een meer volledige verklaring van het feit dat mensen soms egoïstisch en 
soms altruïstisch handelen vloeit voort uit de sociale context waarin de mensheid 
is geëvolueerd.  In deze prehistorische context waren groepen met meer onderlinge 
samenwerking en altruïstisch gedrag vaak succesvoller dan groepen van 
egoïstische mensen, bijvoorbeeld bij het jagen op dieren of het strijden met andere 
groepen (Bowles and Gintis, 2011). Tegelijkertijd zijn er voor individuën binnen 
samenwerkende groepen nog steeds voordelen te behalen door zelfzuchtig te 
handelen. Onder zulke condities kan handhaving van de sociale normen worden 
gefaciliteerd door “altruïstisch bestraffen” waarbij mensen non-coöperatieve 
groepsgenoten bestraffen, ondanks het feit dat zij hiermee zelf kosten en risico’s 
lopen (Fehr and Gächter, 2002).  Een cultuur waarin scheefschaatsen wordt 
afgekeurd en bestraft biedt daarmee voordelen voor alle groepsleden. 
Naast deze evolutionaire invloeden (Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Cesarini et 
al., 2009) wordt ons sociaal gedrag ook gevormd door de interactie van onze 
psychologie en onze hedendaagse omgeving. In klassieke economische theorie 
wordt aangenomen dat de mens rationele keuzes maakt en consistente preferenties 
heeft. Zo zou iemand die van ijs houdt meer bereid zijn te betalen voor een grote 
schep ijs dan voor een kleine schep.  Echter, deze assumptie gaat niet altijd op 
omdat mensen beperkte cognitieve capaciteiten (“bounded rationality”) hebben.   
Zo blijkt bijvoorbeeld dat, wanneer de grotere schep ijs in zeer groot bakje 
wordt gedaan en de kleinere schep ijs in een zeer klein bakje, mensen vaak het 
kleine bakje prefereren. De interpretatie van deze “bias” is dat wij moelijker een 
inschatting kunnen maken van absolute hoeveelheden (hoeveel ijs een bakje bevat) 
dan van proporties (hoe vol een bakje zit). Gegevan dat we meer focusen op 
aspecten die gemakkelijker kunnen worden geëvalueerd kan dit leiden tot 
inconsistente keuzepatronen (Bartels, 2006). In een wereld waarin grote bakjes 
meer ijs bevatten kan zo’n vuistregel (“heuristic”)  functioneel zijn, maar in een 
wereld met doorgewinterde ijsverkopers kan dit leiden to economische 
irrationaliteit  (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011; Haselton et al., 2015). 
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De ontdekking van verschillende “cognitive biases” door psychologen en 
economen in de afgelopen decennia heeft de beperkingen van het klassieke model 
van de mens als rationele beslisser blootgelegd, en vormt de basis voor de 
gedragseconomie (Kahneman, 2003; Thaler, 2015). Deze psychologische 
kronkels, die in het verleden wellicht adaptief waren, zorgen ervoor dat mensen 
frequent inconsistente beslissingen nemen die suboptimaal zijn voor henzelf, zoals 
in de ijssalon, maar ook bij meer meer gewichtige beslissingen zoals het kiezen 
van een beleggingsproduct of hypotheek.  Personen die worden gedreven door 
eigenbelang maken geregeld ook gebruik (of beter: misbruik) van de biases van 
anderen, zoals bijvoorbeeld bij adviseurs in de financiële sector (Mullainathan et 
al., 2012).  Ook zijn mensen soms bewust irrationeel en inconsistent in de manier 
waarop ze bepaalde informatie verzamelen en interpreteren, om zo hun incorrecte 
overtuiging in stand te houden en hun zelfzuchtige preferenties  te rechtvaardigen. 
Zo kiezen sommige klimaat-sceptici ervoor om enkel stukken te lezen waarin het 
broeikaseffect wordt ontkent, en kritische artikelen te ontwijken.  Door het bewust 
ontwijken van deze informatie kunnen ze zichzelf bijvoorbeeld laten geloven dat 
ze sociaal handelen wanneer ze met een SUV boodschappen gaan doen(Sweeny et 
al., 2010). 
Hiernaast kunnen sommige cognitieve biases ertoe leiden dat 
onbaatzuchtige mensen keuzes nemen die suboptimaal zijn voor degenen die ze 
willen helpen, bijvoorbeeld  in het bij donaties aan goede doelen. Zo letten veel 
mensen bij het evalueren van een stichting meer op de overhead kosten (een 
proportie) dan op de uiteindelijke effecten die worden bereikt (een absolute 
waarde, bijvoorbeeld het aantal levens dat wordt gered). Het gevolg is dat met 
gedoneerde gelden niet het maximale aantal mensen wordt geholpen (Gneezy et 
al., 2014). 
Voor een belangrijk deel zijn de inzichten over sociale preferenties en 
bounded rationality voortgevloeid uit de “experimentele revolutie” binnen de 
economie. Tot laat in de twintigste eeuw voerde theoretisch onderzoek de 
204 
 
boventoon en was het empirische onderzoek hoofdzakelijk observationeel, 
waardoor causaliteit vaak lastig kon worden onderscheiden van correlatie. Vanaf 
de jaren tachtig  raakte de experimentele benadering geleidelijk in zwang binnen 
de economie (Hamermesh, 2013).  
Met lab-experimenten worden onder zeer gecontroleerde condities de 
mechanismes van economisch gedrag onderzocht. Bij veldexperimenten is er 
minder controle, maar hier staat tegenover dat onderzoek kan worden gedaan in 
een realistische context die moeilijk is te repliceren in het lab. Ook weten 
subjecten in veldexperimenten vaak niet weten dat ze onderdeel zijn van een 
studie, waardoor sociaal wenselijk attitudes en gedragingen en andere vormen van 
“observation bias” kunnen worden vermeden. In recente jaren zijn 
veldexperimenten ook steeds populairder bij overheden, bedrijven en andere 
organisaties die willen begrijpen hoe zij burgers, medewerkers en consumenten 
kunnen “nudgen” richting bepaald gedrag (Dur, 2017; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).  
Ook zijn er in recente jaren diverse experimentele tussenvormen ontstaan, zoals 
het “lab-in-the-field” experiment waarbij een lab-experiment met subjecten in 
andere populaties wordt uitgevoerd, zoals consumenten in ontwikkelingslanden. 
Deze verschillende experimentele methodes zijn complementair en bieden – 
wanneer gecombineerd – inzicht in de robuustheid van de causaliteit en de invloed 
van contextuele factoren (Stoop et al., 2012). 
Deze proefschrift poogt met een vijftal veld- en lab-experimenten een 
bijdrage te leveren aan het antwoord op de vraag waarom mensen zich soms 
onbaatzuchtig en soms juist egoïstisch gedragen. Hierbij staat de rol van cultuur, 
cognitieve biases en bounded rationality centraal. Tevens wordt in de laatste twee 
hoofdstukken gekeken naar individuele keuzes. De contributies van deze studies 
zijn voornamelijk empirisch; hiernaast poogt het eerste hoofdstuk ook een 
methodologische bijdrage te leveren in de vorm van een nieuw instrument om 
klantgericht gedrag van werknemers in de bancaire sector te meten. 
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Hoofdstuk 2 (in samenwerking met Alain Cohn, Ernst Fehr, Karen Maas, 
Helen Toxopeus en Michel Marechal) is gericht op de vraag hoe klantgericht 
gedrag bij bankmedewerkers kan worden gestimuleerd. Deze studie bouwt voort 
op eerder experiment waaruit blijkt dat de cultuur bij banken oneerlijk en 
zelfzuchtig gedrag bij medewerkers in de hand werkt (Cohn et al., 2014). Middels 
een veldexperiment bij alle filialen van een grote commerciële bank wordt het 
effect getoetst van een gedragsinterventie waarbij bankmedewerkers wekelijks met 
elkaar spreken over ethische dilemma’s die zij in hun werk tegenkomen. Het 
klantgericht gedrag van deze  medewerkers word gemeten met een “mystery 
shopping” methode, waarbij acteurs zich voordoen als potentiële klanten en met 
gestandaardiseerde scripts advies van de medewerker over financiële producten 
inwinnen. Elk bankfiliaal is 12 keer bezocht, 6 keer voorafgaand aan het 
programma, en 6 keer tijdens de periode van circa 2 maanden waarin het 
programma werd geïmplementeerd. De mystery shopping scripts waren zo 
geconstrueerd dat het belang van de bankmedewerker (producten verkopen) haaks 
staat op het belang van deze vermeende klant; namelijk om geïnformeerd worden 
over het feit dat deze producten niet geschikt waren, bijvoorbeeld omdat de klant 
het product niet goed begreep. De belangrijkste bevinding is dat dit programma – 
gemiddeld genomen – geen statistisch significant effect had op het klantgericht 
gedrag en dat de meerderheid van bankmedewerkers in hun advies de klant niet 
centraal stellen. Ook blijkt dat het programma een negatief effect had bij filialen 
waar voorafgaand aan het programma meer variatie was in de mate van 
klantgerichtheid. Een mogelijke verklaring hiervoor is dat de groepsgesprekken 
onbedoeld fungeerden als platform voor de dat minder klantgerichte medewerkers 
om de klantgerichtheid van hun collega’s te ondermijnen.  
Hoofdstuk 3 (in samenwerking met Dinand Webbink) gaat over de 
zogenaamde “reference group bias”. Op basis van eerdere lab-experimenten blijkt 
dat de beoordeling van charitatieve projecten sterker wordt beïnvloedt door het 
deel van de populatie die geholpen wordt dan door het absolute aantal mensen 
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(Bartels, 2006). Zo geven de meeste mensen een hogere waardering aan project A 
waarbij in een vluchtelingenkamp van 1.000 personen er 500 mensen worden 
gered (50%) van een levensbedreigende ziekte dan aan een project B met identieke 
kosten waarbij in een vluchtelingenkamp van 10.000 personen er 1.000 mensen 
(10%) worden gered. Dit is irrationeel voor iemand die zoveel mogelijk levens wil 
redden, omdat in project B voor gelijke kosten dubbel zoveel levens worden gered. 
Deze studies zijn echter uitgevoerd met studenten en het is de vraag of 
professionals bij goede doelen en overheidsinstellingen net zo gevoelig voor deze 
bias. We onderzoeken dit met een drietal experimenten met zowel studenten en 
experts. Subjecten krijgen opeenvolgend een aantal hypothetische projecten 
voorgelegd waarbij er variatie is op twee dimensies: (i) het aantal mensen dat 
gered kan worden en  (ii) het totaal aantal mensen in de groep waarvan subgroep 
een onderdeel vormt (de “reference group”). De voornaamste bevinding van deze 
studie is dat beide groepen een vergelijkbare mate van gevoeligheid hebben voor 
deze bias. Hiernaast onderzoeken we of de gevoeligheid voor deze bias kan 
worden verminderd door mensen projecten te laten vergelijken, in plaats van deze 
sequentieel en los van elkaar te evalueren. De intuïtie hierbij is dat men de 
absolute aantallen begunstigden in de projecten onderling kan vergelijken, 
waardoor dit aspect makkelijker kan worden geëvalueerd en vervolgens meer 
gewicht krijgt in de uiteindelijke waardering.  Voor zowel studenten en experts 
leidt deze “joint evaluation” modus inderdaad tot een verminderde gevoeligheid 
voor de reference group bias. Donaties en projectgelden zouden dus waarschijnlijk 
effectiever kunnen worden ingezet wanneer mensen verschillende opties met 
elkaar vergelijken. 
Hoofdstuk 4 (in samenwerking met John Protzko, Kellie Liket en Vera 
Schölmerich) betreft het verschijnsel van “motivated reasoning” en de manier 
waarop zelfzuchtigheid wordt beïnvloedt door ideeën over het bestaan van vrije 
wil.  Deze studie is geïnspireerd op een experiment waaruit blijkt dat mensen 
vaker bereid zijn te liegen voor financiëel gewin nadat ze een tekst hebben gelezen 
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waarin wordt geclaimd dat vrije wil niet bestaat. In deze tekst, een artikel uit het 
populair wetenschappelijk blad “New Scientist” wordt neurowetenschappelijk 
onderzoek aangehaald waaruit zou blijken dat alle keuzes die wij maken worden 
bepaald door onze hersenen en omgevingsfactoren. Subjecten die deze tekst 
hadden gelezen (de treatment groep) waren vervolgens vaker bereid om te liegen 
voor persoonlijk gewin dan subjecten die een neutrale tekst hadden gelezen over 
energie technologie; de controle groep (Vohs and Schooler, 2008). De interpretatie 
van dit resultaat is dat ongeloof in vrije wil mensen een excuus geeft om hun 
zelfzuchtigheid te rechtvaardigen. Voortbouwend hierop vroegen wij onszelf af of 
ongeloof in vrije wil ook altruïstisch gedrag zou ondermijnen. Om dit te testen 
voerden wij via het online platform Amazon mTurk een experiment uit bij N=108 
subjecten in de Verenigde Staten. Bij de treatment groep werd het geloof in vrije 
wil significant gereduceerd door het lezen van het New Scientist artikel. 
Vervolgens speelden subjecten 24 “binary dictator games” waarbij ze een 
geldbedrag op twee manieren konden verdelen tussen zichzelf en een arm persoon 
in een ontwikkelingsland.  Hierbij was er telkens deze keuze tussen een meer en 
minder zelfzuchtige verdeling (bijvoorbeeld alles zelf houden vs. de helft 
weggeven). In lijn met onze verwachting blijkt dat subjecten in de treatment groep 
vaker de meer zelfzuchtige optie kiezen. Echter, voor religieuze subjecten trad dit 
effect niet op. Een mogelijke verklaring hiervoor is dat voor deze subjecten er 
vanuit hun religie een sterkere sociale norm is om geld te geven aan de armen, en 
dat het geloof in vrije wil geen directe effecten heeft op het conformeren aan deze 
norm. In andere woorden, als altruïsme geen keuze is maar een sociale 
verplichting speelt vrije wil – of in elk geval, het geloof daarin - een minder 
belangrijke rol. 
Hoofdstuk 5 (in samenwerking met Karen Maas en Haki Pamuk) gaat over 
de rol van onzekerheid in keuzes die mensen maken voor anderen; hierbij kan 
bijvoorbeeld worden gedacht aan een financieel manager die voor haar klant 
beslist in welke aandelen te investeren.  In de economie wordt een onderscheid 
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gemaakt tussen risico en onzekerheid (Knight, 2012). In het geval van risico zijn 
winsten en kansen bekend, bijvoorbeeld als iemand geblinddoekt 1 knikker mag 
pakken uit een schaal met daarin 50 rode knikkers (ter waarde van 0€) en 50 
blauwe knikkers (ter waarde van 50€). Bij onzekerheid zijn winsten of kansen 
onbekend, bijvoorbeeld als onbekend is hoeveel van de 100 knikkers rood vs. 
blauw zijn. Wanneer ze voor zichzelf kiezen zijn de meeste mensen zowel risico-
avers en onzekerheids-avers: ze prefereren zekere winst (25€) boven 1 
willekeurige knikker uit de “risico schaal”, en ook boven 1 willekeurige knikker 
uit de “onzekerheids-schaal”. Echter, uit een aantal recente experimenten blijkt dat 
risico-aversie verschillend is bij keuzes die mensen maken voor anderen. In 
sommige studies vindt men verlaagde risico-aversie in “other choices” 
(Chakravarty et al., 2011; Polman, 2012) terwijl in andere studies juist een 
tegenovergesteld patroon naar voren komt( Füllbrunn and Luhan, 2015; Kvaløy et 
al., 2014). Deze verschillen worden onder andere toegeschreven aan de 
verantwoordelijkheid die mensen voelen voor anderen, en de risico-preferenties 
die zij op andere projecteren. Op basis van deze resultaten stelden wij onszelf de 
vraag of mensen in het maken van keuzes voor anderen ook andere preferenties 
hebben omtrent onzekerheid . Om dit te onderzoeken voerden wij een “lab-in-the-
field” experiment uit met N=371 ondernemers in Bangladesh. Deze ondernemers 
kregen een aantal vignetten gepresenteerd, waarin diverse trainingsprogramma’s 
werd beschreven. In verband met het feit dat er binnen de Islamitische cultuur in 
Bangladesh een taboe is rondom spelletjes waarbij geld kan worden gewonnen 
maakten wij in deze context gebruik van hypothetische scenario’s. Bij programma 
A had deelname een zekere winst (een salarisverhoging); bij programma B was 
deze winst groter maar risicovol (50% kans), en bij programma C was de winst 
ook groter maar onzeker (onbekende kans). Om een inschatting te maken van de 
mate van risico- en onzekerheidsaversie werd subjecten gevraagd een voorkeur 
aan te geven tussen programma’s A vs. B, en tussen programma’s A vs. C. Aan de 
hand van deze “preference elicitation” methode kon vervolgens ook een 
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inschatting gemaakt worden van de onzekerheids-aversie gecontroleerd voor de 
mate van risico-aversie (Charness and Gneezy, 2010). Sommige subjecten werd 
gevraagd deze keuzes te maken voor zichzelf, terwijl andere subjecten werd 
gevraagd dit te doen voor een collega. Uit de resultaten blijkt dat subjecten 
dezelfde mate van onzekerheids-aversie hebben in keuzes voor zichzelf en keuzes 
voor anderen. Deze bevinding komt overeen met de resultaten van een recent lab-
experiment met studenten in een westerse universiteit.  Echter,  binnen de 
subgroep van subjecten bij een vragenlijst na afloop van het experiment aangaven 
de onzekere kans kleiner in te schatten dan 50% vinden wij een lagere mate van 
onzekerheids-aversie in keuzes voor anderen. Ten slotte blijkt uit dat subjecten 
gemiddeld genomen juist meer risico-avers zijn bij keuzes voor anderen. 
Hoofdstuk 6 (in samenwerking met Mark Sanders en Stephanie 
Rosenkranz) betreft een lab-experiment over zogenaamde “complexe keuzes” 
tussen verschillende financiële producten die elk uit diverse kosten-componenten 
bestaan. Zulke complexiteit speelt bijvoorbeeld bij het kiezen van hypotheken of 
zorgverzekeringen, waar consumenten – geven hun beperkte rationaliteit vaak 
suboptimale keuzes maken (Schram and Sonnemans, 2011). Uit de literatuur blijkt 
dat mensen in zulke situaties geholpen kunnen worden om betere keuzes te maken 
door eenvoudige aanpassingen in de manier waarop de informatie wordt 
gepresenteerd (Besedeš et al., 2015; Samek et al., 2016). Wij testen in dit lab-
experiment met 158 studenten het effect van een nieuwe “keuze hulp” in zulke 
situaties.  Subjecten kregen een reeks matrices te zien van 4 producten bestaande 
uit 5 kosten-attributen. De totale kosten per product konden berekend worden op 
basis van deze attributen. Subjecten konden meer geld verdienen naarmate zij 
goedkopere producten selecteerde. Echter, gegeven de tijdsdruk waaronder deze 
berekening gemaakt moest worden was dit een complexe keuze. In de treatment 
groep kregen studenten een zogenaamd “benchmark product” te zien. Dit bestond 
uit de gemiddelden per attribuut. Er waren twee versies van deze treatment: in de 
ene groep werden deze gemiddelden in absolute termen uitgedrukt (“absolute 
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benchmark treatment”), en voor het andere deel werden de gemiddelden gelijk 
gesteld aan 100, en de waardes voor de overige producten uitgedrukt als 
percentage hiervan (“relative benchmark product”).  Uit de resultaten blijkt dat de 
relatieve- maar niet de absolute benchmarks tot een verbetering van de keuzes 
leidde. Dit suggereert dat consumenten gebaat zijn bij instrumenten waarmee zij 
eenvoudiger zien hoe kosten van verschillende attributen zich verhouden tot het 
marktgemiddelde.  
Samenvattend pogen deze studies nieuwe inzichten te geven in de 
oorzaken, gevolgen en interactie van sociale preferenties en beperkte rationaliteit 
in de context van economische keuzes. Het is mijn hoop dat dit onderzoek een 
kleine bijdrage levert aan een onbaatzuchtiger wereld waarin mensen betere 
keuzes maken voor zichzelf en voor anderen. 
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English summary 
 
Humans sometimes behave very selfishly, yet in other cases they prefer to help 
others. These “social preferences” in turn play a key role in many economic 
phenomena ranging from financial fraud to charitable donations. This dissertation 
presents a series of lab- and field-experiments about the drivers of  social 
preferences, with a particular focus on bounded rationality, culture and beliefs. 
These experiments are conducted in a diverse set of populations, ranging from 
bank employees to entrepreneurs in a developing country to professionals in 
charitable organizations.  The results indicate that humans differ considerably in 
their prosociality. Furthermore, well-intended “nudges” such as a group-level 
ethics training can be ineffective or even cause more selfish behavior. In addition, 
it is shown that people have a tendency to interpret information such to justify 
their selfish tendencies. However, the results also indicate that small changes to 
the manner in which information is presented can cause people to make better 
choices for themselves, and for others. As such, these studies support the notion 
that there is great value in putting conjectures and assumptions about preferences 
and behaviors in the economic domain to the experimental test. 
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